An exploration of lay epidemiology and cancer by Macdonald, Sara


















Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or 
study, without prior permission or charge 
 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 








Sara Macdonald, B.A. (Hons.) 
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
Academic Unit of General Practice and Primary Care 











Some estimates suggest that as much as 70% of cancer is preventable by disease 
modification alone (Peto 1991). Disease prevention via behavioural change is a 
challenging endeavour. There is widespread recognition that for behaviour to be 
better understood there is a need to understand the context in which it occurs, 
and the beliefs that underpin it. Lay epidemiology illustrates the sophistication 
of belief formation. The arrival at a coronary candidate provides according to 
Davison, Frankel and Davey Smith (1991), a cultural mechanism that aids the 
estimation of risk as observed from known cases in the family and wider society. 
Consequently, the estimate provides the potential motivation for behavioural 
choices. Other studies that followed the original model of lay epidemiology have 
similarly described the coronary candidate (Preston 1997; Emslie, Hunt & Watt 
2001a; Frich, Malterud & Fugelli 2007; Weiner 2009) and suggest that the lay 
public have an understanding of the risk profile for Coronary Heart Disease. 
This study aimed to explore the utility of the elements held within lay 
epidemiology in cancer beliefs. Do the lay public recognise a ‘cancer candidate’? 
Method: A series of 31 in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted 
between November 2007 and October 2008. Interviews took place in two 
communities in Glasgow, Scotland – one affluent, one deprived. The sample was 
drawn from a number of community organisations and leisure clubs in the 
communities to facilitate accessing an ‘ordinary’ view. Cancer sufferers were 
excluded from the study. A topic guide was used to ensure consistency 
throughout interviews and focused on participants’ experience of cancer. 
Although the study did not adhere to a strict grounded theory approach, the 
analytic method of constant comparative analysis was followed.  
Findings: The complexity of the scheme described by Davison, where a wide 
range of sources of knowledge to inform beliefs resonated. Sophisticated and 
complex explanatory models of cancer were described. Cancer inhabited an 
important cultural position and was most commonly associated with fear and 
dread. Possible aetiological explanations included behavioural, environmental, 
biological and psychological factors. Smoking was the most widely recognised 
risk factor. Knowledge of other risk factors for individual cancers was patchy.  
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Candidacy therefore was not as unequivocal for cancer. Many ‘anomalous cases’ 
(those without obvious explanation) were proffered. Ultimately the randomness 
of cancer was emphasised.  
 
Conclusion: Cancer is a more complex disease than CHD, both culturally and 
biomedically and this is reflected in the beliefs voiced by participants in this 
study. This complexity is a barrier to the adoption of a cancer candidate.  
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 1. Introduction & Background 
When Geoffrey Rose (1985) stated that everyone ‘is a high risk individual for this 
mass disease’, he was referring to Cardiovascular Disease. This could equally 
apply to cancer early in the 21st Century. The latest World Health Organisation 
figures show that cancer continues to represent a considerable global disease 
burden. Each year 12 million new cancers are diagnosed and 7.9 million people 
die of the disease, representing a total of one in every eight worldwide deaths1. 
Current estimates suggest that three in five of the UK population will suffer from 
some form of cancer over their lifetime and in Scotland 15,000 people die of 
cancer each year. Despite a number of reviews of cancer care since the 
publication of the Calman-Hine report in 1995, the overarching policy objectives 
have remained unchanged; a reduction in incidence and an improvement in 
survival.  Survival has improved significantly as a result of improvements in early 
detection and the enhancement of existing cancer services. More of a challenge 
to policy is a reduction in incidence, which requires primary prevention via 
behavioural change, arguably cancer’s holy-grail. Together environment and 
behaviour account for 90-95% of all cancers and estimates suggest that 70% of 
cancer is preventable through behavioural modification alone (Peto 2001).  
In Scotland though the overall incidence of cancer in men reduced by 4% in 2008, 
it rose in women in equal part during the same period2. Most of the improvement 
in incidence among males is the result of the reductions in lung cancer. 
Incidence in other sites is however rising, as is lung cancer in women. Gender is 
not the only social determinant of cancer status. Cancer incidence and mortality 
is greater and survival is poorer among the most deprived across industrialised 
countries (Coleman et al 2004; Faggiano et al 1997; Shack et al 2007). Although 
survival is closely associated with stage at presentation, evidence that those 
from deprived communities present with more advanced disease is inconsistent 
(Brewster et al 2001). Social patterns are perhaps unsurprisingly apparent in 
behaviour as well as incidence and survival. Across a range of measures, those in 
the least affluent communities are more likely to engage in the unhealthy 
behaviours associated with cancer. An estimated 10 million people over 16 in the 
                                         
1
 http://www.who.int/cancer/   accessed 26/10/10 
2
 http://www.isdscotland.org/isd/183.html 
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UK smoke regularly. On average 22% of men smoke in the UK. When this figure is 
broken down it shows that 16% of men in the most affluent communities smoke 
compared to 27% of in the least affluent3. Scotland has higher than average 
smoking rates when compared to the rest of the UK, though this has reduced 
from 29% in 1999 to 25% in 2008. However smoking in areas of deprivation is 
consistently higher than elsewhere, with 42% of current smokers living in the 15% 
of most deprived areas4.  The numbers of those classed as obese in Scotland has 
been steadily rising since 1995. Obesity, once the preserve of the wealthy, is 
now associated with deprivation. As deprivation increases so does obesity, and 
the trend is particularly strong among women5. Related to this, consumption of 
fruit and vegetables is 1.5 times higher among affluent groups (James et al 
1997). It would appear that those in deprived communities are most resistant to 
life-style change and the adoption of healthy behaviours. Moreover, research 
shows that cancer risk behaviours are adopted and established at a relatively 
young age. Those from more deprived communities were more likely to have 
tried smoking, to eat a high fat diet and be overweight (Wardle et el 2003). 
1.1 Promoting Health 
All of this risky behaviour occurs in a climate where more and more information 
about health and healthy behaviours is available. The dominant policy discourse 
is now firmly in the realm of individual responsibility (Davison & Davey Smith 
1995) and closely follows the biomedical model. Health promotion urges 
individuals to ‘choose’ healthy living and healthy lifestyles. The assumption is 
that awareness and knowledge provide the basis for that choice. Individuals are 
aware of healthy and unhealthy behaviours and many, particularly those in the 
most deprived communities, simply make the ‘wrong’ choice. This is often 
assumed to be both irrational and fatalistic (Balshem 1991) because a linear 
causal relationship between knowledge and behaviour is expected.  
Many psychological theories have been developed that aim to explain behaviour 
and ultimately facilitate behavioural change. Wallaston (1976) developed the 
                                         
3
 http://info.cancerresearchuk.org/cancerstats/types/lung/smoking/#cancer accessed 26/10/10 
4 http://info.cancerresearchuk.org/cancerstats/types/lung/smoking/#cancer accessed 26/10/10 
5 http://www.scotpho.org.uk/nmsruntime/saveasdialog.asp?lID=4048&sID=3489 accessed 
26/10/10 
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Health Locus of Control concept which proposed that those who felt most in 
control of their own health are more likely to take steps to change their 
behaviour. The hypothesis follows that encouraging individuals to augment their 
sense of control will result in the adoption of healthier behaviours. Although two 
large studies (Friis et al 2003; Steptoe and Wardle 2001) found that high levels of 
internal control were predictors of ‘good’ behaviour, findings on the whole have 
been inconsistent (Lyons & Chamberlain 2006). Bandurra (1977) introduced the 
notion of self-efficacy into predictive models and focused on an individual’s 
perception of ability and achievement. In short, behavioural change is more 
likely to be achieved if there is an inherent belief that the outcome will be 
positive and that it is within the realms of capability. To stop smoking an 
individual must not only want to but also believe that they are able to do it. 
Self-efficacy is also integral to Ajzen’s (1991) Theory of Planned Behaviour. The 
Theory of Planned Behaviour developed from the Theory of Reasoned Action, 
which had intention at its heart but took cognisance of social norms and 
attitudes. It has been widely used in health research (Armitage & Conner 2001; 
Webb & Sheeran 2006) and is a well supported concept, though Stainton-Rogers 
(1991) criticised the model for being trivial. Attitudes and behaviours are also 
vital to the Health Belief Model. It introduces the idea of personal susceptibility 
to disease, perceived disease severity and the consequences of engaging in the 
behaviour.  It also looks specifically at the presence of triggers or cues to action. 
Holm and colleagues (1999) found strong associations between those who 
attended for mammography and the belief that cancer screening was a 
worthwhile activity but it has been thought to be weak in predicting behaviour 
(McCord 1997; Lyons & Chamberlain 2006). In addressing the criticism that such 
models are static, Prochaska and Di Clemente (1983) introduce stage models 
which accept that beliefs will change during the lifecourse and offer a circular 
rather than linear approach. All of these models have met with criticism, 
generally for being too simplistic (Ogden 2008). Stainton-Rogers (1991) argued 
that behaviours do not occur in such a formulaic manner, but more importantly 
the theories fail to consider the social context.  
1.2 Incorporating the social 
Although social measures, like sanitation and housing, were known to have clear 
health benefits and succeeded in improving the nation’s health, it is medicine 
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that has dominated the public health agenda. Yet, the validity of its dominance 
has been questioned, especially since biomedicine fails to explain social patterns 
in the experience and causes of ill health (Calnan 1987). This is not the only 
criticism levelled at biomedicine. Much of medical sociology, from functionalism 
(Parsons 1951) to critical theorists (Illich 1976; Navarro 1977), has examined the 
role of medicine in the everyday lives of the individual and, ultimately both 
draw distinctions between the ‘professional’ and the ‘patient’. Though it now 
seems rather old-fashioned not to consider the lay perspective it has not always 
been widely accepted that understanding lay views about health can add much 
to the understanding of lay beliefs and behaviour (Friedson 1970). Popay and 
Williams (1996) go as far as to suggest that ignoring the lay voice is foolhardy, 
particularly as it can offer untold insights into the experience of health and 
illness.  
Shaw (2002) however urged caution when dealing with the lay voice and 
questions how ‘lay’ such voices really are. Shaw took what he called ‘the 
Helsinki study’ (Kangas 2001), which looked at illness narratives of depressed 
patients, as his starting point, and asked if anyone in modern society can be 
truly ‘lay’. He suggested that the distinction between ‘lay’ and ‘expert’ has 
outgrown its usefulness. He cited many examples of research that demonstrated 
that when looking for meaning about illness, patients in reality often adopt 
professional explanations. Moreover, policy explicitly encourages the ‘expert 
patient’ (Department of Health 2001). Shaw quoted Kangas’ study, which despite 
referring to depression in this instance could equally apply across the illness 
spectrum: 
“Lay perceptions of depression are made of bits and pieces taken 
from many sources, reflecting the fact that individual, social and 
cultural contextualization of depression takes place in an era of 
increasing reflexive practices . .. Lay theories, perceptions and 
explanations. . . are constructed and negotiated in an increasingly 
plural and complex environment of knowledge”. (Kangas, 2001: 89 
cited in Shaw (2002)) 
This complexity does not suggest that ‘lay’ experiences should not be explored. 
Rather Shaw suggested that any exploration be mindful of the growing overlap 
between lay and expert knowledge and be sceptical of claims that the two 
inhabit entirely different spheres.  
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The similarities between the ‘lay’ and expert positions are highlighted by 
Davison and colleagues’ work on lay epidemiology (Davison, Frankel and Davey 
Smith 1991). The lay epidemiology model suggests the lay public draws on 
knowledge and experience to develop a sophisticated system of beliefs that, 
while mindful of health education messages, are set within the context of 
experience and, are evidence based. This evidence may be gathered from 
family, community, or societal events and each event will impact on beliefs to 
varying degrees. The model offered an insight into why some individuals may be 
resistant to change behaviours that may make them susceptible to, in this 
instance coronary heart disease (CHD). Could the model be of equal value when 
considering other diseases, particularly those that are strongly associated with 
known risk factors and countless health promotion efforts?  
This thesis aims to explore the utility of the lay epidemiology model in the 
context of cancer beliefs. The thesis has four main sections. The beginning 
section concentrates on the literature, by first reviewing studies of health 
beliefs from which lay epidemiology is drawn, before going on to outline lay 
epidemiology more closely. The second part of the literature review takes 
cancer as its focus and looks not only at general cancer awareness but also more 
broadly at the cultural position of cancer in our society. This first sections ends 
with a number of questions that the study sought to answer. The second shorter 
section turns to methods, and in two chapters, outlines the broader 
methodological considerations of the study before going on to detail the 
research design and process. The data findings are then presented in four 
chapters. Chapter 7 introduces the sample, before going on to describe the 
participants experience of cancer in Chapter 8. The meaning and understanding 
that participants’ have derived from that experience is outlined in Chapter 9 and 
finally in Chapter 10 the findings are explored in the context of lay 
epidemiology. Throughout the data findings chapters other relevant research is 
considered and included. The final sections in Chapters 11 and 12 discuss the 
findings, in light of the research questions, summarise the study and reach some 
conclusions about the usefulness of the lay epidemiology model when exploring 
cancer beliefs.  
 2. Literature Review 
2.1 Literature Review Introduction 
This literature review has three aims. First, it aims to provide a context for the 
thesis by outlining the wider literature on health beliefs. Next, to explore 
thoroughly the concept of lay epidemiology, and finally, to detail what is known 
about cancer among the lay population.  The literature review will be separated 
into two chapters. The first will focus on health beliefs, including lay 
epidemiology, and the second on cancer.   
Both ‘health beliefs’ and ‘cancer’ are represented by large literatures. It would 
be impossible to present either in their entirety, and so it is important to outline 
what literature will be reflected on in the following chapters.  
2.1.1 What literature is included? 
Tackling subjects with potentially limitless amounts of research means that 
setting early parameters is crucial. Studies of the lay experience of health have 
a long and varied history and have changed the way in which we think about the 
illness experience (Lawton 2003). Those that centre on the health beliefs of ‘lay’ 
public are less common. Early studies that simply teased out definitions have 
now given rise to a wealth of literature that considers beliefs among various 
social, demographic and ethnographic groupings. Such studies have further 
developed to describe and interpret the beliefs of various disease-specific 
constituencies. Despite such variety the majority of this work has its origins in a 
number of key health belief texts. Their inclusion in this thesis is based on the 
acknowledgement that these works are important forerunners of much of the 
health belief literature that has followed.  
Hughner and Kleine (2004) recently conducted a review of health beliefs 
literature published between 1983 and 2003 and present a synthesis of the data 
from the 28 included studies. Many of the studies included are dealt with in 
detail within this chapter because of their significance in the field of study. 
Hughner and Kleine present 18 different health themes that they then combined 
to give four key areas. These concentrate on definitions, causal explanations, 
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external factors impinging on health, and the place of health in people’s lives. 
They conclude that much of the work that has sought to define health has 
concentrated on illness rather than health. They also suggested that lay theories 
of health often do not match professional views, so for example lay groups value 
‘not lying down to’ illness. People attribute responsibility for illness events to 
fate or luck and this is common throughout lay studies of health. Health too was 
judged to be taken for granted rather than something to be aimed for.  
Like health beliefs, cancer and beliefs about cancer are represented by a wide 
literature. The area that is loosely termed psycho-oncology has looked closely at 
beliefs about cancer, but the focus has tended to be on cancer patients. The 
extent to which such studies truly access the ‘lay’ voice is questionable. As Shaw 
(2002) asserts, patients become, over the course of their illness, experts.  In 
addition, there are numerous studies that explore very specific aspects of cancer 
beliefs, for example beliefs about screening, or symptom awareness. The 
literature reviewed here will therefore be confined to studies relating to beliefs 
about cancer among the lay public. Unless especially relevant, the views of 
patients and their carers will not be reviewed.  
2.1.2 Search Strategy  
Each element of this review required its own discrete literature search. Medical 
sociology readers were used as the starting point to locate important health 
beliefs texts. Citation searches were widely used and frequently cited texts 
were considered. By focusing solely on lay epidemiology, the thesis has an 
arguably narrow remit, which negates the conventional approach to literature 
searching that values ‘inclusivity’. Besides, a search for the term ‘lay 
epidemiology, yields little. Again, citation searches addressed this gap. A more 
traditional approach to searching was adopted for the cancer beliefs element of 
the review. Electronic databases including MEDLINE, CINAHL and Web of 
Knowledge were searched using the terms cancer*, know*, aware*, belief*, lay 
and public. The main inclusion criteria were studies that considered beliefs 
about cancer among non-patients and studies that focused on cancer generally. 
Those studies that primarily considered awareness and beliefs about screening 
were not included.  
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The remainder of this chapter will deal with health beliefs. It will first introduce 
a number of seminal texts that provide the historical and theoretical background 
for lay epidemiology before going on to give an in-depth account of lay 
epidemiology.   
2.2 The theoretical context: unearthing beliefs about 
health.  
Many of the early studies that introduced lay beliefs about health are to be 
found in social anthropology. The first ethnographies are attributed to Rivers 
(1924) and later Clements (1932) and Ackerknecht (1942). These analyses tended 
to describe health beliefs in non-western cultures. They focused on irrational 
‘primitive’ beliefs and are now considered to be, at best, patronising. The 
paternalistic offerings from social anthropology soon gave way to less 
disparaging ‘systems theories’, which proposed that views about health mirrored 
overall cultural belief systems (Dunn 1968). The dominance of the biomedical 
model has meant that similar analyses of western health beliefs were largely 
absent. The assumption being that scientific explanations obviate the need to 
explore lay beliefs of health. As such, the lay voice was almost entirely 
neglected. Lupton (1994) traced the history of lay beliefs and noted that many 
of the early offerings relied heavily on professional/scientific accounts. She 
suggested that the shift from pre-Enlightenment beliefs about health and 
disease, where religion and morality were integral, to the scientific post-
Enlightenment model rendered lay beliefs meaningless. The body became 
viewed as a series of mechanistic parts that could be treated and cured in 
isolation. This marked the beginning of biomedicine’s hegemony. A further 300 
years passed before the gaze began to readjust to incorporate non-scientific 
models.  
2.2.1 Lay beliefs 
As has already been detailed, studies that consider lay beliefs about health have 
borrowed heavily from social anthropology. The emphasis on the ‘otherness’ 
apparent in beliefs about health in non-Western or ‘primitive’ societies has 
spilled into studies of lay views in contemporary western societies. As Bury 
(1997) highlights, a tension arises when it is assumed that ‘expert’ views are 
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‘correct’ and lay ‘beliefs’ are inherently ‘wrong’. In this context terminology 
becomes important, for example early labelling of beliefs as ‘folk’ tended to 
emphasise the discord between lay and professional viewpoints. The contention 
being that ‘belief’ is secondary to ‘knowledge’. Irrespective of the semantics it 
is clear that much can be gained from giving the ‘lay’ perspective recognition. 
Popay and Williams (1996) argued that the recognition of lay knowledge can be 
advantageous in many ways. First, they cite Hilary Graham’s (1987) influential 
work on smoking patterns among young women living in areas of social 
disadvantage that highlighted the importance of understanding health behaviour 
in the context of peoples’ lives. They also demonstrated that there have been 
instances where lay knowledge has prompted the scientific community to 
reassess their knowledge. Links between poor health and environmental factors, 
housing conditions and work hazards are all given as examples of occasions 
where lay knowledge informed scientific knowledge rather than vice versa. 
Despite their pleas for parity between lay and scientific knowledge, Popay and 
Williams equally stressed their inherent differentness: 
“For the most part, however sophisticated and sociologically 
illuminating the knowledge expressed in lay beliefs may be, it 
remains disorganised and ad hoc, posing little if any direct challenge 
to the medical profession. However much these beliefs are part of a 
shared culture and society, they are expressions of personal 
experiences which remain outside the world of science and politics”. 
(Popay and Williams pg 118 cited in Challenging medicine Gabe (ed)) 
It is this spirit that is evoked in this thesis. Using the term lay beliefs throughout 
should not detract from their value.  
2.2.2 Describing lay beliefs. 
Lay beliefs are now widely researched. Data that allow better understanding of 
the health beliefs of various socio-cultural groups are widely available, as are 
narrowly focused disease specific areas. It is a vast literature. Yet, while new 
insights are offered into the nuances of belief, the majority of current lay 
beliefs work owes much to a number of early, seminal studies. The following 
section details a series of important qualitative health belief studies. While they 
have been instrumental in improving an understanding of many aspects of health 
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beliefs, they have been included here because they say something about lay 
notions of causality, or lay aetiology, which is central to lay epidemiology.  
Claudine Herzlich’s (1973) work concentrated on the social representations of 
health. She carried out a study of health beliefs among 80 middle-class 
individuals, most living in Paris but also some in Normandy. Herzlich believed 
that the views expressed by her respondents demonstrated that their thoughts 
on health were quite distinct from those of professionals. Her findings show that 
health was judged in three different but often overlapping ways. First, health as 
a ‘vacuum’ wherein health is essentially seen as the absence of disease that only 
becomes apparent during periods of illness. Second, health as a ‘reserve’, where 
health is inherent but can be added to or augmented and ultimately used to 
fight illness. Finally, ‘equilibrium’, described as a higher state of ideal health 
that is threatened by ways of life. She questioned her respondents about where 
health ‘came from’. Respondents placed health in two separate categories; the 
endogenous, or that which could be found inside an individual and the 
exogenous, found outside the individual. Yet it was the exogenous, represented 
as the ‘way of life’ that posed the greatest threat to health. City-living, and 
living in Paris in particular, exposed its inhabitants to a series of health threats 
borne out of the fast pace of life, pollution, germs and modernity in general. 
The impact on health was both physical and emotional:  
“The constant commotion isn’t made to make people ordinary, they 
are difficult, nervous, tired, that’s the truth about modern life”. 
(Herzlich 1973 cited in Bury & Gabe 2004 pg28) 
Conversely country-dwellers were not subject to the same strains and as such 
had an altogether healthier way of life. City living meant many more 
opportunities to pass germs not so apparent in the country. The respondents 
identified three major diseases that were judged to be directly associated with 
modern life: cancer, mental ill health, and heart disease. These are the diseases 
which, according to Herzlich, were ‘at the heart of individual preoccupations’ 
and took on a ‘special significance’. As one respondent said of cancer: 
“Cancer, I rather associate with current allergies, with very modern 
allergic diseases, with the physical and nervous strain we undergo in 
cities, and then in breathing in the present-day atmosphere in cities” 
(Herzlich 1973 cited in Bury & Gabe 2004 pg29) 
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Although there was recognition that the endogenous aspect of health contained 
inherent susceptibility to some diseases, a ‘good’ constitution could effectively 
guarantee health. Individuals were thought to possess protective traits. Herzlich 
captures the moral dimension integral to explanations of health.  While illness is 
bad, health is good and health is to be found within the individual. Battle 
metaphors were utilised, suggesting that individuals are inherently strong and 
can fight the dangers associated with modern ways of life.  
As noted earlier, part of the discourse in health beliefs has concerned itself with 
differences or indeed similarities between ‘expert’ and ‘lay’ views of health. 
Snow’s (1974) study of health beliefs among Tucson residents demonstrated the 
dissimilarity of views between interviewees and biomedicine. Respondents’ 
emphasis was on environmental and supernatural forces as the roots of disease 
and achieving ‘balance’ was seen as the key to good health. Snow’s findings are 
interesting, yet they present ‘illness’ as a whole and do not draw distinctions 
between the aetiology of different illnesses or diseases. For example, there are 
no clear statements about causes of minor illnesses, like the common cold, 
although the inference is that voodoo or black magic may be reserved for more 
serious conditions. Conversely Helman’s (1978) study that presents ‘folk’ models 
of belief among general practice patients in the UK shows similarities between 
doctor and patient accounts. Both groups draw distinctions between colds and 
fevers and their respective aetiologies. Like Snow, Helman found that the 
common cold was believed to be the result of environmental factors, like the 
weather. Fevers were thought to be the result of ‘germs’, a term borrowed from 
biomedicine. Helman concluded that biomedical concepts are easily integrated 
into ‘folk’ models and that doctors engage in collusion with patients to maintain 
the folk model. Both Helman and Snow’s work offered interesting descriptions of 
beliefs but attempt neither to interpret nor explain them.  
A more in-depth account is offered by Cornwell (1984) in her influential work in 
east London in the late 1970s.  In an exploration of lay health beliefs among a 
working class community she highlighted the difference between ‘public’ and 
‘private’ accounts of health and illness. Public accounts provide what the 
respondents believe are ‘the right answers’. Cornwell suggested that the 
findings from her interviews show that in public accounts individuals tend to rely 
heavily on the medical model for explanation. This was less pronounced in 
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private accounts, which were more biographical and convoluted. According to 
Cornwell, her respondents presented causation of illness on three distinct, but 
interrelated, dimensions. First, illness was either internal or external, second, it 
was avoidable or unavoidable and finally an individual was either to blame or 
blameless in becoming ill. Despite illness being seen as avoidable, Cornwell 
noted respondents’ reluctance to apportion blame. Yet, public accounts of 
health and illness were littered with moral judgements, particularly about 
attitudes to work and how effectively disease or illness was borne by individuals. 
Private accounts for Cornwell were more biographical in nature and often 
involved the retelling of narratives which held intricate causal explanations 
within them.  
“The concept of the causal process was dynamic rather than static, 
with many factors interacting – acting and reacting upon each other – 
and with illness as the eventual outcome.”  (Cornwell 198:149)  
Respondents’ reluctance to blame individuals for illness was coupled with 
scepticism about the relationship between behaviour and illness. For example, 
few respondents accepted the link between smoking and lung cancer. Most 
respondents knew individuals for whom smoking did not feature as a factor in 
their premature death or who had smoked and survived. Rather than lifestyle, 
individuals attracted blame when they were seen to dwell on problems, or failed 
to ‘get on with life’. Overall the aim was to be seen as a survivor rather than a 
victim. Cornwell proposed that views about health were simply a feature of the 
wider belief system in the community or their ‘hard -earned lives’.  
Mildred Blaxter (1979, 1982, 1983, 1990) has been a prolific commentator on 
health beliefs. Blaxter (1979) Blaxter and Patterson (1982) and Blaxter (1983) 
presented findings from a study carried out with two generations of working 
class women in a Scottish city. The study demonstrated the wide-ranging and 
complex nature of aetiological theories. The study did not set out to look 
specifically at any particular aspect of health and illness, instead the women 
were asked to discuss issues about health and illness that were important to 
them. Blaxter noted: 
Typically, these women had a very stoical, puritanical and at the 
same time fatalistic view of the occurrence of illness: illness was 
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weakness, ‘lying down to it’, being functionally unfit, giving in to 
diseases. (pg Blaxter 1983:60)   
As with Cornwell’s work, Blaxter uncovered the strength of the moral dimension 
inherent in thoughts about illness. Obviously health was seen as something 
positive and Blaxter believed that the respondents may have provided accounts 
that lessened the extent of illness in their lives. For both generations the most 
important response to illness was ‘not lying down to it’. This cohort routinely 
described illness in what Blaxter called moral and spiritual, rather than physical, 
terms. The preoccupation with the moral dimension of health does have an 
important consequence. If some degree of ill health is inescapable, then the role 
of fatalism or ‘bad luck’ is augmented. The women in Blaxter’s study mentioned 
a wide range of diseases, and a cause was ascribed to the most of those 
mentioned. The most common causes were infections, heredity, and family 
susceptibility, together with environmental factors such as living and working 
conditions. Blaxter noted that family susceptibility and heredity were given 
more credibility in lay theories than they are in medicine and the respondents 
supposed connections between disease patterns that were common in families. 
Other aetiological theories were based on the idea that stresses and strains, 
both physical and emotional, could ‘bring on’ disease. Many thought that disease 
could result in further disease, for example, a common cold could easily become 
pneumonia, if not carefully monitored. This is what Blaxter called a secondary 
event. Only with common diseases, like the cold or flu did Blaxter’s respondents 
implicate individual behaviour as a cause of disease. Blaxter, like Cornwell, 
found that respondents were loath to incriminate individual behaviour. Often, 
respondents cited the natural constraints of poverty and the influence that this 
had on their own and their children’s health. Yet, they were keen to stress that 
both rich and poor could be similarly afflicted by disease.   
There are additional Scottish studies of health beliefs that have particular 
resonance here. Mullen’s (1994) study of religion and health beliefs among 
middle-aged men in Glasgow found that many of his respondents thought that 
some diseases, like cancer, were ‘in you’ and were therefore fatalistic about 
one’s ability to avoid them. Similarly ‘constitutions’ were marked out as 
important, though some thought it was possible to improve or bolster one’s 
constitution. In an ethnographic study carried out with middle-class families in 
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Edinburgh, Backett (1992a 1992b) sought to explore beliefs about health and 
lifestyle in families that were in a strong position to be healthy; in terms of 
social and material advantage. Consistent with studies on health beliefs, Backett 
found that health was seen as multidimensional and that fate was included 
alongside scientific explanations. As Crawford (1984) established, Backett’s 
families were eager to illustrate their good behaviours, and to demonstrate that 
they knew what healthy behaviour was. Yet, on closer consideration the 
imagined often did not match the reality. Few followed the healthy regimen that 
they thought was morally incumbent upon them. Thus, Backett concluded that 
with the increased amount of information available on health, awareness had 
changed but behaviour had not necessarily followed. Central to the discussions 
were ideas about balance, which was necessary for health, in all areas of life. 
Backett, Davison and Mullen (1994) brought together data from three separate 
studies that focused on health beliefs. They concluded that moderation, which is 
assumed vital for a healthy lifestyle, was the common feature across studies. 
There was a general resistance to a strict regime in any area of life and often 
participants talked about ‘trading’ good and bad behaviours.  
In a further attempt to better understand beliefs about health, a series of 
studies by Pill and Stott (1982a, 1982b, 1985), asked a group of young mothers 
about the preventability of illness. They drew on the original concept of health 
locus of control (Wallaston 1976) to develop a tool that measured health 
behaviours. In terms of aetiology, a range of explanations were offered including 
heredity, personal susceptibility, environment, germs, lifestyle factors and 
personality. In the initial exploratory study approximately 20% of all informants 
denied any personal responsibility for health. Echoing other locus of control 
work, they found that informants could be separated into two key groups. 
‘Lifestylists, or those that saw individual responsibility for health, and ‘fatalists’ 
who believed that health and illness were largely out with the control of the 
individual. What was unique about their findings was that the two were not 
mutually exclusive: 
“Most people appear to be quite capable of holding a number of 
apparently contradictory general theories of causation at the same 
time which are brought forward in various combinations depending on 
the situation and the nature of the questions asked”. (Pill & Stott 
1985:983)  
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Both lifestylists and fatalists believed that individuals had some responsibility for 
their own health but, while lifestylists believed this was the result of 
behavioural choice, fatalists understood this as the impact of worry, 
hypochondria, and dwelling on illness. Pill and Stott also found that views were 
socially patterned and those with even a marginally higher level of education 
were more likely to be ‘lifestylists’.  
Calnan’s (1987) study considered the relationship between social class and 
health and compared the views of women in social class I and II  with those in 
social class IV and V. Questions were about a series of health related beliefs and 
concepts, but of most relevance to this review are their beliefs about causality. 
Stress and obesity were key factors in the origin of CHD in both social class 
groups, and although other explanations like smoking and drinking were offered 
by both groups they prioritised them differently. Calnan reported that cancer 
stood out as the feared disease and that the ‘logic in lay models was difficult to 
disentangle’. Cancer was attributed to a number of factors, and popular among 
middle class women were ideas of heredity and biological predisposition. He 
continued that these were distinct from ideas held by working class women, 
which he described in the following excerpt: 
“The working-class women’s accounts, while also characterised by 
doubt and uncertainty, identified a different type of theory about 
cancer causation to the one adopted by the middle class groups. The 
most popular theory adopted specifically by this group implied that 
cancer was in everybody or in some people and only needed to be 
triggered off.” (Calnan 1987:65) 
The impression that cancer is a dormant feature present in some or all of us is 
an interesting one. However, though Calnan was keen to make the distinction 
between the class groups, it might be argued that the ideas of predisposition 
and something ‘in’ everybody are essentially the same but articulated 
differently.  
The review of these above provides a brief overview of some of the key texts in 
the origins of health belief literature. They show that individual beliefs about 
health are derived not only from experience but also from biomedical concepts 
that are incorporated easily into explanations. Though Herzlich suggested that 
the health beliefs of her interviewees were distinct from scientific explanations, 
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the evocation of the importance of germs is testimony to the salience of 
biomedicine. Herlizch’s idea of health as a ‘reserve’ is common in many of the 
reviewed studies. For many, health is an inherent abstract concept that is 
thought about only in response to a specific health-related problem. It is only in 
these circumstances that thoughts turn to health and illness and the search for 
explanation begins. Ascertaining the reasons for poor health or illness events and 
the extent to which the sufferer is to blame are arrived at in response to the 
event. Common in the studies is the notion of naturally occurring differences, or 
inherent constitutions, between individuals. Illnesses too have inherent 
differences. Participants across studies categorise illness into those that can be 
avoided and those that cannot. A constant seam runs through the studies that 
highlight the moral expectations placed on the ill, who must not ‘lie down’ to 
illness. Yet parallel to this the studies also report a reluctance to apportion 
blame to individual disease sufferers (unless the disease was thought avoidable). 
Although these studies are now historical they do show that lay views are 
complex and sophisticated. They perhaps reflect the context in which they were 
undertaken. For many of those interviewed illness primarily meant infection. 
The studies took place in an era before the, now dominant, narrative relating to 
prevention took hold. The avoidance of illness via abstention from risky 
behaviour now places the responsibility firmly with the individual.  
2.2.3 Explaining Health Beliefs 
While the reviewed studies are illuminating they do not aid our understanding of 
the process involved in constructing beliefs. Kleinman (1980) describes what he 
terms explanatory models, which are activated during episodes of individual 
illness. Crucially these are separate from generic beliefs that are ever-present. 
Explanatory models allow individuals to account for, and make sense of, poor 
health by giving details of what they might expect to happen within one illness 
episode. These expectations are culturally created and allow individuals to share 
experiences, so for example the experience of the common cold is well-
established culturally. Chrisman (1989) refers to these as ‘cultural templates’, 
which supply individuals with an understanding of what they are experiencing. 
Chrisman suggested that people look within their ‘repertoire’ of health beliefs 
and find culturally recognised descriptions of their illness experience. The 
information that makes up the repertoire is derived from a variety of sources, 
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both personal and cultural (although arguably the two cannot be separated). The 
result is a specific idiosyncratic belief system: 
“The illness belief repertoire is partially representative of beliefs 
that constitute popular health culture. Any repertoire’s specific 
configuration is the consequence of a person’s life experiences: his or 
her exposure to a limited number of the widely ranging beliefs 
contained within popular health culture.” (Chrisman 1989:14) 
Young’s (1980; 1982) conception of prototypes similarly offered an insight into 
how beliefs about health are formulated. Prototypes are based on personal 
experiences and memories that provide clues to current events and can be 
shared by small groups of people, like family and friends.  
The ideas put forward by Kleinman, Chrisman and Young may be thought of as a 
starting point for Davison and colleagues work on lay epidemiology (Davison, 
Frankel & Davey Smith 1991) 6. The next section of the review will focus solely 
on lay epidemiology, and its constituent components of candidacy, anomalies 
and the prevention paradox.  
2.3 Lay epidemiology 
The lay epidemiology model was introduced in a series of papers beginning with 
the influential Lay epidemiology and the prevention paradox: the implications 
of coronary candidacy for health education (Davison, Smith & Frankel 1991). In 
formulating the model they drew on data generated from a series of in-depth 
interviews with 180 adults in three geographical locations in South Wales. The 
interviews were part of a study that aimed to consider the impact of health 
promotion programmes, and in particular how ordinary people talked about 
heart disease and its causes. The localities had recently been the target for 
‘Heartbeat Wales’, an education campaign on CHD, and while the authors 
supposed that the study population was likely to be typical of any adult 
population in the United Kingdom, they did concede that the recent attention on 
                                         
6
 The paper cited here by Davison, Frankel and Davey Smith (1991) first introduced lay 
epidemiology. For ease of reading this paper and work will be referred to simply as ‘Davison’ in 
the body of the text. The team produced a series of papers that used findings from this study. 
These papers will be cited in full.  
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CHD may have elevated the condition in the minds of the sample population. In 
its broadest sense, lay epidemiology:  
“refers to a scheme in which individuals interpret health risks 
through the routine observation and discussion of cases of illness and 
death in personal networks and in the public arena, as well as formal 
and informal evidence arising from other sources, such as television 
and magazines”  (Frankel, Davison & Davey-Smith 1991:428) 
This information is combined to build an explanatory model for Coronary Heart 
Disease (CHD). Such an approach, it was asserted, was akin to the approach 
found in mainstream epidemiology. Further, they concluded that not only was 
this method of theory building analogous to a scientific model but the detail of 
the beliefs also echoed biomedicine. Lay beliefs expressed by the Welsh cohort 
about the causality of CHD were littered with explanations borrowed from 
contemporary health promotion. Davison suggested that the ‘common currency’ 
among the lay community and health promoters alike was that CHD was 
preventable through behaviour modification. What the lay epidemiology model 
provided was a formula that allowed the general public to estimate the risk of 
CHD in oneself and others. It was this estimation of risk of CHD that Davison 
termed ‘coronary candidacy’, the concept at the heart of lay epidemiology.  
2.3.1 Coronary Candidacy 
Coronary candidacy was described by Davison as a ‘cultural mechanism’ which 
contained a series of widely and easily recognisable concepts associated with 
CHD. Together, these provided an explanatory framework for the identification 
of those thought to be most or indeed least likely to suffer ‘heart trouble’. 
Candidacy demonstrated how health beliefs were operationalised:  
“Through its use (candidacy), generalised information which is 
derived from an aggregation of many cases is returned to the realm 
of the individual.  It is a mechanism that helps individuals to assess 
personal risks, obtain reassuring affirmation of predictability (thus 
mapping unpredictability) devise appropriate strategies of personal 
behaviour and go some way towards explaining events which, by their 
very nature, are deeply distressing. In the cultural edifice which our 
society has erected to make sense of coronary disease and death, 
candidacy is a central pillar.”(Davison, Frankel and Davey Smith 
1991:6) 
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Candidacy, Davison found, was used in different ways.  The first, most powerful, 
and the most easily evoked, was the retrospective explanation of illness events 
and deaths in others. The commonsense view of why a CHD event had happened: 
“Mind you, he was always a bugger for his fry ups and his cream 
cakes, so he had to be well up for it, like” (Davison Frankel and Davey 
Smith 1991:8) 
“Of course, it was in the family, so it was to be expected really” 
(Davison Frankel and Davey Smith 1991:8) 
Candidacy was also used to predict future illness, again in others: 
“looks as if they might keel over at any point” (Davison Frankel and 
Davey Smith 1991:9) 
“I didn’t like to say anymore cos she looked like she could have a 
heart attack any minute” (Davison Frankel and Davey Smith 1991:9) 
“He’ll have a heart attack if he isn’t careful” (Davison Frankel and 
Davey Smith 1991:9) 
Though some respondents also discussed personal candidacy, both in relation to 
past and future events, Davison believed that candidacy tended to be most 
salient when commenting on the health of others.  
These examples from Davison’s interviewees are familiar. They represent the 
everyday language used to discuss heart disease and they offer valid reflections 
on the manner of talk around CHD. They also hint at how candidates are 
identified. Davison claimed that individuals sought three types of information 
when judging candidacy: physical characteristics, social information and 
personal information. Yet, it was not always necessary to access all three types 
of information. Obesity, or physical stature, is central to causal explanations and 
Davison noted that the individual’s ‘build’ was invariably mentioned in any 
discussion of a CHD event. Sometimes, particularly in extreme cases, only 
physical signs were required to confirm candidacy.  Body-mass was the visual 
representation of CHD, and allowed speedy judgements of candidacy to be made 
- even about strangers. In such cases just one factor was enough to define 
candidacy and no further information was needed. Judgements about body-mass 
took on a new significance in the context of retrospective candidacy. If an 
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individual thought to be only slightly overweight experienced a CHD event, their 
candidacy, by virtue of their weight, was confirmed. Equally, if an individual was 
not overweight, this was also central to the discussion but prompted the 
beginning of speculation about alternative explanations. At this point other 
aetiological factors deemed important for CHD were considered. Most common 
amongst them were a lack of physical fitness, family history, occupation, and 
sometimes, for this particular population, geography. When information about 
behaviours or risk factors was available, this too was inserted into the 
explanatory model. Davison demonstrated that a personal explanatory model 
was attached to each individual CHD experience. Potentially complex links were 
made between risks. For example, worriers or those under stress were thought 
to be more susceptible to CHD. In turn worriers were more likely to smoke to 
counteract their worry, thus augmenting their candidacy because smoking is also 
a behaviour associated with CHD. As Davison noted:   
 “This type of linkage tends to give each individual an organic 
wholeness and a personal character” (Davison, Frankel and Davey 
Smith 1991:13)  
According to Davison, candidacy was ‘wide’. Candidacy comprised of such a 
range of behaviours and characteristics that ultimately anyone could be a 
candidate. They illustrated this by showing that individuals located at the 
extremes of a behavioural spectrum could equally be candidates. Those who 
engaged in no physical exercise and those who take ‘too much’ exercise, are 
both thought to be at risk of CHD, as are manual labourers and high-flying 
executives by virtue of work stress.  
2.3.2 Anomalous Deaths and Unwarranted Survivors   
As well as the strength of the candidacy concept in providing an explanation for 
CHD events, a crucial element of candidacy, according to Davison, is that the lay 
epidemiologist is keenly aware of its fallibility. Despite its width, many CHD 
events occur in those who do not fit any candidacy profile. Hence, phrases like 
‘the last person you’d expect’ were used, which represented a violation of 
candidacy. Likewise, not all candidates develop illnesses. This led Davison to 
stress that candidacy is simply a reflection of risk, and consolidates the public 
image of heart attacks as unpredictable events: 
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“ even though most of our informants have professed the opinion 
that heart disease is to some extent preventable or postponable the 
idea that it could happen to anyone (at any time) is omnipresent” 
(Davison, Frankel and Davey Smith 1991:14) 
In the absence of adequate aetiological explanations luck and/or chance are 
arrived at as explantions. Unpredictability is seen as nothing more than bad luck. 
Candidacy can only provide a simple classification for heart illness episodes. The 
recognised fallibility of candidacy is operationalised through the identification of 
what the authors referred to as ‘unwarranted survivors’ and ‘anomalous deaths’. 
That is those individuals who meet the risk profile yet do not experience any 
illness events and those who do not meet any aspect of the recognised risk 
profile and succumb to illness, respectively:  
“The popular idea of the classic coronary candidate and the common 
observation that candidates and victims are not co-extensive 
categories, both owe their existence to this interplay between 
publicly communicated scientific information and the operation of 
Lay Epidemiology” (Davison, Frankel and Davey Smith 1992:678) 
Running throughout Davison’s work is a commentary on the implications of lay 
epidemiology for health education. His team conjectured that the failure of 
individuals to follow healthy lifestyle advice, despite being aware of the risks, 
may be attributed to lay epidemiology rather than the widespread supposition 
that ignorance or even fatalism are to blame ( Frankel, Davison & Smith 1991). 
They called for a better understanding of the context in which behaviour occurs 
rather than relying on the, often denigrating, responses found in much health 
education. They suggest that the health concerns of the lay public are more 
aligned with conventional epidemiology than health promotion. The importance 
of the familial element in CHD, for instance, is strongly recognised by lay 
epidemiology but rarely raised in health promotion material.  
“That popular beliefs systems are closer in spirit to the questioning 
traditions of epidemiology than to the certainties of health education 
has important implications for health education.”( Frankel, Davison & 
Smith 1991:428) 
For the lay epidemiologist, lifestyle factors, they propose, are basically 
inconclusive. Via simple observations individuals see that behaviour modification 
offers little guaranteed protection from CHD. They presented the public 
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response to the egg scares of 1988 as an illustrative case study (Frankel, Davison 
& Smith 1991). The almost immediate threat of the poisonous properties of eggs 
dramatically and instantaneously altered behaviour, yet the advice relating to 
the links between eggs and heightened cholesterol had little impact. Such 
behaviour patterns are rational, rather than fatalistic, as much health promotion 
supposes.  
2.3.3 The prevention paradox 
Davison’s formulation of lay epidemiology went beyond the simple description of 
an abstract concept. As already stated Davison’s team offered lay epidemiology 
as a possible explanation for the failure of health promotion throughout their 
work. They utilised Rose’s ‘prevention paradox’ and considered some of the 
implications of candidacy for health education.  
Rose (1985) originally outlined the problematic nature of health promotion 
activities that focused on the population instead of the individual. He asserted 
that the approaches pose different questions of causality. The first ‘why does 
this happen?’ is asked of a population. The second focuses on the individual 
case; ‘Why did this happen to this person at this time?’ Though Rose encouraged 
his students to ask both questions, the decision to settle on either method has 
significant implications for preventive health strategies. An individual focus 
requires the identification of those in ‘high risk’ groups, possibly via screening 
programmes. Though such a method is likely to be effective, at its core is a 
problem. According to Rose, the ability to ‘predict future disease is usually very 
weak’ because at risk individuals often remain healthy and vice versa. The 
alternative then is to adopt a population approach and ‘to lower the mean level 
of risk factors, to shift the whole distribution of exposure in a favourable 
direction’ (Rose 1985:37). Rose concluded that this most radical approach 
presents the challenge of the ‘prevention paradox’. Population measures do just 
that, they impact at the level of population. Therefore many people have to opt 
to make behavioural change in order for one individual to benefit. Nevertheless, 
the strategy of health education must be to raise the awareness of risky 
behaviours among the general population rather than targeting those who are 
most at risk. If CHD is used as an example, most CHD deaths occur in the mid-
range of the population so many of those who change behaviour would never 
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have had a heart attack in any case. Yet, informing individuals that, statistically, 
they would be unlikely to benefit from behavioural change, is clearly 
problematic and challenges the success of the approach.  
Lay epidemiologists, Davison suggested, recognise the prevention paradox. Heart 
attacks continue to happen in those that were not at risk and those at risk will 
continue to avoid heart attacks. Individuals are reminded of the prevention 
paradox by observing anomalous deaths and unwarranted survivors. This key 
component of lay epidemiology, Davison suggested, has been overlooked by 
health promoters. He used the example of advice given about saturated fat. The 
general population believe that all saturated fat is bad for all people. The result 
is a lower risk threshold across the population and individuals who never 
previously saw themselves as at risk now do so. Moreover, a universal lowering 
of the risk threshold means that there are greater observable numbers of people 
surviving risky behaviour. Although the numbers of those who were not at risk 
are reduced, their profile becomes heightened. All of this consolidates the 
fallibility of candidacy, and calls into question the entire notion of ‘risk’ among 
the general population. The population approach moved Davison to accuse 
health educators as ‘propagating half-truths’ that continue to be delivered with 
‘zeal’. Yet, Davison conceded that highlighting the prevention paradox within 
health promotion material would threaten its raison d’être.  
Hunt and Emslie (2001) in their commentary on lay epidemiology and the 
prevention paradox challenged Davison’s original assertions. While they broadly 
agreed with Davison’s model and in particular supported the strength of the 
candidacy concept, they were keen to emphasise the differences between the 
two strands of epidemiology. First, they proposed that it is the individual, and 
not the collective, that ultimately concerns the lay epidemiologist. They based 
this on the premise that although illnesses and deaths at a population level can 
be observed, the level of detail available is insufficient for the events to be truly 
meaningful: 
“However, we could contend that events within the family are 
particularly salient in deconstructing candidacy. Thus, if a family 
member is an unwarranted survivor or more particularly an 
‘anomalous death’ this has particular power in undermining the 
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acceptance of well-established epidemiological facts about risk 
factors for major disease.” (Hunt & Emslie 2001:445) 
So it is the close experience, according to Hunt and Emslie that shapes 
understanding of health and risk. They go further and, using a research analogy 
suggested that the lay epidemiologist, in monitoring family events, is more akin 
to a qualitative researcher: 
“The emphasis is not on isolating risk factors, but on contextualising, 
qualifying or even rejecting previously accepted risk factors or 
aetiological theories in the face of contrary personal experience.”  
(Hunt & Emslie 2001 pg. 445) 
Additionally, they highlighted a difference in the way in which inexplicable 
events are dealt with. Within formal epidemiology hypotheses change slowly 
across decades to accommodate previously unfathomable occurrences. Such a 
process is unlikely to satisfy the lay epidemiologist, whose need to make sense 
of an incongruous family event is ‘more immediate and compelling’. Hunt and 
Emslie concluded by supporting moves towards acknowledging the inherent value 
in lay knowledge and its potential for augmenting understanding of risk 
estimation.  
2.3.4 Lay Epidemiology and fatalism  
In a further paper that also utilised data from the South Wales study Davison and 
colleagues turned their attention to an analysis of fatalism and lay 
epidemiology. Davison previously asserted that the ‘common currency’ among 
the lay public and health educators was that CHD was largely avoidable through 
behavioural change. Fatalism has often been proposed as a reason for failure to 
adopt healthy behaviours and affect such change (Pill & Stott 1987). Though 
fatalism has been used as a wholly pejorative label signifying ignorance and 
irrationality, it has also more loosely represented the perception that health lies 
out with the control of the individual. It is the latter interpretation, where 
health can be neither controlled nor predicted, that Davison and colleagues 
supposed challenged health education.  
The logical corollary to candidacy’s failure to correctly predict all CHD events is 
significant for fatalism. Davison’s informants in the South Wales study identified 
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three factors that they could not influence, that nevertheless impacted on their 
health. These were inherited personal characteristics, the social environment, 
and the physical environment. The social environment included occupational 
hazards and socio-economic status. Davison suggested a further fourth field, luck 
or chance, which is not a discreet entity but rather is ‘a process or mechanism 
governing the first three’ (Davison, Frankel and Davey Smith 1992). Davison 
proposed that lifestyle ‘choices’ cannot be separated from any of the three 
uncontrollable fields. Individuals are unable to compartmentalise discreet 
categories because choices are rarely made in isolation. Instead choices are 
made in the context of broader social, cultural and economic factors. Integral to 
all of these explanations of health and choice were luck and fate. Often these 
probabilistic notions were intertwined with religious ideas and metaphors that 
evoked time, for example, when ‘it’s your time’, or what Davison called 
‘missile’ analogies and gambling and gaming metaphors, like ‘luck of the draw’. 
Davison concluded with a plea to for health education to be cognisant of the 
general public’s acknowledgement that prediction is weak because of the 
perceived powerful influence of ‘fate’:  
 
“The fact remains, however that within the general statistical 
tendencies that can be observed within populations, there lies a more 
chaotic distribution of illness and death. Some fat smokers really do 
live till advanced old age, and some svelt joggers really do ‘fall down 
dead’”. (Davison, Frankel & Davey-Smith 1992:683) 
Similarly, Frankel, Davison and Davey Smith (1991) used the example of heredity 
and risk associated with CHD to illustrate the problematic nature of modern 
health promotion. Both epidemiology and lay epidemiological perspectives place 
emphasis on the importance of family history as a risk factor, yet this is not 
found in educational material. Neither is the widely acknowledged social 
patterning of health experience: 
“That popular belief systems are closer in spirit to the questioning 
traditions of epidemiology than to the certainties of health education 
has important implications for health education” (Frankel, Davison & 
Smith 1991:428) 
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2.4 The scope of lay epidemiology 
Davison’s original article has been cited frequently. Armstrong’s (2003) audit of 
papers published in the first 25 years of the Sociology of Health and Illness found 
it to be the second most cited paper in the history of the journal, having been 
cited 99 times. It continues to be widely cited having been referenced 300 
times7. Though lay epidemiology has clearly been influential, the concept has 
rarely been built on or developed. Only a handful of studies, which will now be 
reviewed, have taken lay epidemiology as their starting point.  
Data generated from interviews in the West of Scotland Twenty-07 study 
provided the opportunity for some of Davison’s original findings to be tested 
(Hunt, et al 2000). The study sought to examine relationships between family 
history, smoking status, other health promoting behaviours and candidacy. They 
found that around 40% of respondents believed that they had a family history of 
illness and within that heart disease was the most commonly cited. The number 
of relatives who had had heart disease was a significant predictor of perceived 
family history. Candidacy for heart disease was also strongly linked to perceived 
family history. Lifestyle and stress were thought to be an important cause of 
heart disease by those with and without a perceived family history. Though 
those with a perceived family history of heart disease, however, were more 
likely to think lifestyle factors ‘very important’ in explaining heart disease. 
Similarly both groups thought that following a healthy lifestyle was ‘particularly’ 
important for those with a family history of heart disease. Few, in either group, 
endorsed the ‘fatalistic’ elements included in the surveys. They found that those 
that perceived themselves to be at high risk of heart disease were less likely to 
smoke.  
Clarke, Clotty and Pearson (1997) considered lay epidemiology in the context of 
cholesterol testing. Individuals who had been informed that they had raised 
serum cholesterol levels were interviewed twice – after the initial test, and 
again three months later after a second cholesterol test. In the intervening 
period cholesterol levels had dropped significantly. Interview data suggested 
that though participants did have ideas about candidacy, these were personal 
                                         
7
 Retrieved October 1st 2010 www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/119351868/abstract 
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and not uniform throughout the group. The only common predictor of candidacy 
was being overweight. Anomalous candidates who did not fit the picture, 
particularly by being skinny, were thought to be unfairly afflicted with high 
cholesterol. Interestingly, Clarke and colleagues asked participants to comment 
on their personal behaviours. Most of those interviewed believed that the result 
of their second test was not an accurate reflection of their behaviour between 
tests. Not only were some disappointed that their behavioural changes had not 
made a greater impact on their cholesterol levels but others acknowledged that 
they had made few changes yet had good results. They concluded that far from 
being irrational or fatalistic in their beliefs about behavioural change, 
participants produced rational reasons for their choices: 
“….. what I haven’t had proved to me – is that sacrifice in 20 years 
time going to prevent me from having a heart attack? If I knew it 
was, then alright, then I could make the sacrifice, but when it is so 
unsure as to whether it is going to do it, why should I make the 
sacrifice” (Clarke, Crotty and Pearson 1997:219) 
Lawlor et al (2003) suggested that lay epidemiology may account for the failure 
of smoking cessation programmes in deprived communities. The authors noted 
that although there has been a marked reduction in the overall smoking rate in 
the UK and the USA, this has not been consistent across all social classes. By 
1999 only 13% of men in social class I smoked, compared with 44% in social class 
V. Further, they demonstrated that while the health benefits have been obvious 
for those in Social Class I, they are less so for social class V; not until 1991 did 
the all cause mortality of men in social class V fall to the level that men in social 
class I enjoyed in 1931. They suggested that improvements in overall health are 
required as catalysts for the adoption of health promoting behaviours, like 
smoking cessation. Indeed they proposed that if the daily lives of men in social 
class V are more hazardous (as can be seen by the high level of mortality from 
accidents), then smoking poses no immediate threat: 
“The hazardous environments faced by individuals from lower social 
classes affect their likelihood of quitting smoking not only because 
dealing with such circumstances takes precedence over smoking 
cessation but because within these environments smoking is often an 
important pleasure and coping mechanism.”(Lawlor 2003 269) 
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The authors concluded that smoking cessation must have easily observable 
benefits, and via the mechanisms provided in lay epidemiology, this has not 
occurred for those in social class V. The operation of lay epidemiology therefore 
accounts for the relative failure of smoking cessation programmes amongst the 
most deprived. Similarly, in their commentary on sun exposure and health risks 
Ness et al (1999) proposed that from a lay epidemiological perspective sun 
exposure offers more benefits than harm. The numbers of people dying from skin 
cancer are relatively low and they claimed that there are some diseases, like 
cardiovascular disease, mental health and dermatological conditions that benefit 
directly from sun exposure. They cautioned against the reduction of vitamin D 
exposure which potentially has adverse effects. They concluded that lay 
epidemiology is ‘ahead of medical thinking’ and ask that more definitive data on 
the risks associated with sun exposure is presented. This position is questioned 
by evidence from Australia. Australia has the highest level of skin cancer 
incidence in the world and Sinclair & Foley (2009) suggested that campaigns 
around safe sun messages have been successful in reducing the overall 
melanoma incidence. Arguably what has been achieved in Australia is a cultural 
shift in attitude towards sun exposure. Such a change, Rose believed, would 
reduce the effect of the prevention paradox. Miller (2005) used the lay 
epidemiology model to explain the behaviour of injecting drug users (IDUs) in 
Australia. He found that his respondents’ risky behaviour was justified by the 
landscape of drug use and illness in one particular community, rather than 
mainstream health education. This chimes in, not only with Davison’s finding 
about the influence of community observations but also, given the size of 
Miller’s population, Hunt and Emslie’s (2001) commentary that emphasised the 
importance of ‘family’ experience in defining beliefs.  
Such studies prompted Allmark and Tod’s (2006) to question ‘How should public 
health professionals engage with lay epidemiology?’ Here they set out the 
ethical arguments around public health’s engagement with lay epidemiology. 
While they acknowledged the power of the prevention paradox, they supported 
the need for public health messages that are ‘meaningful’. They questioned the 
ethics of public health challenging what may be seen as core cultural values in 
communities, but accept that in state-funded health services such challenges 
are more acceptable. They concluded that by being mindful of the mechanisms 
Chapter 2  39 
in lay epidemiology, public health may have more success. Similarly Watterson 
(1994) and Bury (1994) in earlier papers called for health educators to take more 
notice of lay epidemiology. Bury (1994) referred to public responses to health 
promotion as largely a ‘black box’. He looked to health beliefs literature 
generally and lay epidemiology more specifically to demystify these notoriously 
complex relationships. Both authors suggested that if the unpredictable nature 
of health and illness is at least acknowledged by health promotion this may 
engender greater public confidence in preventive strategies.  
Many of the papers that have cited Davison’s original work focus broadly on lay 
understandings of CHD. For example, Smith et al (1999) conducted a large 
quantitative survey of Australian residents that was designed to ascertain the 
estimated preventability of a number of common conditions including skin and 
lung cancer, CHD, and diabetes. While Davison claimed that people commonly 
believed that CHD was preventable, only a small number of respondents in 
Smith’s survey concurred. Instead most (44%) thought that CHD was sometimes 
preventable. Of all the diseases surveyed diabetes was thought least 
preventable. They concluded that individuals generally under-rated the 
preventability of conditions. Preston (1997) in an ethnographic study of CHD-risk 
families echoed Davison’s work. According to Preston, the families had a clear 
view of what a coronary candidate ‘looked like’ and when people who had 
suffered CHD did not fit the ideal type it caused ‘conflict’ in their belief 
systems. Preston demonstrated that families opted into only those health-giving 
behaviours that fitted into already established lifestyles, rather than adopting an 
entire regime change. Again the importance of luck and fate in risk models 
emerged from Preston’s data. Wiles (1998) was primarily concerned with 
rehabilitation following a heart attack and found that participants had fixed 
notions of coronary candidates and described many anomalous CHD deaths. This 
led participants to conclude that their recovery would be governed by fate and 
luck rather than lifestyle modification. In a west of Scotland study that 
considered perceptions of family history and CHD, Emslie and colleagues found, 
as is consistent with the other studies, that respondents described an 
explanatory model of CHD that included a range of behavioural, lifestyle and 
hereditary factors (Emslie, Hunt & Watt 2001a). Unlike other studies, 
respondents in this study introduced structural factors which may be explained 
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by the prevalence of socio-economic disadvantage in the west of Scotland. Both 
the unpredictability and speed of heart disease was noted. Heart attacks were 
therefore regarded as a quick, and relatively painless, death. These views were 
often discussed in the context of other family illness experiences that were slow 
and painful, like lung cancer. Heart disease and heart attacks in old age were 
viewed positively. Drawing on data from the same study, Emslie, Hunt and Watt 
(2001b) questioned the omission of gender in Davison’s original analysis. They 
argued that masculinity is central to coronary candidacy and that anomalous 
deaths and unwarranted survivors too, are a wholly masculine concept. This led 
them to conclude that the language used is misrepresentative. When Davison 
used the term CHD, this actually referred to ‘heart attacks’, rather than the 
chronic morbidity which is more commonly associated with women. They also 
questioned the connection between candidacy and age. In the original model of 
candidacy, Davison paid little attention to age, and claimed that ‘after the age 
of about 40, candidacy seems to increase with age’. Emslie and colleagues 
argued more attention be given to the importance of age in the candidacy 
model. Older people dying of CHD were thought to have died of old age more 
than CHD, thus negating the need to consider candidacy. A further paper from 
the same team (McConnachie et al 2001) considered the presence of ‘anomalous 
deaths’ and ‘unwarranted survivors’ in a west of Scotland cohort. They 
examined visible risk factors – smoking and BMI, together with less visible risk 
factors like blood pressure, cholesterol, social class and deprivation. They found 
that visible risk factors were useful predictors of death from CHD. Those who 
may be regarded as unwarranted survivors had fewer non-visible risk factors 
than their counterparts. Similarly those judged to have an anomalous death had 
a higher non-visible risk profile than others in the low risk group. This echoed 
Marteau et al’s finding that the lay epidemiologist is more likely to rely on 
visible risk factors than non-visible factors like cholesterol, primarily of course, 
because they can only access visible risk factors (Marteau et al 1995). Another 
study that aimed to redress the gender imbalance in the study of CHD was 
carried out by Ruston and Clayton (2002). They interviewed women at high risk 
of CHD who they found arrived at ways of working a lower personal risk into 
their estimation. This was done by simply assuming that men were at greater 
risk, especially by virtue of their employment. They point out that not only do 
Chapter 2  41 
women rarely feature in qualitative studies of CHD but they were routinely 
excluded from large quantitative explanations.  
In a study concerned with the development of an intervention aimed at changing 
health behaviours, Angus et al (2005) questioned high risk individuals about their 
risk of CHD. They found that mechanisms similar to the lay epidemiological 
model were employed by focus group respondents to estimate risk.  Interestingly 
Angus cited many studies including Davison’s work and that of Emslie, Hunt & 
Watt (2001b) that illustrated a wide variety of terms to describe CHD, including 
a ‘dicky-ticker’. Davison reported that often CHD and the attendant high risk 
behaviour was often discussed in humorous tones. Yet, Angus portrayed a 
different picture of talk about CHD, referring to it as a ‘sneaky’ disease, with 
participants emphasising the unpredictable nature of CHD. This type of language 
is more usually associated with talk about cancer (Lupton 1994), which will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.  
Frich et al’s (2007) study focused on portrayals of candidacy amongst a high risk 
cohort suffering from familial hypercholesterolemia in Oslo. They found that 
even amongst this high risk group, traditional images of candidacy were strong 
and settled on older men who engage in high risk behaviours. They shared 
Emslie’s assertion that candidacy is an exclusively masculine concept and for 
that reason many female participants frequently found the reality of their own 
risk difficult to accept. Younger participants who had few cardiac events in their 
family situation were most likely to reject candidacy and think instead that CHD 
could happen to anyone. Many were keen to make distinctions between those 
who could and could not be held responsible for their own risk status, and often 
sought to distance themselves from traditional candidates. Commenting on the 
morality of typical candidates’ behaviour provided this distance. As with most of 
the studies already reviewed the uncontrollable factors - fate and luck - were 
emphasised, which extended to those thought lucky enough to have strong 
constitutions. While this study obviously focused on a high risk group, their 
familial link was only one among many factors considered when arriving at their 
personal risk assessment. In an almost identical study in the UK, Weiner (2009) 
also found that participants offered biomedical as well as genetic explanations 
of familial-hypercholesterolaemia. As with the Norwegian cohort, Weiner’s 
participants made clear distinctions between ‘inherited cholesterol’ and 
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‘ordinary cholesterol’. Weiner noted though that participants offered examples 
of modifying their behaviour in an attempt to reduce their overall risk. This, 
Weiner argued allowed them to remain morally intact: they were taking 
responsibility for their own health. Weiner found that the idea of Davison’s 
‘coronary candidate’ was tenacious amongst this high risk group and like Frich’s 
found that heredity was only one element in the candidacy profile. Weiner 
proposed that despite Emslie, Hunt and Watt’s (2001b) contention that gender 
was largely missing in lay accounts of CHD, women involved in her study allied 
themselves to the typical male candidate type. 
2.5 Lay epidemiology & Cancer  
Few studies consider cancer and lay epidemiology. Salant and Gehlert’s (2008) 
study looked specifically at breast cancer and took lay epidemiology as its 
starting point. The focus group study with African-American communities in 
Chicago set out to explore respondents’ meaning and understanding of breast 
cancer. Respondents yearned for more simplicity, for pesticide-free food, 
pollution-free environments and settled on the idea that old-fashioned living was 
largely risk free. Aetiological explanations, therefore, focused on ‘modern’ 
living. They found that stigma and fear continued to be associated with breast 
cancer, and especially the ‘risk of knowing’, which might explain women’s 
reluctance to engage in screening programmes. Ignorance provided protection. 
Related to this was the belief that stress could cause cancer and the worry 
connected with ‘dwelling’ on cancer was itself a risk factor. Breast cancer 
candidacy was based on a number of behaviours like smoking and drug and 
alcohol use, as well as hereditary factors and age. Like Clarke, Crotty and 
Pearson (1997) Salant and Gehler found a personal, rather than collective, 
model of breast cancer candidacy. Personal risk estimations rarely featured in 
everyday thoughts and it was not ‘unless it hits home’ that it enters reality. The 
study concluded that ‘community’ beliefs dominated explanations of causality: 
“Through shared experiences of disadvantage and perceptions of 
competing disease risks, community-level understandings of breast 
cancer risk helped to explain the absence or invisibility of the breast 
cancer ‘candidate’ from everyday risk perceptions.” (Salant & 
Gehlert 2008:613) 
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2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has dealt with beliefs about health. Details of a series of studies 
were outlined and collectively they demonstrate the sophistication of lay views 
of health.  The studies have important commonalities. There are significant 
moral undertones present in many of the views expressed and often this 
manifests itself in a reluctance to ‘blame’ individuals for their illness. Related to 
this is scepticism around the preventability of diseases. Such studies though 
must be located in their historical context and it could be argued that they 
emerged at a time when the concentration on risk and preventability in health 
promotion was not well established. Lay epidemiology however emerged from a 
somewhat different cultural and political climate where the emphasis was firmly 
placed on individual responsibility for health. Davison’s model described the 
framework used by ordinary individuals when arriving at beliefs about health 
generally, and perceptions of risk for coronary heart disease, more specifically. 
Davison and colleagues’ work in South Wales uncovered an easily recognisable 
coronary candidate. Mainstream risk factors were integral to coronary candidacy 
but crucially the model had well recognised short-comings. The consequence of 
this, Davison proposed, was scepticism around the avoidance or preventability of 
CHD. Although lay epidemiology has been influential it is arguably under-
developed. Those few studies that have drawn directly on Davison’s work have 
found an enduring image of coronary candidacy. These studies also highlight the 
moral discourse entrenched within views about health. Some of those that 
focused on high-risk populations because of genetic predispositions, concluded 
that participants wanted to distance themselves from personal responsibility and 
were keen to stress the culpability of others. This represents a shift from the 
earlier health beliefs studies where participants generally shied away from 
apportioning blame. A small number of studies have explored lay epidemiology’s 
relevance in other disease categories. Only one study considered lay 
epidemiology in the context of cancer (Salant & Gehlert 2008). Candidacy for 
breast cancer was not as salient as coronary candidacy. The next chapter will 
explore lay understandings of cancer more closely. 
  
3. Understanding Cancer  
3.1 Introduction  
Psychosocial oncology is represented by a large, inter-related and, often 
unwieldy, literature. Each stage of what is commonly termed, the cancer 
journey, has been explored and the experience of patients and their carers well 
documented. Cancer-related interventions too, like screening programmes and 
palliative care, have been given frequent attention. Studies that attempt to 
ascertain knowledge of, and awareness about, cancer are also included in this 
broad genre. These commonly concentrate on understanding of risk factors and 
recognition of symptoms. In addition, many studies can be found that present 
the nuances of experience and beliefs about cancer amongst various social and 
demographic groups.  
Given the abundance of material, the challenge for this thesis was pinpointing 
those areas of literature that were of most relevance. Essentially this section of 
the review must establish two things. First, what do lay people know and think 
about cancer? Second, what is the cultural position of cancer in modern 21st 
century society? As the previous chapter outlined, lay epidemiology is 
fundamentally about the recognition of risk both in oneself and others. With this 
in mind the literature under review here will focus on awareness and knowledge 
of ‘risk’ in relation to cancer. It must be noted that there will be some degree of 
overlap with awareness of risks and symptoms and such studies will not be 
excluded. Those that focus solely on awareness and knowledge of cancer 
symptoms, without dealing with risk or causation, will not be reviewed, for a 
recent example see Robb et al (2009). Other literatures that were judged 
irrelevant were those that had screening, and similar preventive behaviours, as 
their main focus. Further, as has been previously specified, this study has looked 
at cancer as a generic disease rather than the more usual site-specific approach 
but studies that were concerned with particular cancer sites are included.  
This chapter will therefore be divided in two. The first sections from 3.2-3.6 will 
look at what people know about cancer, and include cancer awareness, cancer 
risk and cancer ethnograpghies. The focus will be on the biomedical 
Chapter 3  45 
understanding of cancer. The second section 3.7-3.10 will look at the cultural 
position inhabited by cancer, providing an insight into the social understanding 
of cancer and the media representation of cancer. Together the sections will 
give a picture of what cancer means.  
3.2 Cancer Risk Factors 
Cancer is a complex disease and the multisite nature of the disease means that 
there are a number of known risk factors. There are also a series of reported risk 
factors, for instance, mobile phone use, that are questioned. It is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to provide a detailed breakdown of risks per cancer site and 
a review of the evidence regarding individual risk factors. However, it is helpful 
to be aware of the information available to the lay public about cancer risk 
factors. To this end, the information available from Cancer Research UK, is 
presented. Cancer Research UK is the country’s largest and most widely known 
cancer charity. The charity has a website that provides a great deal of 
information about cancer to the public, patients and professionals alike. Table 1 
gives detail of the risk factors, according to Cancer Research UK, that have been 
linked with cancer. Some are well-established, others are, more controversial
 Table 1 Cancer Risk Factors * 
 Behavioural Biological  Environmental Psychological 




Obesity & Dietary Factors Shift work  
Low levels of physical activity 
Age 
HRT  





     
Cosmetics & hair dyes Stress 






Reported   
Pesticides 
 
* The information in this table can be found on Cancer Research UK’s website.  www.cancerresearchuk.org
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3.3 What do the public know about cancer? 
3.3.1 Historical Perspectives 
The American Cancer Society carried out its first survey of cancer awareness 
among the public in 1948. Since then, in the numerous studies that have 
followed, the main focus has tended to be the public’s knowledge and awareness 
of warning signs or symptoms of cancer, though some do include more general 
questions about cancer incidence and risk factors. For instance, Horn and 
Waingrow (1964) provided an overview of the American Cancer Society’s cancer 
awareness survey and chart changes in responses to surveys over three time 
periods 1948, 1955 and 1962. They showed that over the 14 year period fewer 
people believed that cancer was contagious, more people would be willing to 
work next to someone who had cancer, and more thought that someone could 
have cancer but not know it. Interestingly, one of the aims of the public 
education campaigns was to discourage the association between cancer and old 
age (now an accepted association) and the authors concluded that awareness in 
this area too was improving. Cartwright and Martin (1958), in a study intended to 
assess awareness of tuberculosis, offered an interesting insight into popular 
views of cancer aetiology. In series of interviews with adults in Edinburgh they 
found that the most frequently reported cause of cancer was trauma via a knock 
or a bruise, followed by smoking, environmental factors like pollution, heredity 
and finally stress. They found that younger interviewees were more likely to opt 
for smoking and environmental causes, while those in older age groups were 
more likely to mention physical trauma. In a more recent, but admittedly dated 
study, Luther, Price and Rose (1982) presented data from the first ‘random digit 
dialling’ questionnaire in the United States that attempted to gauge levels of 
cancer awareness amongst the US public. They found that almost three quarters 
of respondents believed that smoking was the most likely cause, followed by 
food and drink, pollution, chemicals and sun exposure.  
3.3.2 Awareness in the information age 
In the context of psychosocial oncology as a whole, relatively little research 
examines or explores the general public’s view of cancer. A number of large 
population based cross-sectional questionnaire studies have been carried out  
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that provide details of what the general public believe to be risk factors for 
cancer. Breslow and colleagues (1997) accessed views of 12,000 members of the 
general public in the United States and they concluded that knowledge of cancer 
risk factors was poor. Respondents were unable to make connections between 
cancer and increasing age, between bowel cancer and dietary factors, and 
between sexual activity and cervical cancer. In a similar, smaller study of UK 
adults, Wardle et al (2001) asked respondents to identify risk factors for cancer 
from a prescribed list. The list included established causes, like smoking, dietary 
factors, viruses and infections and those labelled ‘mythic’ or ‘distracter’ items 
like stress, pollution and living near power lines. The strongest association was 
made between smoking and lung cancer, and smoking was identified as a risk 
factor for all cancers. Most were aware of the links between number of sexual 
partners and cervical cancer risk. Neither family history nor age were considered 
important risk factors. Amongst the mythic causes, stress was the most 
frequently selected risk factor, particularly for breast cancer. Food additives 
and pollution were thought to be significant in bowel and lung cancer 
respectively. They also found that awareness was socially patterned and both 
women and those with higher levels of education were more likely to correctly 
identify risk factors. The authors concluded that although few respondents had 
selected mythic causes, adults in the UK had a poor awareness of cancer risk 
factors.  
A similar methodology was employed to provide baseline information for Cancer 
Research UK’s education programme in 2004 (Redeker et al 2009). As with 
Wardle et al’s study, questionnaire respondents were offered both established 
and mythic risk factors. The findings were similar. The link between smoking and 
cancer was almost universally accepted. Three-quarters of respondents in this 
study were aware of the association between sun exposure and skin cancer. Both 
alcohol consumption and obesity were selected as risk factors by a third of 
respondents. Stress was again the most common mythic risk factor and ‘living 
near power lines’ too was endorsed. Common misconceptions also featured in 
Stein et al’s telephone survey (Stein et al 2007) which calculated a health 
literacy score for respondents. Literacy, and therefore awareness, was 
patterned according to socio-demographic variables. Lower awareness was found 
among men, older adults, non-whites and those on low incomes. Adlard and 
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Hume’s (2003) study in UK general practice however found that questionnaire 
respondents were likely to opt for known risk factors like smoking, diet and 
alcohol, rather than misconceptions like vitamin tablets and power cables. As 
well as smoking and infections, stress was also widely identified as a risk factor 
in a Japanese population study (Inoue et al 2006) where family history and 
genetics were also thought to be important. The significance of family history as 
a risk factor for breast cancer was also identified in an Australian study that 
looked at a series of common cancers (Reeder & Trevena 2003). More than half 
the respondents failed to name any risk factors for breast cancer and the vast 
majority were not aware of any of the risks associated with prostate cancer. 
Respondents were clear though about the risks attached to both smoking and sun 
exposure. Makris et al (1994) in a large quantitative study of University students 
in Greece found that awareness of risk factors and causality was poor across 
cancers. One study (Murray & McMillan 1993) that aimed to look specifically at 
gender differences in beliefs about cancer found that cancer was the most 
feared disease generally, though women were more fearful than men.  A factor 
analysis found that most saw stress, health behaviour and environment as 
important causal factors, though gender differences in perceived causality 
emerged – men were more likely to believe that cancer was caused by behaviour 
and women by heredity. Conversely, Thomas & Fick (1993) found that men were 
more pessimistic about cancer detection and outcomes than women. Fatalistic 
attitudes were found to be widespread across the American population by 
Niederdeppe & Levy (2007), with around half their respondents believing that “it 
seems like almost everything causes cancer”. They found that such beliefs were 
concentrated among those less educated and that whites were more likely to be 
fatalistic than those from other minority-ethnic groups. Those who engaged in 
positive health behaviours were less likely to be fatalistic. 
The above studies show that awareness of cancer risks is at the same time 
erratic and relatively predictable. It comes as little surprise that, without 
exception, smoking was selected as a significant risk factor by almost all 
respondents across most studies. The identification of other risks is readily 
explained by local idiosyncrasies. Infection in Japan or sun exposure in Australia 
reflects the higher incidence of gastric cancers and melanoma and in each of 
these countries. What these risk factors have in common is media attention on 
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the cancer-site, risks and prevention. Given the lack of publicity prostate cancer 
receives, it is unsurprising that 80% of respondents failed to name any risk 
factors (Reeder & Trevena 2003). Knowledge reflects readily available 
information. Concentration on environmental or genetic risk factors in 
individuals’ models indicate mass media fixation with these areas. One paper 
(Stein et al 2007) was critical of the media’s unnecessary concentration on the 
importance of pollution and recommends investment in smoking cessation 
programmes.  
The studies hint at a tendency for respondents to accept false causal 
relationships between ‘mythic’ factors and cancer (Breslow et al 1997, Wardle 
et al 2001, Redeker et al 2009). Such conclusions lead to calls for improved 
information but perhaps the value of including such falsehoods requires 
consideration. Methodologically, questionnaires fail to capture reasoning and a 
greater understanding is needed of why stress is so widely regarded as a risk 
factor for cancer. Moreover, one might argue that the very inclusion of 
misconceptions in questionnaires exacerbates misunderstandings. Providing 
prescribed lists of risks may simply prompt endorsement and Waller and 
colleagues (Waller, McCaffrey and Wardle 2004) found extremely poor 
unprompted recall of warning signs and risks for breast and bowel cancer and 
when prompts were offered levels of awareness improved greatly Their study 
leads them to conclude that studies of awareness that provide a tick-box format 
may be overestimating knowledge and awareness.  
3.3.3 Site-specific knowledge 
More common than studies that aim to gauge general awareness about cancer 
are those that have adopted a site-specific approach to cancer awareness. Both 
breast and colorectal cancer are frequently considered. Oral, skin, 
gynaecological, and urological have been surveyed less frequently. Few studies 
have looked specifically at lung cancer despite its impact on mortality.  
Studies that reported awareness of breast cancer show that perceptions of risk 
are poorly understood (Ibrahim 1991; Paul et al 1999; Grunfeld et al 2002; 
McMenamin et al 2005; Linsell et al 2008). Assessments of lifetime risk were 
wildly underestimated: almost a third of respondents thought that their risk was 
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one in a thousand (Grunfeld et al 2002) and another study found that half of all 
respondents judged their lifetime risk as one in a hundred (Linsell et all 2008). 
Other studies reported the over-estimation of risk (Paul et al 1999; Wilcox & 
Stefanick 1999; McMenamin et al 2005). Knowledge about risk factors is equally 
poor. In particular the association between older age and breast cancer is 
recognised rarely. Most women believe that breast cancer is a disease that 
affects younger women. There is some evidence that the over-estimation of risk 
has increased since the 1980s (Paul et al 1999). Understanding of life-style 
factors in relation to breast cancer is both limited and erratic across countries 
(Peacey et al 2006). Stress is commonly thought to be a risk factor (Payne 1991). 
Risks for colorectal cancers include age, family history and lifestyle factors. 
Awareness of these links is variable. In a European comparison, Keighley and 
colleagues (2004) found that neither age nor family histories were recognised 
risk factors. Although diet was reasonably well recognised, few made 
connections between physical inactivity and colorectal cancer. An earlier British 
study (McCaffrey, Wardle and Waller 2003) reported that the majority of 
participants could name no risk factors for colorectal cancer and awareness of 
the importance of age, family history or diet was extremely poor.  
Studies that have considered public awareness of oral cancer have found that 
only a little over half of the sample were aware of the very existence of oral 
cancer (Warnakulasuriya et al 1999; Horrowitz, Canto & Child 2002). More 
recently overall awareness has improved and there is widespread recognition of 
the connection between smoking and oral cancer, though the evidence about the 
impact of information on high risk groups is mixed (Lowry & Craven 1999; 
Humphris, Freeman and Clarke 2004). Understanding of the links between 
alcohol and oral cancer is less well appreciated (Lawoyin et al 2003; West et al 
2006; Elango et al 2009). Smoking is a well-established risk factor for both lung 
and oral cancer but recognition of its role in other cancers is weak. Neider et al 
(2006) in a study of bladder and renal cancer found that just under a third of 
respondents correctly identified the association between smoking and urological 
cancers compared with 98% who made the links between smoking and lung 
cancer. More recent data suggested that awareness of such links has improved 
slightly (Anastasiou et al 2010). Fitzpatrick et al’s study of prostate cancer 
(Fitzpatrick et al 2009), found that awareness of risks, like age and family 
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history were good but respondents were less sure about the role of behavioural 
factors. Again they reported startling misconceptions, for example 10% of the 
non-patient sample believed that prostate cancer affected men and women 
equally. The international study also found variation by country, for example, 
28% of German men believed that they could reduce prostate cancer risk by not 
carrying their mobile phone in their pocket. The authors concluded that 
awareness had improved since their previous study (Schulman, Kirby & 
Fitzpatrick 2003) but that overall personal risk perception was poor. 
Gynaecological cancers fare little better. A series of studies have shown that the 
initial failure to make links between sexual activity, HPV and cervical cancer has 
improved (Buga 1998; Pitts and Clarke 2002; Waller, McCaffrey & Wardle 2004; 
Marlow, Waller & Wardle 2007). The recent introduction of the HPV vaccine 
provided an opportunity for the discussion of the sexual transmission of the virus 
and successfully raised awareness of the risks associated with HPV and cervical 
cancer (Gerend & Magliore 2008). Ovarian cancer is less researched and 
consequentially less understood, though knowledge is improved with experience 
via a friend or relative (Lockwood-Rayermann et al 2009). Although the risks of 
sun exposure are well established in some countries (Reeder & Trevena 2003) 
they remain poorly understood in the USA (ADA 1995) and the UK (Hiom 2006). 
Sun exposure in the UK is believed to be harmless and the appetite for sun-bed 
use remains buoyant and the risks under-appreciated (Amir et al 2000).  
The startling omissions amongst these site-specific studies are studies that 
consider lung cancer. Though it may be argued that the almost universal 
recognition of the links between lung cancer and smoking negate the need for 
such studies.  
Overall, investigating the knowledge and awareness of risk factors for cancer 
amongst the lay public is a neglected activity. Any review of the available data 
demonstrates that if information is provided awareness increases. It might be 
assumed that levels of awareness had improved dramatically since the original 
American Cancer Society surveys but when considered more closely, the picture 
is more complex. Improving awareness has not been a steady and equitable 
process. Some cancers have fared better (or worse, depending on your view 
point) than others. Moreover certain aspects of information seem to have been 
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embraced more readily than others. For example, Barrat et al (1997) found that 
awareness of mammography as a detection tool for breast cancer had more than 
doubled in the eight years between 1988 and 1996 but that respondents 
possessed a scant understanding of risk. The responsibility for levels of 
awareness and variation in knowledge can be at least partly attributed to media 
coverage. Much has been written about the predominance of breast cancer in 
the mass media (Gottlieb 2001). Yet, those areas where less is known or certain 
about risks within the scientific community are unlikely to be fully grasped by 
the lay public. The emergence of the importance of genetics for certain cancers 
has impacted on understanding and awareness. This is something that will be 
returned to in the coming sections on risk, the cultural position of cancer and 
the overall treatment of cancer in the media. For instance, around half the 
women surveyed endorsed a link between family history and ovarian cancer but 
genetics explain only 10–15% of cancers (Lockwood-Rayermann et al 2009).  
The studies reviewed thus far illustrate changes in awareness over time. Clearly 
publicity has an impact The early studies from the American Cancer Society were 
keen to encourage a move away from the supposition that cancer was a disease 
that simply affected older people. The challenge facing health educators today, 
particularly with breast cancer is to re-establish age as a significant risk factor.  
3.3.4 Variations in cancer awareness 
Many of the studies reviewed have reported different levels of awareness based 
on socio-demographic variables like education, socio-economic status and 
gender. Those with higher levels of education were judged to be more 
knowledgeable about cancer in a number of studies (Weinrich et al 1992; 
Breslow et al 1997; Ratnasinghe, Weed & Shankar 1999; Wardle et al 2001; 
McCaffrey, Wardle & Waller 2003). Weinrich et al (1992) also found that those 
with higher levels of income possessed greater cancer knowledge. Typically, 
women are reported to be more knowledgeable than men (Wardle et al 2001; 
McCaffrey, Wardle & Waller 2003).  
In their review of health beliefs, cancer and ethnicity, Pfeffer and Moynihan 
(1996) documented the lack of relevant British research. They outlined the 
common problems associated with gathering meaningful health beliefs data and 
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make a plea that this is approached with more sensitivity. They also found that 
most studies of ethnicity and health focus on a single ‘ethnic’ group, rather than 
compare the ethnic minority with the white majority. More recently Scanlon & 
Wood (2005) found that there were significant differences in breast cancer 
awareness both between different minority ethnic groups and between those 
groups and the general population. The same is not true of the United States 
where ethnicity is always considered and reported. Dein (2004) provided an 
overview of research on attitudes towards cancer across the world and 
demonstrated that there are a plethora of studies that highlight the cultural 
nuances apparent in explanatory models of cancer (Perez-Stable et al 1992; 
Mishra, Aoulua & Hubbell 2000; Estape et al 2003).  
3.4 Understanding Cancer Risk 
Estimating risk through the mechanism of candidacy is central to lay 
epidemiology. Candidacy relates to evaluations of risk not just in others but also 
in oneself, although admittedly it was more effective judging others’ risks. In 
the previous section awareness of cancer risk factors was reviewed. Knowledge 
and awareness of risk factors are crucial for the development candidacy models. 
This section will look at the perception of risk in relation to cancer.  
3.4.1 Cancer and the ‘risk society’ 
Risk has become an issue in late modernity. Both Beck (1992) and Giddens (1991) 
have developed discourses around ‘risk society’, which at its most basic refers to 
a society preoccupied with the future. A detailed examination of the concept of 
the risk society is beyond the scope of this thesis but the idea is relevant to 
perceptions of cancer risk in a number of important ways. First, where once the 
major threats were natural disasters that were volatile and attributed to acts of 
God, risks are now thought to be man-made and posed by society itself. Risk has 
become central to the way we think about cancer. First, we are aware of the 
importance of behavioural risk factors in the development of cancer. Moreover 
there are links, albeit contested, between environmental factors and cancer. 
Related to this is the shift towards individual responsibility for health. While 
risks were once experienced at a societal level, risks in the 21st century are 
faced by individuals. This is extremely important in how we think about health in 
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general and cancer more specifically. Epidemiologists construct risk estimates 
which are then used by health promoters and educators. The way in which 
messages about risks were communicated was key for Davison and colleagues in 
explaining the resistance to behavioural change. Resistance or non-adherence to 
health promotion messages that ask people to change their behaviour introduces 
a moral dimension to the risk discourse. The responsibility to engage in good 
behaviours and thus avoid disease lies with the individual (Giddens 1999). If 
people are able to avoid risk, are they able to avoid cancer? If so, according to 
Lupton, risk adopts a ‘moral’ tag (Lupton 1993; 1995): 
“ when risk is believed to be internally imposed because of lack of 
willpower, moral weakness or laziness on the part of the individual, the 
reciprocal relationship of sin and risk is reversed. Those who are deemed 
to be at risk become sinners, not the sinned against, because of their 
apparent voluntary courting of risk.” (Lupton 1995:90)  
Moral judgements are common in cancer narratives and this will be returned to 
in greater depth in the later section on cultural understandings of cancer.  
3.4.2 Cancer and perceptions of risk 
Theories of behavioural change, like the health belief model (Rosenstock, 
Strecher & Becker 1988) and the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen 1991), have 
at their core a requirement to recognise and appreciate risk .Without the 
knowledge that one is at risk one is unlikely to contemplate changing behaviour. 
Yet, surprisingly few studies have focused discreetly on perceptions of cancer 
risk among the ‘lay’ public. There are a number of qualitative studies that 
consider risk perceptions but do so in the context of screening awareness and 
behaviour. Studies that had screening as their main focus were excluded from 
this review. These often examine the decisions about participating in the 
cervical screening programme (Armstrong 2005; Armstrong & Murphy 2008), for 
example among women who have had abnormal pap smear results (Kavanagh & 
Broom 1998; Bertram & Magnussen 2008). There are also a number of studies 
that have looked specifically at the views of minority ethnic groups (Chavez et al 
1995; Cohen & Azaiza 2005, Ackerson, Pohl & Low 2008) Some compare views 
across socio-demographic groups. For example a recent study found that non-
whites perceived themselves to be at lower risk than whites even when other 
important variables like behaviour were controlled (Orom et al 2010). The 
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authors attributed this to variations in perceptions of family history. Non-whites 
were less likely to believe that they had a family history of cancer. Breast 
cancer and mammography screening are also commonly studied, particularly 
amongst those judged to be from high risk families (Chalmers, Thomson & 
Degner 1996; d’ Agincourt-Canning 2005; Bakos et al 2008) or those with an 
identified genetic susceptibility (Ryan & Skinner 1999). There are those that 
concentrated on individuals who have a heightened genetic risk of colorectal 
cancer (Harris, Treloar & Byles 1998; McAllister 2003). Other studies have 
tended to look at high risk groups like smokers (Lowry & Craven 1999; Marteau, 
Rana & Kubba 2002) or those from a particular minority ethnic groups or migrant 
population that are at a heightened risk by virtue of their social status (Lanz et 
al 1994; Morgan, Park & Cortes 1995; Mishra, Aoulua & Hubbell 2000; Allen et al 
2007) 
3.4.3 The lay view of risk 
Those few studies that did examine perceptions of risk among the lay public 
present an understanding of risk that is variable. Humpel and Jones (2004) found 
that most women over-estimated their risk of breast cancer. Robertson (2000) 
similarly found that the risk of breast cancer was over-estimated and that 
women reported that they felt an ‘inevitability’ about breast cancer. 
Perceptions of risk were fluid and that explanatory models changed in light of 
new information. Using tangible examples to inform beliefs about health was 
also documented by Katapodi et al (2005), who introduced the ‘availability 
heurtistic’. Heuristics are information shortcuts and, in the context of health, 
facilitate the development of health belief systems. The availability heuristic 
draws on data which is most convenient to access, like family experience rather 
than information from expert sources (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). Katapodi 
and colleagues suggested that the women involved in their study of breast 
cancer risk had used heuristics to develop a ‘stereotype’ of a high-risk 
individual. They then compared themselves with the stereotype and made their 
risk judgement about themselves accordingly. Most believed that they were at 
low risk because family history was a key feature of the stereotype. Their 
description of the stereotype is akin to the candidacy element of lay 
epidemiology, and like candidacy the women in this study gave examples of the 
stereotype failing. Although they concluded that all the women went through a 
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similar process to arrive at their individual risk assessment as Davison reported 
of candidacy, what is less clear is the universality of the stereotype. The 
universality of the coronary candidate was fundamental for lay epidemiology. 
Risk was similarly underestimated in studies of colorectal cancer (Robb, Miles & 
Wardle 2004, 2007; Hay, Coups & Ford 2006). Robb, Miles and Wardle (2004) 
found that perceived risk of colorectal cancer was higher among those with a 
family history of the disease, poorer self-reported health, higher levels of 
anxiety, the presence of bowel symptoms, smokers and the physically inactive. 
Men and older-age groups tended to under-estimate their risk. Similar 
conclusions were reached by Hay, Coups and Ford (2006), though the 
relationships between smoking and risk and gender and risk were not upheld. 
Bowel symptoms, anxiety and poor self-reported health were again associated 
with a higher perceived risk (Robb, Miles & Wardle 2007). The qualitative arm of 
this study however found that more than half of the participants believed that 
their risk was average. Diet was central to the risk estimate, though the authors 
concluded that family history is critical in any estimation of risk.  
A more general exploration of health promotion and cancer prevention was 
undertaken by Goldman et al (2008). They studied a group of working class 
people who had been exposed to a health promotion programme in the work-
place, and found that most did not think cancer. There was widespread 
acceptance of risk factors – smoking, diet, the use of sunbeds, and obesity were 
commonly reported. While smoking was the most common risk factor, good 
nutrition was seen as the key to cancer prevention. Food additives were thought 
to be especially hazardous. As in other studies stress was also thought to be a 
risk factor. Environmental factors like toxins, radiation, power lines and 
pollution were all introduced into interviews by participants. Environmental 
dangers posed by working conditions were also cited as risk factors. A widely 
held view was that ‘cancer is in us or around us, waiting to happen’ (Goldman 
2008:784). Genetics, though not linked with all health issues, were frequently 
mentioned in relation to cancer.  
A recent thematic synthesis carried out by Lipworth et al (2010) reviewed the 
literature on perceptions of cancer risk. The review included 87 papers that 
dealt with risk perception among high-risk groups and screening across a range 
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of groups. The information is synthesised into eight categories: perceptions of 
risk, the process of risk perception, seeking control and taking responsibility, 
experiencing cancer directly, constructing risk temporally, embodying risk, 
identifying with risk and constructing risk in a social context.  Although not all of 
the categories are relevant, it was clear that perceptions of risk are not 
straightforward. While many sought to control their risk by behaviour 
modification or screening, others found strategies that allowed risk to be denied 
(Murray & Turner 2004). Many of those with an increased genetic risk, down-
played the overall importance of the genetic component (Sanders et al 2003). 
Some reported struggling to reconcile the unavoidable nature of risk, and many 
were fatalistic. 
The finding that had most in common with lay epidemiology was the 
construction of risk in a social context, and although the findings in this section 
refer in part to relationships with health professionals, they include one study 
that considered the community experience of cancer (Salant & Gehlert 2008). 
Salant and Gehlert’s study of African-American women drew on the ideas 
embodied in lay epidemiology. They conducted a series of focus groups and were 
particularly interested in the ‘community’ response to breast cancer risk. They 
found that participants evoked memories of a nostalgic time where risk was 
reduced because life was thought to be ‘purer’. Participants emphasised the 
chemical aetiology of cancer, including pesticides. Stress was also thought to be 
major risk factor for breast cancer. Perceptions of candidacy were mixed though 
the major elements inherent in breast cancer candidacy were hereditary factors, 
poor lifestyle and age – though both older and younger women were identified as 
candidates. They did not find a precise model of causality or candidacy. Many 
participants reported that they gave no consideration to breast cancer unless 
they were confronted with it but that perceptions of risk are integral to their 
community’s feeling of victimization.  
Lipworth and colleagues (2010) concluded that what many of the studies 
included in their review had in common, was the assumption that if lay beliefs 
do not match those of health professionals, then the public are ignorant. The 
review recommended that the many factors that shape perceptions of risk 
should be taken into account including social, personal and psychological 
factors. Lipworth’s synthesis is the only review available that brings together 
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literature on perceptions of cancer risk factors. This method of qualitative 
synthesis attempts to pull together findings from disparate studies and present a 
single message (Dixon-Woods 2006). However, including 87 studies makes this a 
large qualitative review. Although they aimed to include a very wide range of 
studies the meaningfulness of the resultant data must be questioned. The 
variety in both the types of participants and the subjects under study means the 
conclusions lack depth. They identified gaps in the existing literature and 
confirmed that ‘at risk’ groups are most commonly the subjects of studies that 
seek to explore risk. There is scope therefore to consider the views of the 
‘ordinary’ person in relation to risk. 
3.4.4 Risks and Genetics 
Genetic risk is an area of great importance in terms of cancer beliefs. Family 
history is frequently placed at the centre of risk assessments – either for others 
or oneself. Scientific advances that have resulted in the identification of cancer 
genes have clearly captured the public’s imagination. Specific genes BRCA 1 and 
BRCA 2 have been linked with breast and ovarian cancer and genetic elements 
are also found in some colorectal cancers, prostate and testicular cancers. 
Introducing a series of papers entitled ‘Public Understanding of Science’ in 1995, 
Macintyre predicted a future where people could be screened for a ‘wide range 
of cancers’. The paper called for a ‘scientific understanding of the public’ 
(Macintyre 1995:228), where professionals appreciate the public’s sophistication 
in this issue, rather than assume that they are unable to correctly process this 
data. According to Macintrye, many of the important factors, like interpretations 
of chance and probability, are well understood and moreover, that many studies 
of lay beliefs about health and illness show how embedded in British popular 
culture are ideas about the inheritability of diseases (Macintyre 1995:228). 
While this may be true, there is also evidence that risk can be underestimated 
because of the assumptions about inheritability (Kapodi et al 2005). In reality 
familial links explain only a small part of the risk. Further, the folly of assuming 
that lay and expert models of genetic risk are similar is demonstrated by Parsons 
and Atkinson (1992). In their seminal study of perceptions of risk among families 
with Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy they found that the women they interviewed 
often misinterpreted the risk information given to them, which in turn had 
influenced their reproductive decisions. This tied in with Gifford’s (1986) 
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assertion that while for the epidemiologist the calculation of risk is an objective, 
technical process, but for the lay person it is a subjective, lived experience 
drawing on many different types of information. As Blaxter (1999) cautioned: 
“there is a considerable risk in the assumption that we are all talking 
about the same thing" (Blaxter, 1999: 23). 
Irrespective of the difficulties associated with genetics and cancer, it is an area 
that is receiving increased attention. Although the great majority of cancers 
have no genetic element, significant efforts have been made to raise awareness 
of cancer genetics. Piniewski-Bond et al (2003) evaluated a widespread 
advertising campaign to raise awareness of the cancer and genetics. They found 
that around 40,000 households had been aware of the campaign and around 
15,000 had changed their views as a result. Although the authors conclude that 
the campaign served to eradicate myths about cancer genetics, much of the 
work that has been done reports that this is an area that is poorly understood. 
Of the 87 papers included in the thematic synthesis by Lipworth and colleagues, 
23 dealt directly with ‘cancer families’. The location of a gene for breast cancer 
has led to a substantial amount of work which explores the perceived risks of 
women with a family history of breast and or ovarian cancer (Chalmers et al 
1996; McAllister et al 1998; Ryan & Skinner 1999; Werner-Lin 2007). Also of 
colorectal cancer (Jacobs 2002, Harris, Treloar and Byles 1998). One concept 
introduced by Lipworth and colleagues is that of ‘liminality’ (Lipworth 2010), 
where those from at- risk families describe a sense where they are neither 
sufferers nor disease free. There is an important distinction to be made between 
those cancers where a ‘gene’ can be isolated and tested for, others where there 
may be a hereditary element, like prostate cancer, and those where there is no 
link. Macintyre claimed that the public understanding of genetics and disease is 
embedded in our society but the difficulty is that it may be that it is too 
embedded. Most of the studies already included here reported that people 
believe there to be a strong hereditary element in cancer, and as Kerr et al 
(1998) suggested, people falsely estimate their genetic risk. It is perhaps not 
surprising that those with a greater number of affected relatives believe 
themselves to have a higher risk (Beebe-Dimmer 2004).  
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3.4.5 Cancer risk models  
The discovery of cancer genes and the rise in importance of risk has driven the 
development of cancer risk models. The result has been a burgeoning literature 
in this area (Freedman 2005) and a number of models that calculate risk. The 
National Cancer Institute in the US devotes a website to the calculation and 
estimation of risk8. Much of the literature in this area has focused on the 
understanding of risk and the most appropriate means of imparting such 
information. Han and colleagues (2007, 2009a, 2009b) have been prolific 
commentators in this area and have produced a series of papers that explore 
participants’ views about and understanding of risk models, many of which were 
being promoted by the US National Cancer Institute. Much of Han’s work 
considered the preferences for the presentation of risk information and models 
but concluded that risk could be interpreted in many different ways.  
3.4.6 Risk and Cause: a semantic distinction? 
While risk may be open to interpretation, it does refer to a prospective rather 
than retrospective judgement. Risk is probabilistic in nature and as Gabe (1995) 
posited, while it was once a neutral term, it has become almost wholly negative. 
The language of risk is important. All of the studies on awareness have asked 
individuals to comment on associations between risk factors and cancer, not 
causal relationships. Retrospective candidacy refers to perceived causal 
relationships – obesity caused the CHD event. Davison admitted that candidacy is 
less powerful when making future risk assessments.  
There are few studies that discuss causality and cancer amongst the lay public. 
Some, like Blaxter’s study, had health generally rather than cancer specifically 
as its focus (Blaxter 1982). Where there is a larger literature is the area of 
‘causal attribution’. These studies employ psychological concepts, like Health 
Locus of Control (Wallaston 1976) to gain an understanding of people’s health 
beliefs, particularly about aetiology. Typically studies of causal attribution take 
cancer patients and survivors as their sample and ask them to propose the 
reason for the development of their disease (Faller Schilling & Lang 1995; Kohli 
1998; Stewart et al 2001a, 2001b; Arman et al 2006; Costanzo et al 2005). Many 
                                         
8
 http://riskfactor.cancer.gov/cancer_risk_prediction/ 
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of these studies have found that the importance of behavioural factors is 
underestimated (Maskarinec et al 2001) and typically that cancer patients are 
less certain about causality than non-patients (Linn, Linn and Stein 1982).  
3.5 Cancer ethnography 
Most of the studies outlined in the first section on cancer awareness among the 
general public deployed large questionnaire cross-sectional studies. Those 
studies in the previous section on perceptions of cancer risk highlighted the 
complexity of beliefs about cancer. Few studies have set out to capture the 
views of the lay population about what causes cancer, particularly in the UK and 
USA (Dein 2004). There have been a number of studies that have looked 
specifically at the understanding of cancer among various ethnic groups, most 
notably in the USA. Dein’s review of this literature suggested that the majority 
of the groups studied have very little biomedical knowledge about cancer but 
they do have firmly held beliefs, many of which are heavily influenced by God 
and fate. One study of particular relevance to the west of Scotland that also 
explored beliefs about cancer in a cultural minority group was Scanlon et al‘s 
(2006) ethnographic study that compared Irish and white British people. A series 
of focus group discussions took place in Glasgow, Manchester and London among 
first, second and third generation Irish individuals and the indigenous white 
British population. They found few differences between the Irish and British 
participants and concluded that neither group had a particularly clear 
understanding of cancer. The majority saw cancer as a single disease that 
affected different parts of the body, though distinctions were made between 
good and bad cancers. Good cancers were those perceived to be curable. 
Participants also felt that some cancers could be “hidden” or “silent”, and the 
sufferer may not know they have the disease. This unpredictable nature of 
cancer emphasised the fear associated with the disease, a response that was 
keenly felt among the groups, irrespective of biomedical advances. Some 
believed that cancer merely required a trigger to set it off. Most participants 
held a complex model of causality and a series of factors were thought to be 
important, including lifestyle, family susceptibility, and the physical 
environment. Irish participants were more likely to believe that cancer could be 
the result of economic disadvantage. Many, particularly Irish participants, were 
sceptical about the influence of lifestyle factors, though interestingly they 
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believed that the traditional rural Irish way of life offered a protection, unlike 
their urban existence, which encouraged unhealthy lifestyles.  
The emphasis on the importance of environmental factors is not novel. In an 
earlier paper, Balshem (1991) recounted her experience as a health professional 
undertaking a research project in Philadelphia in 1980. She had originally 
intended to discuss heart disease but, partly as a result of recent media interest 
in the idea of cancer ‘hot spots’ in Philadelphia, cancer became central to her 
analysis. As with earlier studies (Linn, Linn and Stein 1982) Balshem found that 
the participants in her study concentrated on external factors when seeking an 
explanation for cancer. Most common among them was environmental pollution, 
though both God’s will and fate were also commonly offered as explanations. 
Fate therefore was more important in many ways than lifestyle because although 
lifestyle can improve your chances of avoiding cancer, fate had the ultimate 
power. Balshem attributed the elevated position of fate to the failure of modern 
science to convince her study participants that it was able to provide answers. 
Participants in Balshem’s study bemoaned the fact that ‘everything causes 
cancer’. In this respect cancer is the disease equivalent of the boy who cried 
wolf; if everything causes cancer there is no certainty about anything causing it. 
Participants in Balshem’s study were therefore sceptical of the importance of 
lifestyle factors and much like Davison’s ‘Uncle Norman’ (Davison, Frankel & 
Davey Smith 1991), Balshem’s participants introduced the ‘Defiant Ancestor’ 
who had engaged in all the ‘wrong’ behaviours but remained disease free. While 
the original ‘Uncle Norman’ stereotype simply defied the odds by living to a 
‘ripe old age’ in the context of smoking and drinking heavily, Balshem’s 
ancestors had an additional quality. The ancestors were described in moral 
terms. They were seen to work hard, not to dwell on disease and to have a 
positive attitude. Such features are similar to the respondents in Blaxter’s (1982) 
generational studies of mothers and daughters where work and ‘not giving in’ to 
disease were lauded.  
3.6 Conclusion: What do people know about cancer? 
This section on the understanding of cancer has highlighted a number of critical 
points. First, there are relatively few studies that deal with the understanding 
and awareness of cancer among the general public. Those that are available 
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tend to employ large scale quantitative methods that say little about the 
subtlety and complexity of beliefs. Awareness of cancer risk factors is variable. 
The risks of tobacco are universally accepted and sun exposure is also becoming 
widely recognised as a hazard. Other known risk factors are less well 
appreciated, typically the importance of physical activity and alcohol 
consumption. The public are attached to a number of ‘mythic’ risk factors, 
stress being principal among them. They also appear wedded to the importance 
of heredity across all cancer sites. Many introduce fate and God’s will into 
explanations of causality. Perceptions of risk are similarly variable. Some studies 
report an underestimation of risk and many others find the opposite. 
Undoubtedly the level of media attention the cancer risk factor receives is key 
in shaping beliefs. This would explain both the success of the smoking message 
and the misconception about the links between breast cancer and age.  
As the reliance on ‘Gods will’ as an explanation suggests, the lay public draws on 
more than biomedical explanations in reaching an understanding of cancer. The 
cultural experience of cancer is also important, as the following section 
demonstrates.  
3.7 The culture of cancer 
For Davison, candidacy represented a “cultural mechanism” that allowed an easy 
understanding of what heart disease meant. The coronary candidate is a 
familiar, axiomatic image. It is an image based on a heart which endures strain, 
one that has to work too hard.  This pervasive metaphor, of the heart as a pump, 
fits neatly into the wider mechanistic metaphor dominant in the biomedical 
model. This picture is arguably simplistic but there is no doubt that it aids the 
widespread understanding of ‘heart trouble’, which was central to the power 
and legitimacy of candidacy.  
Cancer is arguably less straightforward and is often thought of as the most 
feared of diseases. If lay epidemiology is to be applicable to cancer then the 
cultural position of cancer needs to be fully understood. The following section 
first considers one of the most influential pieces of writing about cancer, if not 
disease: Sontag’s Illness as Metaphor. It then goes on to look at some of the 
metaphors associated with cancer. As Lupton (1994) argued, metaphors often 
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hint at the way in which a disease is viewed by wider society. The section also 
details the depiction of cancer in the popular press, before concluding with a 
comparison between cancer and heart disease, which is at the core of this 
thesis.  
3.7.1  Illness as metaphor: Sontag and cancer 
Much can be learned about the cultural position of cancer by exploring the 
metaphors associated with the disease. An obvious place to begin is Susan 
Sontag’s ‘Illness as Metaphor’. Published first in 1978, the essay dealt with 
Sontag’s own experience of breast cancer, though arguably it went far beyond 
the conventional personal accounts of living with illness. Sontag drew on the 
experiences of fellow patients and observed interactions in clinics and concluded 
that cancer metaphors worsened the entire disease experience.  
“As long as a particular disease is treated as an evil, invincible 
predator, not just a disease, most people with cancer will indeed be 
demoralized by learning what disease they have.” (Sontag 1978:7)  
Sontag drew comparisons between Tuberculosis, the disease of the 19th century, 
and cancer, the scourge of the 20th century. She referred to both tuberculosis 
and cancer as ‘master illnesses’ because both held social, moral and political 
significance, but they were not indistinguishable. Unlike cancer, tuberculosis 
was romanticised and Sontag provides frequent examples of literary figures who 
have succumbed to ‘consumption’. As Lupton (1994) summarised Sontag’s 
representation of tuberculosis 
“…a disease of romance and passion, a sign of ‘inward-burning’ or 
ardour, conceptualized as disintegration, transparency, hyper-activity 
alternating with elegant languidness, leading to a noble and often 
lyrical death’ (Lupton 1994:58) 
Conversely, cancer had nothing to redeem it. It is ‘horror-filled’, consuming the 
public-psyche with dread. Sontag analysed the way in which cancer had been 
portrayed in the second half of the twentieth century. Her overwhelming 
conclusion was that cancer could not escape the stigma associated with it:  
“…  treating cancer as no mere disease but a demonic enemy, make it 
not just a lethal disease but a shameful one.” (Sontag 1978) 
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This shame, according to Sontag, rendered individuals reluctant to discuss 
potential symptoms. Consequently, they failed to seek help and were 
untreatable by the time they sought help. Sontag’s solution is to purge cancer of 
its symbolism and to view it as a purely biological entity. In her later essay 
(Sontag 2001) Sontag adapted the original Illness metaphor to include AIDS. Here 
she highlighted the morality inherent in illness metaphors. Both cancer and AIDS 
are seen to be punishments for not behaving correctly, for being weak, yet 
reckless and choosing to take risks. Sontag’s chief aim was to de-bunk the taboo 
and stigma. She believed that:  
“The most truthful way of regarding illness – and the healthiest way 
of being ill – is one most purified of, most resistant to, metaphoric 
thinking” (Sontag 1978:3) 
Though Sontag’s motivation was clearly honourable, there are ironies inherent in 
her essays. She overestimates the ability of science and therefore medicine to 
be objective. Moreover, she too utilises metaphors liberally, for example, in the 
introduction: 
“Everyone who is born holds dual citizenship, in the kingdom of the 
well and the kingdom of the sick.”(Sontag 1978:3) 
Sontag has been labelled naïve for suggesting that illness can be free of 
metaphor and more particularly for claiming that bio-medicine, itself riddled 
with, and reliant on, metaphor for meaning, can be objective. The mechanical 
metaphor for the body is central to biomedicine and is used by patients and 
physicians alike. Some of the metaphors are so well-established that Lupton 
questioned whether they are now ‘dead metaphors’. Lupton (1994) showed that 
there are many examples of medical professionals relying on metaphors to 
explain illness to patients. While Lupton acknowledged Sontag’s naivety, she 
also recognised Sontag’s role in illustrating the function of metaphor. People 
make sense of illness through metaphor and Sontag was instrumental in the 
widespread acceptance of this fact. 
Weiss (1997) paid homage to Sontag in a study that interviewed nurses, 
physicians and students about their views of cancer, heart disease and AIDS. The 
project asked participants to provide pictorial images of each disease. Like 
Sontag, Weiss was clear that cancer immediately evokes fear, is inextricably 
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linked with suffering, and only AIDS patients experience similar levels of stigma.  
Yet, she offered a more contemporary analysis of cancer metaphors and claimed 
that rather than being seen as the ‘leprosy of modern times’, as cancer once 
was,  the accent has shifted to more ‘heroic’ metaphors of ‘hope’ and ‘fighting 
spirit’. In the pictorial representations, Weiss claimed that heart disease is 
devoid of imagery. The imagery attached to cancer was undoubtedly familiar. 
Cancer eating the sufferer from within and eventually consuming the whole 
person was presented repeatedly. Interestingly, Weiss found little difference 
between lay and professional depictions.    
Sontag is not without her critics. In a provocatively titled essay ‘Who’s afraid of 
Susan Sontag?, Clow (2001) not only criticised Sontag for her naivety, but 
questioned the entire validity of her premise. Though Clow accepted that cancer 
is a disease that patients are fearful of, she challenged the depth of the stigma 
and the apparent shame associated with the disease. Sontag, and later Patterson 
(1987), cited the euphemisms present in obituaries and implied that this 
evidenced the reluctance to reveal cancer as a cause of death. Clow conducted 
a detailed examination of post-war obituaries. She concluded that obituaries 
were ‘opaque’, which proved nothing and, according to Clow, fewer than 15% of 
all obituaries specified a cause of death. Clow asserted that the presence of 
euphemisms simply confirms cancer. Such an admission however surely serves to 
strengthen Sontag’s argument. Clow stated that rather than attempt to obscure 
cancer, health professionals sought to provide information about cancer on  
mass scale and, what is more, the public had an appetite for personal accounts 
of cancer in newspapers and magazines. Yet Toon’s (2007) account of the public 
health movement in the United Kingdom before the Second World War 
reinforced Sontag’s argument. Toon demonstrated that there was a reluctance 
to provide information about cancer, as it was assumed that information would 
only increase fear. A similar conclusion was reached by Patterson (1987) who 
believed that public enthusiasm for cancer information was the result of 
‘cancerphobia’. Clow cited a Gallup poll from 1940, where 98% of people did not 
see any shame attached to a cancer diagnosis. This challenged Sontag’s 
assumption that a cancer diagnosis is inherently shameful. Clow believed that 
Sontag’s sources have not been sufficiently scrutinised. Though Clow is generally 
supportive of Sontag’s motives and accepted that Illness as Metaphor was 
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profoundly important she concluded that Sontag simply succeeded in 
‘mythologising’ the very metaphors she set out to eliminate: 
“Despite her intellectual prowess, despite the tremendous power and 
importance of Illness as Metaphor, it turns out that some people are 
not afraid of Susan Sontag.” (Clow 2001;310) 
A further critique of Sontag was tendered by Coulehan (2003) who questioned 
the necessity of removing metaphor from the medical encounter and the illness 
experience. Coulehan used the example of the Navajo where narratives and 
metaphors are central to the traditional healing process. 
3.7.2 Historical Perspectives 
Sontag essentially initiated the debate about the culture of cancer. Ten years 
after Sontag, Patterson (1987) published The Dread Disease: Cancer and Modern 
American Culture, a cultural history of cancer since the 1880s. Patterson’s 
account was arguably more academic and evidenced than Sontag’s but both 
reached similar conclusions. Patterson’s work led to a flurry of social histories of 
cancer. Jasen (2002), Aronowitz (2001) and Moscucci (2010) all provide 
interesting accounts that offer clues to the origins of the metaphors that Sontag 
described as so pervasive.  
3.7.3 Cancer Metaphors 
“ … cancer is a disease which has occasioned a constellation of 
metaphorical systems, largely due to its severity, mystery and 
evasion of medical solutions.” (Lupton 1994: 66)  
Regardless of the legitimacy of Sontag’s interpretation of the stigmatising nature 
of cancer, there is little doubt about the pervasiveness of the metaphoric nature 
of the disease. As the above quote from Lupton suggests there are many 
metaphorical representations of cancer. Cancer itself is a metaphor, and reflects 
the image of a tumour with the protruding legs of a crab. Lupton traced the 
history of cancer metaphors and showed that even in medieval times cancer was 
seen as a ‘gnawing’ animal and as rot invading the body which destroyed 
sufferers from within. There are a number of variations on this theme that bring 
the metaphor up to date. Hawkins’ (1999) analysis of pathographies concluded 
that cancer is often presented as: 
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 ‘an alien intruder or invading enemy’ (Hawkins 1999:66) 
Allied to this are the ubiquitous combative or militaristic metaphors that have 
become standard when describing cancer. ‘War on Cancer’ was declared by US 
President Richard Nixon in 1971 when he launched the National Cancer Act. The 
aim of the Act was to eradicate deaths from cancer and though there have been 
notable improvements in mortality since then, the war continues. In this context 
cancer becomes ‘the enemy’ - a label that invites a string of metaphors. If 
cancer is both a disease that comes ‘from within’ and the ‘enemy’, then the 
leap to combative metaphors seems logical. Moreover, Lupton proposed that the 
use of many of the metaphors in modern media aim to ‘simplify’ cancer and 
improve the public’s understanding of a complex disease. Yet the 
straightforward description of the reproduction of ‘rogue’ cancer cells is easily 
translated as irrational and disorderly. Portraying cancer as an irrational, out of 
control ‘entity’ is also common (Lupton 1994). Unlike other diseases, cancer is 
often assigned a personality, displaying a series of traits. Adjectives like devious, 
sneaky, evasive are all commonly used to characterise cancer (Balshem 1991).  
Herzlich and Pierret (1987) described cancer as ‘THE disease’ of the twentieth 
century:  
“In our representations cancer is the specific illness of our society, 
the prototype of the ‘modern illness’, that has become the very 
embodiment of physical suffering for us.”(Herzlich & Pierret 1987:55)  
Over a number of studies spanning 30 years Herzlich and Pierret collected the 
views of cancer patients. They reported that some participants in their studies 
denied the historical existence of cancer, while others believed that though 
cancer may have existed, it was labelled as something else. Despite the 
participants’ insistence on the modern nature of cancer, Herzlich and Pierret 
charted a long history of accounts of cancer. They cited very early use of the 
‘eating away’ metaphor from Thomas Paynell in 1528 who wrote ‘a canker is a 
melanchoyle impostume, eatynge partes of the bodye’. Death from cancer was 
documented as early as 1666, when Anne of Austria was reported to have died of 
breast cancer. Causal links were first documented in Sir Percival Pott’s study of 
cancer among chimney sweeps in 1775.  
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Interest in cancer then waned during the Victorian era, when the focus was on 
what they termed ‘social scourges’ – small pox, syphilis and tuberculosis. 
Nevertheless the language of plague continued to be used in reference to 
cancer, and they provided the example of ‘drop like flies’. This, according to 
Herzlich and Pierret, explains entirely the fear that was synonymous with 
cancer. People were unsure about the origins of cancer and whether it was 
contagious. Herzlich and Pierett reported that their interviewees talked about 
the contemporary ‘obsession’ with cancer. Many participants suggested that 
while at one time a symptom was recognised as innocuous, the modern way was 
to immediately assume that cancer was at its root. Cancer was so feared that 
some were reluctant to ‘speak its name’. It was this duality that led them to 
conclude that cancer inhabited both the modern and the archaic: 
“If cancer, like all great diseases whose impact on the collective 
consciousness we have tried to retrace, is indeed a metaphor, it is 
infinitely richer than Susan Sontag would lead us to believe: it is a 
metaphor that merges the archaic with the modern version of illness; 
a metaphor that uncovers our relationship with today’s world and at 
the same time brings us face to face with our fragility as 
individuals.” (Herzlich & Pierret 1987:66) 
3.7.4 Metaphors and the individual 
It is in the realm of the individual that metaphors become problematic. 
Separating cancer from the cancer patient is awkward, particularly as cancer is 
often believed to come from ‘within’. There is ample scope then for the ‘evil’ to 
be associated with the patient as well as the disease. The consequence is the 
stigma and shame trailed by Sontag. Arriving at aetiological explanations for 
each cancer case raises issues of personal responsibility and Lupton proposed 
that such ponderings often have a moral tone. Lupton cited Pinell’s (1987) paper 
that collated data from letters written by cancer patients to the Department of 
Health in France, the Concertation Nationale Cancer. Pinell asserted that the 
fear surrounding cancer is disproportionate to the actual threat, and claimed 
that  
“Cancer condenses all the characteristics of an unforgettable horrible 
death” (Pinnell 1987: 27) 
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Pinell found that most contributors were reluctant to take any personal 
responsibility for cancer, instead locating the cause outside of themselves. 
Environmental pollutants for example were often cited. However, the letters 
went beyond that and hinted that ‘disharmony’ caused cancer. As one 
respondent wrote:  
“I am convinced that there will be no cancer in a better world” 
(Pinell 1987: 32) 
Pinell concluded that the ability to see oneself as an innocent victim of cancer 
was important to those writing the letters. Similar findings were reported in 
earlier studies that asked cancer patients to comment on the causes of cancer 
(Bard & Dyk 1956; Moses & Civaldi 1966; Linn, Linn & Stein 1982). All three 
studies found that patients tended to hold factors outside their control 
responsible for their illness. Some of those factors included over-work, early 
deprivation (Bard & Dyk 1956) heredity or poor medical care (Moses & Civaldi 
1966). Linn, Linn and Stein’s study compared the views of cancer patients with 
non-cancer patients and found that cancer patients were less certain about the 
causes of cancer than those without cancer. Those with cancer were more likely 
to endorse heredity and “God’s Will”, so distancing themselves from 
responsibility (Linn, Linn & Stein 1982).  
3.7.5 Moral Responsibility 
All of the above studies capture the importance of moral responsibility in the 
modern discourse on cancer. Are people responsible for their own illness? Does 
anyone deserve cancer? These questions force a return to Herzlich & Pierett’s 
analysis that cancer is both modern and archaic. Lupton showed that as the 
major diseases have moved from widespread epidemics to individual diseases 
like cancer and coronary heart disease the determinants of health have moved 
from the social to the individual. The emphasis is on behaviour. Smoking is 
widely recognised as a significant risk factor for cancer. The stigma felt by 
smokers has been reported (Mackenzie et al 2009). Again, Sontag’s analysis is 
relevant because, irrespective of Clow’s questioning of the depth of shame, 
studies have clearly documented the stigma expeirnced by lung cancer sufferers 
(Chapple, Ziebland & McPherson 2004). Stigma is attributed to the ‘horrible’ 
nature of lung cancer, the perception that the disease is self-inflicted, and the 
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high death rate. The paper is littered with examples of moral judgements and 
references to the ‘dirty’ label associated with all cancers, not just lung cancers. 
Though some interviewees saw smoking as the most significant factor, others, 
especially those that had joined support groups introduced environmental 
factors as possibilities. This shows the need to absolve oneself of responsibility.  
As well as the moral responsibility associated with the cause of disease, another 
significant component of the cancer narrative is ‘hope’ (Lupton 1994; Ehrenreich 
2009). Current convention suggests that cancer patients should remain positive 
and fight back. Hawkins’ (1999) analysis of pathographies presented numerous 
personal accounts of illness that document ‘the fight’ against cancer. Both 
patients and health professionals use militaristic metaphors frequently and 
clinicians report that the use of such terms provides an essential analogy for the 
course of treatment and the ‘journey’ that the patient is about to embark on. 
Yet, Hawkins claimed that in many of these pathographies the veiled inference 
is that cancer patients who do not possess sufficient quantities of the ‘fighting 
spirit’ ultimately have poorer outcomes.   
3.8 Cancer and the media 
The media influence our understanding and experience of disease (Lupton 1994; 
Philo 1999; Seale 2003). However, much of the available information should be 
treated with caution. MacDonald and Hoffman-Goetz (2002) found in their 
analysis of the accuracy of information presented in Canadian newspapers that 
only 7% of articles contained factually correct information. Many of the well-
known metaphors already described can be found liberally cited in the media 
coverage of cancer. Clarke’s (1986, 1992) studies of the depiction of cancer in 
magazines published in the United States echoed Sontag’s original thesis and 
reported on the commonality of military metaphors when reporting cancer: 
“Cancer is described as an evil, immoral predator.” (Clarke 1992:108) 
Even before Nixon declared war on cancer, Clarke unearthed militaristic 
metaphors and cancer ‘fighters’ in popular magazines. Reports showed that 
cancer, unlike other diseases, impacts on the whole person and that following a 
cancer diagnosis the sufferer’s life is changed irrevocably. Some articles 
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discussed personality characteristics associated with cancer. Principal among 
them were “hopeless, inadequate or somehow desperate people” (Clarke 
1992:108). Together with individual traits, Clarke showed that a wide range of 
potential causes are put forward in the magazines, including ‘chickens or 
viruses’, though the most common cause was smoking. Individual responsibility 
was at the forefront of all the pieces. Clarke concluded that personal behaviours 
rather than environmental factors were more likely to be held responsible for 
cancer. These findings were replicated in a Clarke’s later analysis of Canadian 
magazines printed in 2001(Clarke & van Ameron 2008), and most of the articles 
suggested that people have the power to change their own health.  
Seale (2001a, 2001b) carried out an analysis of the coverage of cancer in British 
and American Newspapers in one week in October 1999. He subsequently offered 
an analysis of both religious and sporting metaphors. Seale developed Sontag’s 
ideas that explored the moral connotations of cancer and suggested that cancer 
can be viewed as a form of divine punishment and is seen as a demonic enemy. 
He believed that religion might answer questions about cancer that biomedicine 
is unable to answer, primarily, who deserves cancer? He postulated therefore 
that much of the media coverage would include the religious status of cancer 
sufferers, particularly in the United States, arguably a more religious society. 
Despite this he found only a handful of references to the role of religion in the 
cancer sufferer’s life. Religious language was used and individuals alluded to 
blessings and miracles though Seale surmised that these terms unknowingly 
evoked religiosity. Seale claimed that recovery from cancer is assumed to be a 
personal responsibility and much of the language, rather than militaristic, simply 
conveys ‘struggle’. It was rare for reports to make direct causal links between 
faith and survival. Faith was more likely to be introduced into terminal cancer 
stories. Seale concluded his analysis on religion by suggesting that patients with 
cancer and their families appear to seek answers from biomedicine rather than 
religion, though he did propose that the increased interest in complementary 
medicine and what he described as ‘psychological’ thinking may have replaced 
religious thinking in contemporary secular societies.  
As well as an analysis of religious content, Seale (2001a) also examined the data 
he gathered to explore sporting metaphors. Previous work by Clarke and 
Robinson (1999) focusing on testicular cancer found that sporting and military 
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metaphors were commonplace. Seale suggested that sport is a ‘civil religion’, 
which provides a means to demonstrate individual worth and triumph when 
faced with cancer. Seale drew parallels between militaristic imagery and 
sporting language. In sporting stories terms like fighting and winning were used 
and interestingly Seale pointed to the use of ‘rounds’ to describe stages of 
treatment, much like sporting heats or boxing bouts. Often the sporting pastimes 
of people with cancer were reported. Seale provided a number of examples of 
young women with breast cancer involved in mountain climbing. The analogy of 
reaching the top while also overcoming cancer was used and, according to Seale, 
sport facilitates the emphasis on the ‘heroic’ nature of the cancer struggle.  
Clearly the treatment of cancer in the media will focus on what is newsworthy. 
Seale noted that the concentration is on cancer among younger people, and in 
particular tragic cases. The focus on younger people has been documented 
elsewhere. Henderson and Kitzinger (1999) have looked at the way that 
‘inherited breast cancer’, linked with younger women, has been treated by the 
media. In their analysis of newspaper coverage in the years following the 
discovery of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes they found that genetic factors were 
the second most common risk factor mentioned in newspaper articles. This is in 
spite of the estimate that only around 10% of breast cancers are genetic. 
Nevertheless genetic breast cancers are often tragic stories, some involving 
prophylactic mastectomies. Clearly, emphasising the unusual helps consolidate 
the tragic representation of cancer. Clarke and Everest (2006) in their synthesis 
of data from magazines found that the exacerbation of fear was the most 
common theme in cancer stories, and that fear and cancer had become 
conflated. Fear was presented in a number of ways: the silent nature of cancer 
is stressed, so one can have cancer unknowingly, cancer is presented as being 
common and has so many risk factors that some suggest that ‘everything causes 
cancer’. Clarke and Everest proposed that the ubiquity extends to individuals, 
which exudes the idea that everyone will eventually develop cancer. The 
presentation of cancer in this way accentuated the uncertainty that is 
synonymous with cancer. As Comaroff and Maguire’s (1981) study of parents of 
children with leukaemia claimed, it is the uncertainty that families are most 
fearful of. Despite advances in treatment, a proportion, albeit small, of the 
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cancer puzzle remains unsolved. The unanswerable, by its very nature, assumes 
a mythic quality. 
3.9 Cancer vs. heart disease 
Davison’s work on lay epidemiology was developed from data generated in a 
study about Coronary Heart Disease. Lay epidemiology shows the importance of 
social factors in the understanding of disease, which also includes the cultural 
context in which information flows. It is useful therefore to compare cancer and 
CHD, in cultural terms. Many of the studies already reviewed make direct 
comparisons between the diseases. As Sontag noted: 
“the doctors also treated the cancer as if it were something more 
than an illness: It wasn’t like having a heart attack ….. there was a 
taboo about it” ( Sontag 1978:101) 
Clow (2001) also considered the disparity between cancer and heart disease. 
Death from heart disease epitomises a ‘good death’, one that is both quick and 
unexpected, while cancer is characterised as a slow, painful and agonising 
demise. NicGabhainn et al (1999) concluded that heart disease was feared less 
than cancer. Lupton (1994) claimed that heart disease was ‘morally neutral’ and 
that very often rather than relying on graphic metaphors we need only look to 
biomedicine for our understanding of heart disease. Arguably then, lay and 
professional views of heart disease are more attuned than they are for cancer. 
Moreover, the reductionist model of heart disease allows the sufferer to become 
separate from their disease, with the heart is viewed in its mechanical context. 
Cancer, however, permeates slowly from within:  
“It begins in silence. In the beginning no one knows what is happening 
inside. Then it begins its course. Ruins you from the inside. Until it 
consumes everything.” ( Weiss 1997:462) 
Weiss concluded that metaphors for heart attacks were more pragmatic, and less 
emotionally loaded or sad as cancer metaphors. Similar findings are reported by 
Emslie, Hunt and Watt (2001a) in their study in the West of Scotland.  The 
strength of the tragic in cancer metaphors may in part be explained by a lack of 
understanding. MacFarlane & Kelleher (2002) found that cancer was the only 
disease that could not be explained by the older adults in their study. Many of 
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the studies already detailed in this review (Balshem 1991; Weiss 1997; Scanlon 
et al 2006) have found that participants were surer of the causes of heart 
disease:  
‘When they say heart attack I see fat ambulatory treatment, fat 
dishes, hamburger, cigarettes, gym, smoking, weak person, a machine 
in need of fixing, pump, heart transplant, explosion, plumbing, heart 
palpitation’ (Weiss 1997:467)  
Heart disease, Davison found was often attended with humour (Davison, Frankel, 
& Davey Smith 1992). This is not echoed in any of the studies of cancer. What 
this brief comparison shows is that cancer and heart disease have very different 
meanings. This is likely to reflect the different ways in which the diseases are 
culturally framed.   
3.10 Conclusion: culture of cancer 
Much of the previous section has shown that cancer has a distinct cultural 
position. It is thought to be the ‘most feared’ disease, and even allowing for 
medical advances it continues to inhabit the terror ground. This terror and the 
associated uncertainty can be traced back to early experiences where a cancer 
diagnosis almost inevitably meant death. The manner of this death was always 
negative, characterised by a sudden shock or a long, painful demise. Early health 
promotion efforts hoped to demystify the disease but by offering only small 
amounts of information tended to exacerbate cancer’s negative image.  Cancer 
is defined by shame and stigma and although this is perceived to be a somewhat 
old-fashioned view, modern media continues to emphasise fear and the stigma 
comes from the lack of hope or fight in the face of the disease. Any study of 
beliefs about cancer and how they are developed and refined needs to be 
mindful of the disease’s unique cultural position.
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4. Aim & Research Questions 
4.1 Aim 
The study aims to explore beliefs about cancer and ascertain the utility of the 
ideas held within lay epidemiology in the formation of such beliefs  
4.2 Research Questions 
 What are typical views about cancer?  
 Does lay epidemiology offer an aid to our understanding of beliefs about 
cancer and cancer risk? 
 How important are personal, social, cultural, biomedical and 
environmental factors in the formulation of beliefs about cancer and 
cancer risk? 
 Is there any notion of candidacy in relation to cancer?  
 To what extent are anomalous deaths and unwarranted survivals 
employed in formulation of beliefs about cancer and cancer risk?  
 Do lay explanations view cancer as a homogenous disease or multi-site 
and multi-causal? 
 Are there differences between beliefs in deprived and affluent 




5. Methodological Considerations 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this study was to explore whether features of ‘lay epidemiology’ 
could be found in beliefs about and explanations of cancer. Access to rich, in-
depth information was required. Moreover, the focus was not on cancer sufferers 
but on ‘ordinary’ views. Qualitative interviews provide an ideal vehicle for 
generating such data. A qualitative approach was proposed. However, ‘lay 
epidemiology’ is an already established theory and qualitative work, 
conventionally, seeks not to test theory but to uncover new findings. The 
methodological challenge for this study was to locate it within a qualitative 
paradigm despite this obvious departure, before selecting an appropriate 
research strategy. The following chapter outlines those deliberations and the 
process of finding a method to fit. More detail of the methodological design of 
the study appears in the following chapter on methodological design.  
5.2 Background 
Unlike quantitative theses, those embarking on qualitative studies are expected 
to provide detail of their ontological and epistemological persuasion (Silverman 
2005). There are a number of ways to interpret this. It could point to the status 
of qualitative methods as the ‘poor relation’ in social sciences research and 
there is no doubt the method has struggled to gain credibility and acceptance. 
Alternatively, the requirement could be viewed in a more positive light. By 
asking students to grapple with a set of complex issues and ideas that deviate 
from the received view, the result is a thorough grounding in the theoretical 
underpinning of their work and the ability to use and defend their chosen 
method with confidence. 
From its inception this study focused on the ‘lay’ voice. Despite modifications to 
the research questions in the early part of the study, the desire to locate and 
understand ‘ordinary’ views about cancer and how these were shaped remained 
constant. The aim was to build individual cancer narratives for each participant, 
detailing not only their current views but also to explore how and why they had 
arrived there. There was a need then for the ‘thick description’ (Geertz 1973) 
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captured by qualitative enquiry. Once heralded as the method that ‘reaches the 
parts others can’t reach’ (Pope & Mays 1995) a qualitative approach not only 
allows the access to in-depth material, but also more importantly for this study, 
sheds light on the ‘process’ as well as the ‘outcome’.  
In the planning stages of the study the research question evolved to include the 
ideas found in an already established theory. By introducing the concepts found 
in lay epidemiology into the research questions, was the essence of this work 
hypothesis testing? Was this work largely deductive, therefore breaching a 
cardinal rule of qualitative research? This posed a serious challenge, initially, 
and there was concern that it would struggle to ‘fit’ philosophically, within a 
qualitative paradigm. 
This chapter will look closely at the theoretical issues raised by this thesis, most 
notably the difficulty associated with combining qualitative research and 
existing theory. An understanding of the relationship between research and 
theory is considered before ‘theory’ itself is explored. Epistemology, ontology 
and methodology are key to understanding the dominant paradigms and each 
will be discussed. The discussion will conclude by locating the study in an 
appropriate theoretical tradition (or traditions).  
5.3 Placing theory in the context of research  
Traditionally, the separation is drawn between deductive and inductive theory. 
It could be argued that deductive theory, the central tenet of quantitative 
study, is being employed here rather than the inductive theory associated with a 
qualitative approach. The distinction is thought to be crucial and lies at the 
heart of the quantitative/qualitative debate. Deductive logic follows a 
sequential loop where theory leads to the development of a hypothesis that can 
be tested in experimental conditions; the outcome (either the verification or 
falsification of the hypothesis) is then fed back into the theory. The contrary 
position is inductive reasoning. In an inductive approach theory is the end result 
rather than the starting point. Conventionally then, deductive theory is 
associated with quantitative work and inductive with qualitative work. Bryman 
(2004) however reminds us that the distinctions are not always straightforward. 
Often, the boundaries are blurred and features of each can be found in the 
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opposing tradition. For example, Bryman highlighted that induction often takes 
place at the end of a deductive cycle by adding to the body of theory. Moreover, 
in a largely inductive approach, deduction can be found and is in fact a central 
feature of grounded theory (Glasser & Strauss 1967) where an ‘iterative’ 
relationship between data and theory is encouraged from the outset. Silverman 
(2005, 2001) has argued that qualitative researchers frequently engage in testing 
theories, which demonstrates the maturity of the strategy.  
With this in mind then it is clear that the introduction of ‘theory’ in the early 
stages of this study does not immediately obviate its place within a qualitative 
paradigm. Further reflection on the research questions shows that the emphasis 
is not on hypothesis testing but rather on the exploration of the utility of the 
ideas found in lay epidemiology when applied to cancer, rather than deducing 
that lay epidemiology can, (or can’t) explain beliefs about cancer.  
5.4 Paradigms: ‘The complexity deepens the more you 
delve’ 
In any deliberation of theories that underpin research, their complexity is 
instantly evident. This is not helped by authors’ use of a wide range of 
jargonistic terms and the frequent overlap between descriptions of ‘paradigms’, 
‘traditions’ and ‘strategies’. For the purposes of this discussion it is helpful to 
organise these components in a hierarchy beginning first with a description of 
paradigms followed by their constituent parts, namely epistemology and 
ontology. The major traditions within each paradigm will then be described 
before specific research strategies are discussed.  
Within texts on the philosophy of science and social science, paradigms feature 
strongly. Kuhn (1970) referred to a paradigm as an epistemological and 
ontological view of the world, the ‘model’ in which science is located. It is a 
common set of principles that guide enquiry and offer solutions to problems. 
Although Kuhn believed that social sciences were in a pre-paradigmatic phase 
because there was, as yet, no dominant set of guiding principles it is common 
for the social sciences to be described in paradigmatic terms. Like Kuhn, Denzin 
& Lincoln (2000) describe paradigms as ‘a basic set of beliefs that guide actions’. 
They comprise three components: epistemology, ontology and methodology and 
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each component asks a specific question. Firstly, epistemology questions the 
nature of knowledge and what can be known. Ontology is concerned with reality, 
and questions the nature of reality and finally methodology offers guidelines on 
how to gain knowledge about that reality.  
5.5 Epistemology: realism vs. interpretivism 
There are two main epistemological standpoints - realism and interpretivism. 
Realism, which is akin to positivism, asserts that social science should emulate 
natural science and arrive at ‘reality’ where a ‘truth’ can be found. The process 
is bound by already agreed and appropriate strategies of investigation and the 
investigated and investigator represent discrete entities. Studies within realism 
strip away bias, and results can be replicated and widely applied. As with 
natural science, the method of inquiry is experimental. Critics label it ‘naïve’ 
realism because it fails to acknowledge the importance of ‘structure’ and social 
reality. To counteract this Bhaskar (1978) offered critical realism, which trusts 
that a tangible reality exists but there is more than one way of knowing it. 
Further, critical realism allows for intangible ‘mechanisms’ whose effects can be 
observed (for example racism) rather than ‘knowing’ only what can be directly 
observed.  
Interpretivism posits an alternative epistemological view. It distinguishes 
between the social and the natural world and rejects the possibility of studying 
the social world in the received ‘scientific’ view. The tradition embodies the 
Weberian notion of Verstehen, which loosely translated means ‘understanding’ 
or ‘appreciation’ (Tucker 1965). Weber believed that through ‘interpretation’ it 
was possible to offer explanations for social phenomena, and to extend the 
scientific observation of realism. Similarly, hermeneutics and phenomenology 
concern themselves with the study of how individuals make sense of their world. 
Schutz (1967) insisted that an alternative epistemological tradition is required 
because quite simply, social reality means something to humans, and their 
actions are inseparable from their interpretation of ‘reality’. Phenomenology 
then, attempts to see the world from the point of view of those being studied. 
Symbolic interactionism too has been placed within an interpretive paradigm, 
although its place there is contested (Denzin 1989). Embedded within symbolic 
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interactionism is the notion that our sense of self is derived from the way in 
which others see us.  
5.6 Ontology: objectivism vs. constructionism 
Objectivism views social phenomena as ‘facts’ that exist separately from 
individuals or society. For example, Bryman (2004) asserted that organisations or 
culture are afforded tangible properties, which hold within them distinct 
features that ensure their continuation. The opposing view, constructionism, 
sees phenomena as the creation of individuals and society, which are constantly 
changing and shifting. Even those of a constructionist persuasion acknowledge 
that there is some ‘reality’ because the extreme of this position is untenable, 
although some would argue that the way we reach an understanding of such 
phenomena is in itself socially constructed. Such constructions will vary across 
time and place and in different cultures and communities.  
Intuitively, an exploration of lay views about cancer fits within the 
interpretivist/ constructionist paradigm. In the broadest sense the research 
focus is on beliefs about health. Health, however, is an abstract term, which is 
difficult to scrutinise in scientific conditions, particularly because the meaning 
ascribed to it varies widely. In the 21st century, in the developed world, health 
has come to mean more than simply the absence of disease, and has adapted to 
incorporate new ways of thinking and developments. Further, health is likely to 
mean different things to different individuals and communities, both at different 
historical time points and within different cultures. In this study, comparisons 
are made between views in affluent and deprived communities in Glasgow. 
Observational studies show stark differences in mortality and morbidity between 
the two and it may be that the experience and meaning ascribed to ‘health’ will 
be different.  
5.7 Quantitative/Qualitative divide.  
Positivism is the paradigm associated with quantitative research and the answers 
to questions of epistemology and ontology appear relatively simple. Crudely, 
within positivism, it is accepted that there is a single reality that can be studied 
(ontology), that the researcher can do so objectively, free of value 
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(epistemology) and that there are established techniques or strategies that allow 
the pertinent questions to be answered (methodology). It is worth noting that 
Guba and Lincoln (2000) suggested that although the term ‘qualitative’ is often 
used as the umbrella term for a number of paradigms, they prefer its use to be 
confined to a description of methods. They believed that qualitative methods 
have been and continue to be employed in a positivist framework.  
5.8 Theoretical traditions 
Denzin and Lincoln (2000), when charting the history of qualitative research, 
described five main epochs of qualitative method. This provides a helpful way of 
contextualising the method and shows how it has evolved into its present guise. 
They began with the traditional period, which started around 1900 and 
culminated with post-modernism from 1990 onwards. The most industrious 
period, from 1950-70, was a moment of “creative ferment” that saw the 
emergence of the qualitative enquiry proper. A number of interpretive theories, 
including ethnomethodology, phenomenology, and critical theory all emerged at 
this time. This period then gave way to a time dominated by “blurred genres 
where researchers had a full complement of paradigms, methods and strategies 
to employ in their research” (Denzin & Lincoln 2000:9). All of the major 
methodological movements were by now established. In recent times, 
methodology has a postmodernist feel, and the critical may describe it as a 
methodological ‘free for all’.  
Despite this ‘full complement’, Guba & Lincoln (2000) claimed that four basic 
inquiry paradigms inform everything else: positivism, postpositivism, critical 
theory and constructivism. Positivism and postpositivism, are seen as falling 
within the tradition of realism/objectivism, while critical theory and 
constructivism inhabit the interpretive/constructionist paradigm.  
Denzin and Lincoln (2000) proposed that the research process should follow a 
standard pattern. First, researchers should place themselves within a paradigm, 
decide upon epistemology and ontology, and this would in turn prescribe the 
methodology. The research process should flow from there: 
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“ All research is interpretive, guided by a set of beliefs and feelings 
about the world and how it should be understood and studied. Some 
of these beliefs may be taken for granted, only assumed; others are 
highly problematic and controversial. However, each interpretive 
paradigm makes particular demands on the researcher, including the 
questions that are asked and the interpretations that are brought to 
them.” (Denzin & Lincoln 2000:13) 
More recently there has been a shift in emphasis. Qualitative research is 
becoming more pragmatic. Silverman (2005) and Bryman (2004) for example, 
advocate a process which begins with the research question. The starting point 
should not be the paradigm. Methods are chosen because of their suitability in 
answering the question. Of course, it is unlikely that researchers who feel at 
home in one tradition would ask ‘incongruous’ questions. So, the researchers’ 
beliefs are likely to colour research projects from the outset. In itself, this 
reflection is important philosophically as it demonstrates the centrality of the 
researcher to the process.  
The newfound pragmatism negates the necessity of being overly concerned with 
epistemological and ontological questions. However, it is naive to assume 
research studies are themselves conducted in value free vacuums. The focus on 
the ‘lay’ and not scientific view of cancer in itself hints at the rejection of 
realism. Giving equal weight to a variety of different lay views demonstrates an 
acceptance of a constructivist ontology where no single truth is sought, or even 
required. However, the duality of positions in realism and interpretivism or 
objectivism and constructionsism fails to capture the spectrum of positions 
between the polarised extremes. In reality research is more likely to exist 
somewhere in the middle. Hammersley’s (1992) ‘subtle’ realism offers an 
attractive alternative. It could be described as a common sense approach, which 
allows that, while there is no ‘certainty’ in knowledge, there are areas of 
knowledge that can be judged true based on being both credible and plausible. 
Yet, subtle realism also allows for multiple truths or realities, giving comfort to 
social constructionists. Hammersley states that the job of social research is not, 
as positivism or realism would suggest, to reproduce reality but to represent a 
credible and plausible version of it. Nevertheless, subtle realism remains within 
the positivist school and its adoption could be seen as imposing a positivist 
framework on an essentially interpretive endeavour.  
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Social constructionsim chimes in with the basis of this study in an important 
way, namely that it acknowledges that the result of research is a construct of 
the interaction between the researcher and the researched. Not the production 
of independent data waiting to be unearthed. It is data-generation rather than 
collection (Barbour 2003) with the researcher playing a central role. Ordinary 
views about cancer will not be articulated in precise lay epidemiology concepts, 
though clues to the utility of the concept will emerge in the individual narratives 
told throughout the interviews. These were not however narratives waiting to be 
told, as they might be for cancer patients. Indeed, placing their ideas in the 
context of lay epidemiology was not natural for them; it was a construct placed 
upon them. Moreover the impact of social factors on these views is clearly 
understood. 
5.9 An embarrassment of choices 
As well as the epistemological and ontological standpoint the actual research 
strategy employed is of obvious importance. A number of strategies were 
considered but it was clear that no one strategy coincided precisely with the 
research question. Phenomenology, for example, aims to capture the essence of 
lived experiences and is a method that is useful when researching the impact of 
an illness or particular event on a patient’s life. So, if this study were looking 
specifically at the ‘lived experience’ of cancer, a phenomenological approach 
may have been apt. This study is subtlety different because it did not aim to 
explore a particular experience, instead it sought explore belief frameworks 
about cancer among the ‘ordinary’ public. Ethnography too, offered a possible 
strategy but crucially traditional ethnography demands some time immersed in 
‘the field’ observing the reality of communities. From this perspective 
ethnography is often regarded as descriptive rather than interpretive, and would 
therefore have represented a significant paradigmatic shift for this study. The 
distinction between data excavation and data construction needs to be made 
and both phenomenology and ethnography could be viewed as excavation tools. 
Though not without flaws, grounded theory provides a useful template for 
analysis and this study is therefore influenced by, but does not claim to follow, a 
pure grounded theory approach.  
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5.10 Grounded theory  
Glaser & Strauss (1965, 1967) developed the ‘grounded theory approach’ during 
their studies of the end of life during the 1960s. It was a direct response to the 
dominance of quantitative methods, as Charmaz comments: 
“ In the Discovery of Grounded Theory, Barney G Glasser and Anselm 
L Strauss (1967) set forth a powerful rhetoric of change from the 
quantitative cannon to legitimize qualitative enquiry.” (Charmaz K 
2009:128) 
Grounded theory offered a systematic method for carrying out qualitative 
research. Originally grounded theory featured a number of crucial tenets: 
coding, memo-writing, constant comparative analysis and theoretical sampling. 
At its heart was the notion that the theory should emerge from the data, and 
that analysis should be iterative with emergent theories being fed back into the 
data collection process. Thus making additions and refinements to the questions 
and seeking out specific participants to test emergent themes. The theory has 
altered since its development and although Glaser (1978, 1992) largely 
maintained his original position, Strauss diversified and through work with Corbin 
concentrated specifically on grounded theory as an analytical tool (Strauss & 
Corbin 1990). While Strauss has urged researchers to take a smorgasbord 
approach to grounded theory, his description remains prescriptive as he insists 
on the inclusion of most of the original elements.  
Grounded theory is not without its critics. A common problem associated with 
the method is the idea that researchers should enter the field of study with no 
preconceived ideas; that they approach it as a ‘blank canvas’. Any theory 
emerging does so naturally rather than as a result of the researcher’s previous 
orientation. Silverman (2001) has rejected this notion and cautioned against 
data gathering without any analytic basis. Bryman (2004) too questioned the 
intelligence of such a position and suggested that to wipe clean any prior 
knowledge and learning does research a disservice. Pure grounded theory 
however is both impractical and almost impossible to achieve, and as Barbour 
(2003) points out  
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“ We (researchers) have some notion, even at the outset, of what our 
data are likely to look like and what we intend to do with it” 
(Barbour 2003:1022) 
Despite this, grounded theory has recently become synonymous with ‘quality’ in 
qualitative research. Barbour (2003) warned of the technical essentialism 
associated with the acceptability of qualitative research. There is a sense that in 
seeking to make qualitative work fit in with a received view, it may lose its 
essence. So although, as Barbour (2001) reflected that grounded theory has 
become ‘an approving bumper sticker’ (Bryman & Burgess 1994), the analytic 
tool – constant comparison of data – intuitively ‘fitted’ here. More attention is 
paid to the analytic methods in the following chapter.  
5.11 Chapter Summary 
Placing this study neatly within a single research paradigm was initially 
problematic. The aims and objectives were clear but it was not always obvious 
that it neatly fitted any of the conventional ‘perspectives’. Instead, it was 
important to first locate the study in an epistemological and ontological 
paradigm. Seeking views about cancer and the utility of lay epidemiology 
required an interpretation of the stories told and views offered rather than the 
uncovering of one true story. Moreover the stories and interpretations were 
constructed via the interaction between the researcher and respondent. It 
seemed then that this study naturally fell into the social constructionist 
paradigm, despite the difficulties with this position. An extreme constructionist 
view necessitates that all knowledge is ‘new’, with nothing to build on. As Morse 
warned: 
“The practice of some qualitative researchers of refusing to consult 
the literature and refusing to place the theory within the context of 
the work that has already been published is a serious problem. It 
results in a plethora of small and competing contributions to the 
literature. These contributions are not additive, they do not build on 
what has been published before; thus, qualitative inquiry as a 
discipline makes only a minor impact and has trouble demonstrating 
its contribution to science.” (Morse 2000:715) 
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Primarily this study was pursued with pragmatism. It accepts Strauss’ (Strauss & 
Corbin 1990) invitation to adopt a smorgasbord approach when considering 
methods. A discussion of the methodological design and process follows. 
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6. Methodological Design 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first, design, outlines the research 
plan, while the second outlines the research process. Both include descriptions 
of sampling, methodological technique, namely interviewing, and finally, 
analysis.  
6.1 Sampling Strategy  
6.1.1 Design 
A number of sampling strategies are available to the qualitative researcher. 
These are principally theoretical or purposive sampling, though convenience 
sampling and snowballing may also be employed. The validity of relying on 
convenience techniques has been questioned (Richie & Lewis 2003). The chosen 
strategy should reflect the aims of the study and the degree of prescription 
about the characteristics of the sample will reflect both the strategy adopted 
and the research questions.  
Theoretical and purposive sampling strategies are often set out as two distinct 
approaches but Mason (1996) regards them as more or less identical. A fluid 
approach to sampling is assumed and it aims to deal with gaps or address 
interesting findings that emerge early in the research process. The tool is closely 
aligned to Glaser and Strauss’ Grounded Theory (1967). They outlined it as a 
method: 
“whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes, and analyses his data 
and decides what data to collect next and where to find them, in 
order to develop his theory as it emerges.” (Glasser & Strauss 1967 
p45)  
Purposive sampling similarly targets respondents with certain characteristics but 
these are generally fixed from the study’s outset and a sampling frame, which 
allocates the sample population to appropriate groupings, is produced to inform 
the strategy. While neither strategy claims to be representative an attempt has 
been made to access a wide range of views. In discussing the approaches Lewis 
(2003) suggested: 
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“Both rely on the use of prescribed selection criteria, although 
prescription takes place at different stages of the research.” (Lewis 
2003:82) 
The strategy adopted in this study was more purposive than theoretical in the 
Glaser and Strauss sense. The aim of this study, to obtain lay views and beliefs 
about cancer, was clear. Shaw (2002) alerted researchers to the difficulties 
associated with studies that claim to report a ‘lay’ view. Often quasi-
professional language is adopted by patients and Shaw argued that many 
patients take on expert role in the management of their illness. The result is a 
viewpoint not typically associated with the laity. Cancer patients were unlikely 
to offer a genuinely lay view and as such were excluded from this study. Carers, 
it could equally be argued, may be experts and certainly many are likely to ‘live’ 
through the illness with the patient. Deciding whether carers’ views were 
sufficiently lay was a significant challenge for this study. Ultimately, it was 
judged that the common incidence and prevalence of cancer may make a sample 
‘unaffected’ by cancer difficult to recruit. Moreover, if carers were to be 
excluded, a definition of ‘carer’ would have to be reached. Such a definition 
would have necessitated arbitrary judgements to be made about ‘closeness’ and 
as Chapter 7 shows closeness and relationships within families are not always 
logical. Those who regarded themselves as carers were included and on 
reflection, in the context of a high cancer incidence and prevalence, their 
inclusion may be more likely to represent an ‘ordinary’ view than those 
unaffected by cancer.  
The description of the lay epidemiology concept in Chapter 2 shows that 
information to populate health belief models is gathered from many sources. 
Among them are wider community networks. The original ethnography carried 
out by Davison, Frankel and Davey Smith (1991) took place in three communities 
in South Wales. Salant and Gehlert (2008) in their study of lay epidemiology and 
breast cancer risk suggested that arriving at a definition of community is 
challenging. Ordinarily, community simply applies to a geographical boundary 
that is drawn to ascertain socio-economic and structural characteristics; often to 
decide need and allocate resources. This accurate but administrative definition 
tells little of what it means to live in a community. Notwithstanding the 
difficulties in definition, if community is important in ordinary views, the 
sampling strategy had to attempt to accommodate a community perspective. In 
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Glasgow, a city now infamous for the striking health gradients between affluent 
and deprived, it was apt to reflect both constituencies. Indeed, as the 
background and introduction in Chapter 1 outlined, the administrative 
boundaries have allowed the identification of very different cancer experiences 
between the affluent and the deprived.  
There were therefore two main criteria to consider when sampling. First, that 
cancer patients should be excluded and second, that the views from affluent and 
deprived communities should be accessed. The sampling frame and strategy 
were relatively straightforward. However, the strategy represented something of 
a departure from usual approaches. While theoretical and purposive strategies 
seek to ensure that a range of views and experiences are accessed, this study 
did not begin from this starting point. Instead it aimed to uncover a variety of 
phenomena that contributed to ‘ordinary’ beliefs about cancer. What was sought 
was the ordinary view and in that respect the study did not seek to fill quotas.  
Samples in qualitative studies are typically small. There are both theoretical and 
practical reasons for this. Qualitative data does not aim to generalise findings to 
a wider population, so large numbers are not required to ensure validity. In 
addition, qualitative research is data heavy and labour intensive, particularly if 
approached conscientiously (Richie, Lewis and Elam 2003). This study aimed to 
carry out 40 interviews, 20 in each community. It was judged that this number 
would allow a meaningful comparison between communities. 
6.1.2 Process 
The first step in the sampling process was to select the communities in Glasgow. 
The communities were selected primarily because of their health statistics. 
Bearsden and Milngavie are suburbs of Glasgow and are locally recognised as 
affluent communities. The towns form part of the East Dunbartonshire local 
government district, which was recently voted one of the best places to live in 
Scotland9. Life expectancy for the area is high10 and the health behaviour profile 
reflects that of other affluent areas. Conversely, Glasgow’s east end has become 
synonymous with poor health. It is an area of high unemployment and 
                                         
9 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/north_east/8421193.stm 
10 GGC Joint Health Protection Plan 2010-2012 
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experiences the multifarious problems associated with socioeconomic 
disadvantage. The study initially targeted Shettleston, primarily because of the 
‘Shettleston man’11 media coverage, but expanded to other areas of Glasgow’s 
east end.  
Recruiting participants from general practice populations was considered 
initially. It was planned that letters would be distributed to a random sample of 
general practice patients in both communities. The distribution of patient 
information would take place over a discreet time period. For example, every 
fifth patient attending their doctor, over the course of a specified time period, 
who met the inclusion criteria, would receive a letter of invitation. A number of 
problems were anticipated with this method. First, inviting patients, via their GP 
practice, to participate in a study about cancer could potentially cause 
confusion and distress. Second, it was thought likely that those who attended 
their general practice more than once over the defined time period might 
receive multiple invitations. Even misconstrued coercion was best avoided. 
Finally, in light of Shaw’s (2002) caution, it was thought that selecting ‘patients’ 
from a healthcare setting would compromise the lay and ordinary nature of the 
study.  
To satisfy the aims of the study it was decided that volunteers should be sought 
from community organisations. Health-related groups were excluded, again in an 
attempt to avoid the ‘lay-expert’ health view. A variety of community 
organisations and leisure clubs were contacted in each community. This was 
done both by email and a more conventional mail-shot. In Bearsden/Milngavie 
many local organisations were listed on the East Dunbartonshire Council’s 
website. The Community Health Partnership in Glasgow’s east end keep a 
database of community organisations. Due to data protection guidelines, they 
were unable to share the data base but agreed to contact the groups on the 
study’s behalf. Local political parties, community councils, tenants’ 
organisations and churches of all faiths in each area were also approached. 
Posters were displayed in libraries and community centres. A full list of the 
organisations contacted is available in Appendix 2.  
                                         
11 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/glasgow_and_west/7227953.stm 
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6.2 Data Generation 
6.2.1 Design 
Like sampling strategies, there are a number of strategies available within the 
cannon of qualitative methods to generate data. Observation methods were 
quickly dismissed because it was felt that these would not provide the data 
required to meet the aims of this study. Consideration therefore needed to be 
given to whether focus groups or interviews would best suit the purpose. Focus 
groups are ideal for generating a certain type of data that draws on the 
interaction between group members (Kitzinger and Barbour 1999). Although an 
argument could have been made for using focus groups for this study because of 
its community perspective, there was the danger that the discussions could 
simply have become a trade in cancer anecdotes. Rather, this study hoped to 
generate rich data that encapsulated thoughts and beliefs about cancer and in 
depth interviews provided the most likely vehicle for this. Moreover, the original 
lay epidemiology model as described by Davison and colleagues (1991) was 
derived from data generated during one-to-one interviews and it was felt apt to 
replicate this method, if useful comparisons were to be made.  
Most qualitative research is carried out by some form of interview despite it 
being ‘hard, creative, active work’ (Mason 1996:67). Such popularity has meant 
that there are many texts available that offer hints on how to carry out 
interviews. For example, Kvale (1996) suggested that there are ten important 
skills that any qualitative researcher should possess and nine different types of 
questions. A more helpful summary was offered by Mason (1996) who 
recommended that qualitative interviews include the following ‘core’ features. 
Interviews should resemble an informal dialogue that is guided by themes or 
topics and crucially, there must be recognition that the product of the interview 
reflects a ‘construction’. The ideal interviews therefore are what Burgess (1984) 
called ‘conversations with purpose’, though this ‘touchy-feely’ language may 
betray the complexity of good interviewing. The various skills associated with in-
depth interviewing were summarised by Legard, Keegan and Ward (2003):  
“First the ability of the researcher to listen is fundamental to the art 
of interviewing. The researcher must hear, digest and comprehend 
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the participant’s answers in order how to decide to probe further. 
Second, good in-depth interviewing requires a clear, logical mind. 
The researcher needs to be able to think quickly to distil the 
essential points of what the participant is saying, exercise judgement 
about what to pursue, and simultaneously formulate the relevant 
question. Third, a good memory is an important attribute. It is often 
necessary to make a mental note of a point made earlier on by the 
participant and return to it at the judicious moment in the interview 
to seek further clarification or elaboration.” (Legard, Keegan & Ward 
2003:142)  
Given the repertoire of necessary skills, and the ability for participants either to 
clam up or ramble it is evident that unearthing helpful data is demanding. Not 
‘getting at’ the required data is not the only problem associated with 
interviews. Bordieu (1977) argued that interviews are the least effective method 
because the information given by participants is a “public account” that tells 
interviewers what they want to hear or what participants are comfortable 
disclosing. Bordieu suggested observation methods be used to counteract this 
but such a method was not applicable in this study. Alternatively a series of 
interviews with the same cohort of participants may foster the emergence of 
‘private accounts’ (Cornwell 1984). Though such an approach may have been 
beneficial in this study, it was dismissed on purely practical grounds. 
6.2.2 Interview process  
Semi-structured and unstructured formats are both used in qualitative 
interviews, although many suggest that even the most unstructured interviews 
will have some structured elements (Mason 1996; Collins 1998). Unstructured 
interviews generally begin with loosely focused questions. Subsequent questions 
and prompts are individually tailored in response to the interviewee’s answers. A 
level of structure may be employed to ensure a level of consistency throughout 
the interviews. The interview process in this study followed a largely 
unstructured approach but it also sought to ensure that the key concepts in lay 
epidemiology were sufficiently covered. A number of key ideas were introduced 
in each interview and the topic guide reflected this (Appendix 7). The concepts 
of risk estimation, candidacy, anomalous deaths and unwarranted survivals all 
required exploration in interviews. Lay epidemiology as a concept is relatively 
jargon-heavy so it was necessary to find a more familiar and informal language. 
This was done by first asking participants to talk about people they had known 
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who had had cancer. Participants’ responses, in the form of narratives and 
anecdotes, provided the opportunity to probe further details and explore the 
impact of the experience of others. Participants were then asked to consider any 
apparent similarities between sufferers and reflect on the extent that they met 
with their ideas about ‘who gets cancer’. It was this line of questioning that 
allowed the exploration of the notion of cancer candidacy. Such discussions also 
facilitated the discussion of anomalies. Prior to the interviews it was anticipated 
that children might be identified as anomalies and as such participants were 
asked to comment on children’s cancer. It was important to establish which 
types of narratives are entered into explanatory models. Asking participants to 
recall cases of celebrity cancer would initiate the discussion of the relative 
importance of narratives. As well as asking about lay epidemiology the study also 
sought to access participants’ reflections on different types of cancer. Clinically 
and epidemiologically cancer is treated as a multisite and multi-causal disease 
and the study questioned whether the views of the lay public mirrored the 
experts in this respect. Despite this need for structural consistency it was 
equally important that the interview was flexible enough to permit additional 
salient themes to emerge.  
6.2.2.1 The interview 
The interviews took place between July 2007 and June 2008. All interviews 
began with a description of the aims of the study. Rather than introduce lay 
epidemiology, the stated aim of the study was to gather ‘ordinary’ views about 
cancer. The information shared with participants prior to the interview had 
outlined that the study was part of a PhD project and many participants 
remembered this. This automatically labelled the researcher as a student. 
Establishing roles within an interview situation has an impact on the outcome of 
the process, and the ‘student’ status of the researcher provided distance from 
the ‘expert’ view (Richards and Emslie 2000). Although in this context neither 
the interviewer nor the interviewee was ‘expert’, it was not uncommon for 
participants to state: ‘Well, you’ll know more than me’ and participants often 
sought clarification from the researcher on specific risks and causes of cancer.  
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6.2.2.2 Fieldnotes 
There is some disagreement about how fieldnotes should be collected and more 
specifically what information they should include (Emerson et al 2001). 
Fieldnotes were collated in this study after each interview. These gave general 
observations about the interview, how it had progressed and impressions on the 
interviewee. In particular, anything that marked them out. Even from the very 
early interviews it was apparent that the perceived closeness or ‘proximity’ to 
cancer was important and that this was likely to frame participants’ overall 
beliefs. Fieldnotes then became a statement of proximity for each participant 
and more detailed ‘proximity vignettes’ appear in Appendix 10. 
6.3 Analysis 
6.3.1 Design 
The utilisation of theory from the outset of the study meant that the big 
‘themes’ were already determined. As such, adopting a framework-type 
approach (Richie & Spencer 1993) to the analysis may have been useful but 
ultimately it was decided that the approach may stifle the analysis. Although the 
themes were pre-determined the analytic process had to be flexible enough to 
allow other important themes to emerge. If, for example, candidacy had no 
application in the data, the analyses would have to explore other themes and 
avenues that might illuminate the content of lay beliefs of cancer.  
As the previous chapter on methodological considerations demonstrated, a 
version of the grounded theory method was adapted. The constant comparative 
method of looking at transcripts and data was used as an analytic tool. The 
method allows for the analysis of a single case but at the same time incorporates 
cross-case analysis. According to Glaser and Strauss (1967) the constant 
comparative method has four clear stages: comparing incidents applicable to 
each category, integrating categories, defining the theory and finally writing the 
theory. Clearly the presence of the ‘theory’ from the beginning gave the analysis 
a focus but the analysis did seek to provide a theory about the utility of lay 
epidemiology. The study was not embarked on with preconceived ideas about 
the value of lay epidemiology in this context and no hypothesis was tested. From 
this perspective the analysis was inductive rather than deductive.  
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6.3.2 Analytic process 
The first task in the analytic process is to assign codes to the data that will be 
built on to create a coding frame. Developing and refining a coding frame is vital 
because it allows the systematic exploration of data. Individual elements within 
lay epidemiology provided the starting point for the coding frame. Although 
beginning the process with fixed codes in mind is not always usual in grounded 
theory, Kelle (1997) maintained that we are most likely to embark on any 
analysis with a set of a prioi codes, which are distinct from the nvivo codes that 
emerge from, and are grounded in, the data.  
Each interview was transcribed verbatim and as is customary with good practice 
in qualitative analysis, each recording was listened to after the interview and 
again on receipt of the transcript. Initial codes, based on the a priori codes from 
lay epidemiology, were applied to the transcripts. Thereafter new codes were 
developed and added as patterns and themes emerged. The analysis followed a 
circular rather than linear process and the coding frame went through a number 
of iterations. The a priori coding frame and the final coding frame appear in 
Appendix 8. Codes from the initial coding frame were applied to all the 
transcripts. However, re-reading the transcripts often provided new avenues or 
possibilities and where appropriate new codes were added. This is consistent 
with the constant comparative and iterative approach. The data were initially 
coded manually before the coding frame and transcripts were entered into 
Nvivo12. The data were anonymised before being entered into Nvivo. The 
organisation of nodes and trees gives a helpful ‘filing cabinet’ to store data (See 
Appendix 9). So, rather than use Nvivo as an analytical prop, it was used merely 
as a catalogue and reference system. As Mason reminded us: 
“Computers cannot perform the creative and intellectual task of 
devising categories, of deciding which categories or types of data are 
relevant to the process being investigated or what is a meaningful 
comparison, or of generating appropriate research questions and 
propositions with which to interrogate the data.”(Mason 1996:108) 
Coding and organising the data is simply the first step to the analysis proper. The 
data need to be constantly checked and rechecked and eventually stories begin 
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to take shape. While much is written about coding, this stage in the process is 
given little attention: 
“This is an aspect of analysis that tends not to be described in full, 
being something that the researcher picks up along the way.” 
(Barbour 2008:215) 
The constant comparative method of reading and re-reading transcripts has been 
described as ‘a painstaking and somewhat unglamorous process’ (Barbour 
2008:217). Yet this meticulous and conscientious exercise is what gives rise to 
the emergence of the impressions and feelings about the data:  
“Ideas occur to us when they please, not when it pleases us... Yet 
ideas would certainly not come to mind had we not brooded at our 
desks and searched for answers with passionate devotion.” (Weber 
1918)  
Interpreting the data generated in interviews was central to this study. 
Participants provided a series of narratives to evidence their views and the 
analytic task was judging whether the concepts in lay epidemiology applied to 
the data. 
6.4 Ethical considerations and approval 
As shown in section 6.1.2 on the sampling and recruitment process, a number of 
ethical matters were considered when deciding how study participants might be 
recruited. Cancer is for many a sensitive area and, as the literature review 
highlighted, is a topic often attended with fear. This was among the reasons for 
deciding to ensure that the recruitment did not have a healthcare focus. It was 
possible that some patients may receive the invitation via their GP practice and 
misunderstand the aims of the study and become distressed.  
The decision to recruit participants from outside the National Health Service 
resulted in an ethical permission being sought from the University of Glasgow’s 
Faculty of Medicine Research Ethics Committee. Ethical Approval was granted by 
the committee in June 2007 (Appendix 1).  
Community organisations were contacted once either by letter or email 
(Appendix 3). No reminders were sent. Posters were placed in local libraries and 
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community centres. Any additional was initiated by the organisation or the 
individual volunteer. Involvement was on an entirely voluntary basis. Some 
organisations invited the researcher to attend a meeting to provide further 
information. Others contacted the researcher directly. Any community volunteer 
was provided with an information sheet (Appendix 5), and consented to 
providing the researcher with contact details. They were given 48 hours to 
decide if they wanted to take part in the study. The researcher then contacted 
the volunteer by telephone, again to assess interest and where appropriate 
arrange a suitable time for interview. Prior to the interview, participants were 
informed of the purpose of the interview and the consent form was then 
discussed in full (Appendix 6). It was made clear that they were free to 
withdraw at any point and could choose not to answer any questions. Interviews 
were recorded with participants’ permission. One participant refused permission 
for the interview to be recorded. All participant data were kept in accordance 
with the University of Glasgow’s data handling and research governance 
procedures13.  
Cancer can be an upsetting area for some and it was anticipated that some of 
the participants may experience distress during the course of the interviews. 
Few participants became distressed during the course of the interviews. As an 
experienced interviewer it was possible to handle these situations empathically.  
6.5 Rigour in qualitative research 
The ability to adopt a ‘smorgasbord’ approach in qualitative research has led to 
questions about its rigour. There remains little agreement on how best to 
guarantee rigour, though numerous guidelines and checklists provide hints and 
tips (Hoddinot & Pill 1997; Seale & Silverman 1997; Rogers et al 1998). The lists 
are not uniform, and contain a range measures thought to add rigour to the 
process, including: the transparency of the researcher’s role or using computer 
programmes to aid analysis. Collectively, they display a lack of agreement on 
the ‘right way’ to approach qualitative research and fail to capture the need for 
pragmatism in the qualitative research endeavour. Indeed, opting for one over 
the other introduces the danger of scrabbling for what Barbour (2001) termed, 
                                         
13 http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_46633_en.pdf 
Chapter 6  100 
the ‘technical fixes’ that have come to represent a proxy for quality. This does 
not suggest that quality should not be considered, yet some of the techniques 
like triangulation, respondent validation, and multiple coding, were not 
applicable in this study (Pope & Mays 2000). This should not detract from the 
rigorous approach adopted in this study.  
 
6.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter outlined the methodological design and process of the study. The 
sample was recruited from community organisations and leisure clubs in two 
communities in Glasgow. One affluent and one deprived. The sample was chosen 
to reflect ‘ordinary’ views A total of 31 interviews were conducted. The 
interviews were loosely structured and a topic guide ensured consistency 
throughout the interviews. Interview participants were asked to provide details 
about cases of cancer known to them. The data generated in interviews were 
analysed by adopting the constant comparative method utilised in grounded 
theory approaches.  
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7. Findings  
7.1 Findings introduction 
Although the interview topic guide and the means of coding those conversations 
into themes have been discussed in the previous chapter, it is useful to briefly 
revisit this as it provides an outline for the findings chapter. The primary aim of 
this study was to consider the utility of the ‘lay epidemiology’ concept when 
exploring beliefs about cancer. The interviews were informal discussions that 
centred on the participants’ experience of cancer. A range of themes were 
introduced in each interview to ensure consistency, though in keeping with 
qualitative work generally, the interviews were flexible enough to allow 
participants to introduce subjects important and unique to them  
The aim of this chapter is first to introduce the sample in more detail. It focuses 
on the demographic characteristics of the sample. The findings have then been 
grouped under three main headings or sections: experience of cancer, meaning 
and understanding of cancer, and finally, lay epidemiology. Essentially the first 
theme, experience of cancer provides a routine description of the information 
imparted during interviews. The second theme, meaning and understanding of 
cancer, illustrates how this experience has shaped participants’ views of cancer. 
The final section looks specifically at whether these views and experiences 
suggest that a lay epidemiological perspective is adopted when thinking about 
cancer. Both the sections on meaning and understanding and, to a greater 
extent, the lay epidemiology theme are not descriptions but interpretations of 
the interview data.   
The aim is first to describe the participants’ experience of cancer. Here the 
focus is on details of individual cases known to the participants as well as to 
explore different sources of information. Participants have been assigned 
pseudonyms throughout. What emerged from the experiences shared by 
participants in the interviews was an insight into the process of developing an 
explanatory framework of cancer. From close personal experiences and 
knowledge gleaned from wider, and often removed sources, participants built a 
personal evidence base. While each is uniquely tailored to the participant’s 
individual experience, striking similarities are found throughout the spectrum of 
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understanding. Finally lay epidemiology and its relevance to cancer beliefs will 
be scrutinised. Held within lay epidemiology are a number of crucial 
components, including candidacy, anomalous deaths and unwarranted survivals. 
Each of these will be considered. It is notable that both the chapters on meaning 
and understanding of cancer and lay epidemiology assume a more discursive 
tone, and data relevant to the findings of this study is introduced. The final 
chapter on lay epidemiology in particular consistently contrasts the findings 
from this study with Davison’s.  
Although the findings are presented in linear, sequential logic, there is overlap 
between each section. This is especially true of those sections that consider 
meaning and understanding and lay epidemiology. Explanations of cause or 
aetiology for example are found across the chapters.  
7.2 Introducing the sample 
A total of 31 individuals agreed to participate in the interviews. Most interviews 
took place in the participants’ homes, although five opted to be interviewed at 
the Section of General Practice and Primary Care, University of Glasgow. One 
participant chose to be interviewed at her workplace. All interviews were taped 
with respondents’ permission, only one respondent refused permission and on 
one occasion the recording equipment failed. All audio recordings were 
transcribed in full.  
Two of the interviews were undertaken with married couples, both of whom had 
agreed to be interviewed but opted to be interviewed at the same time. Other 
married couples were also interviewed but chose to be interviewed separately. 
On three occasions another person was present while the interview was being 
conducted, and although they often contributed or offered opinions they were 
not regarded as respondents. There is one notable exception to this when one 
participant’s mother offered a particularly pertinent insight into cancer and 
fatalism and this is noted in Chapter 10 on Lay Epidemiology.  
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7.2.1 Demographics  
Respondents ranged in age from 25 to 83, though the majority were over 50. 
This marked out the sample in a number of ways. First, most of the sample were 
retired. More importantly, the age of the respondents provided the opportunity 
to discuss the changing nature of cancer in light of medical advances. The 
advantages and disadvantages of this are discussed more fully in Chapter 11, 
which provides an overall reflection on the study. The majority too were female 
(22 of 31). More interviews were carried out with those living in the affluent 
community. All of the participants, with one exception, were or had been 
married or cohabiting. Four of the participants were widowed or divorced and 
also lived alone. The remainder lived with their partner or spouse and two 
respondents lived with other family members. Table 2 outlines respondents’ 
characteristics.  
 
7.3 Sample recruitment 
As detailed in the previous chapter a number of community organisations were 
approached (Appendix 2) in a bid to secure volunteers for the study. The 
majority of participants were recruited via this method. A series of posters and 
leaflets were distributed in libraries and community centres in the selected 
communities (Appendix 4). None of the participants were recruited via this 
method.  
 
7.4 Experience of cancer 
As Table 2 shows the majority of participants were close to someone who had 
had or was currently experiencing cancer. The majority had experienced cancer 
among extended family, and this included grandparents and aunts and uncles. 
Table 2 records the closest experience only. The closest experience was judged 
to be spouse, followed by parents and then siblings before going on to extended 
family and wider social networks.  Some participants had experience in all 
categories. Only three respondents reported that they had experienced cancer 
only amongst their social network.  
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 Table 2 Characteristics of participants 
Respondent Age Socioecono
mic status* 
Gender Employment  Proximity to 
cancer** 
Lisa 45 A F Part-time info officer Spouse 
Murray 83 A M Retired engineer Social network 
Kathleen 68 A F Retired Admin Extended family 
Andrew 57 A M Full-time  Extended family 
Jessie 63 A F Retired nurse Parent 
Elsie 62 A F Retired/housewife Spouse 
Jim 64 A M Retired police officer Parent-in-law 
Phyllis 58 A F Self-employed Parent 
Colin 61 A M Management consultant Extended family 
Janet 46 A F Nurse Extended family 
Grace 62 A F Childcare worker Spouse 
Angus 56 A M Self-employed  Sibling 
Emily 37 A F Optometrist Parent-in-law 
Clare 42 A  F Self-employed PR Parents 
Jenny 38 A F Pharmacist Social network 
Barbara 64 A F Retired librarian Social network 
Eileen 72 A F Retired Admin Sibling 
Barry 74 A M Retired bank manager Extended family 
Betty 61 D F Retired Parent 
Charles 74 D M Retired Engineer Spouse 
Gary 37 D M Unemployed Parent 
Caroline 37 D F Carer Parent-in-law 
Karen 25 D F Social Care worker Extended family 
Patricia 62 D F Retired Community worker Parents 
Pauline 57 D F Retired nurse Extended family 
Rose 61 D F Long-term sick Extended family 
Josephine 61 D F Retired retail Parent in law 
Lorna 57 D F Long-term sick Extended family  
Rona 31 D F Self-employed PR Extended family 
Peter 67 D M Self-employed Parent in law 
Julia 65 D F Retired Catering Parent  
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7.4.1 Proximity Vignettes 
Proximity in this study denotes the participants ‘closeness’ to cancer. From the 
earliest interviews it became clear that the level of personal experience of 
cancer was extremely influential in the participants’ beliefs and discussions 
about cancer. Proximity could be experiential, for example through the cancer 
event of a spouse but also temporal in terms of how recent the cancer event 
was. The importance of proximity for the formulation of explanatory models is 
reiterated throughout the findings chapters. As well as Table 2, which provides a 
brief outline of proximity, a short vignette of each participant, based on 
interview fieldnotes, appears in Appendix 10. The detail gives background and 
context to findings chapters. 
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8. Experience of cancer 
8.1 Introduction 
Central to this thesis are the participants’ experiences of cancer and these will 
be described in this chapter. Personal experiences formed the basis of their 
explanatory models of cancer, which were supplemented with evidence from 
wider mainstream sources, like the media. Participants’ experiences of cancer 
were wide-ranging. All could provide at least one example of someone they 
knew with cancer though the level of detail or narrative offered about individual 
cases varied greatly. Typically participants gave detailed accounts of one or two 
relatives’ or friends’ cancers. A handful of respondents felt that cancer had not 
affected them and could cite no one they regarded as ‘close’ as having or having 
had cancer.  
As Table 2 in Chapter 7 demonstrated the majority of participants did have what 
they described as a ‘close’ experience of cancer. A small number had a spouse 
with cancer, or a spouse who had died of cancer, a number also had parents or 
parents-in-law, grandparents, siblings, aunts, uncles and close friends. Ideas 
about cancer were articulated through these borrowed narratives. Often patient 
experience is chronicled through the use of narrative and it is usual for research 
participants to be asked to ‘tell their story’. This is the approach used by Health 
Talk Online14, the video archive of patient experience in a number of clinical 
areas, including cancer. The participants in this study show that when asked to 
talk about cancer, often in abstract terms, even those with little direct 
experience borrow narratives. This resonates with Kapodi et al’s (2005) paper 
that discussed the importance of availability heuristics. People will discuss the 
information that they have readily available and they evidence their beliefs by 
providing anecdotal examples. (Scanlon et al 2006) 
8.2 Proximity 
Proximity refers to the participant’s closeness to cancer. Clearly those with a 
closer proximity to cancer provided more detailed narratives than those who felt 
they had not been affected by cancer. Those unaffected talked about cancer in 
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more general terms and merely pooled information from alternative sources, 
such as the media. Those affected by cancer could often provide very detailed 
information of cancer journeys and drew comparisons and highlighted 
differences between the cases they were familiar with. Family dynamics vary 
significantly. For some participants, the experience of an aunt or uncle was 
thought to be very close while for others this was barely regarded as being in the 
family. Those participants with a closer proximity to cancer had deliberated 
more and had been more questioning about the potential causes of illness in the 
cases known to them. What emerged was a more reasoned and intricate 
explanatory model. This group talked about the need for explanations and to 
understand why the event had or was happening, particularly if no obvious cause 
was apparent. As Clare demonstrated when discussing her mother’s cancer: 
So there wasn’t any kind of obvious links in that (family) and so I 
guess that made myself and my sister, who have spent a long time 
discussing these things, wonder about where it all came from. (Clare 
42, Affluent) 
Proximity refers not only to relational or kinship closeness but also closeness in 
time. Those participants with a very recent close experience of cancer tended to 
offer more and be more thoughtful about the event. For example, Kathleen’s 
friend was undergoing surgery for colorectal cancer on the day of the interview, 
and she reported seeking out information on her friend’s behalf.  
8.3 Distant proximity 
While those participants with a closer proximity to cancer were more likely to 
offer information about individual cases in depth, all participants drew on a 
breadth of information. So, while the intricacies of cases might have been 
missing from narratives, participants did proffer views and insights into the 
disease experience of not just family, but friends, and wider social networks. 
This ranged from neighbours, school-gate peers, fellow club members, 
churchgoers, and colleagues. Although the sufferer may not have been well-
known to the participant they were able to routinely provide detail about their 
cancer and disease experience. It was clear that in such affiliate organisations or 
social networks discussions about illness were regular occurrences. The result 
was akin to ‘Chinese whispers’ and although the quality of the information may 
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be dubious, participants accepted these cases as truth or fact. Moreover, many 
of these half-known cases were critical to views about cancer.  
The following extract highlights that information, even from someone quite 
removed, can impact on the overall cancer belief system. Throughout the 
interview the participant, Josephine, returned to the unpredictability of cancer, 
particularly with regard to the speed at which cancer can take hold:  
Josephine: What I cannae understands aboot cancer is em the speed, 
you know how quickly. Now there’s a wee boy, I say a wee boy, but 
I’ve known him since he was a wee boy em that goes to oor church, 
he’s the minister’s son’s friend. His mum works round in the chemist 
and eh I think it’s Lymphoma he’s got but anyway, and I know there’s 
all different kinds of cancers and all different, but this wee boy has 
been maybe ongoing for aboot three years maybe. Noo when he was 
first diagnosed as I say he got his chemotherapy and his treatment 
and all the rest of it and he was free of cancer.  
I: How old is he? 
Josephine: He’s twenty-one now. And then, aboot less than a year 
ago, em, his mum was saying that he was going for tests and he was 
quite worried but when he came back he was still cancer free. And, it 
was only a matter of weeks, now when I’m saying a matter of weeks, 
it was only maybe aboot three weeks, four weeks, he was back in the 
hospital, it’s all re-appeared and he’s back on chemotherapy. And 
apparently, em, I think he’s terminal now because eh, whit dae you 
call it, the minister was saying a couple a weeks ago when he was, 
you know, gieing the intimations that the boy had stopped the 
treatment. (Josephine 61, Deprived) 
This extract illustrates two fundamental points. First, cases of cancer that are 
far removed can be offered as experiential narratives. This is not unique. The 
interviews are littered with examples of stories from wide social networks. More 
importantly in the extract above , the most salient factor for Josephine  was the 
‘speed’ at which an apparent success story had changed, thus emphasising what 
she believed to be a major feature of cancer; unpredictability. Being unable to 
forecast the disease trajectory and outcome are likely to be the root of those 
universal metaphors that emphasise the irrationality of cancer (Balshem 1991; 
Lupton 1994). 
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8.4 The legacy of early memories  
Many participants began the interview by telling of their first encounter with, or 
experience of, cancer. As detailed in the introductory chapter the majority of 
participants in this study were aged between 55 and 70 and this generation has 
witnessed dramatic changes in cancer treatment and outcomes. Early 
experiences were important in formulating their beliefs about cancer. The 
contrast between past and more recent experiences is touched on in the first 
extract from Rose, who illustrates the importance of the relationship between 
experience and understanding. Yet, despite medical advances there is an 
underlying sense of permanent negativity:   
When I was twenty-one, and it came, when I realised what it was, 
because my aunt had it and I watched her. In they days they didnae 
have the Macmillan Sisters or they didnae have, you know, the places 
for them to go. And I watched my mum and her other sister nursing 
and I saw her degrading, and it lasted a long time. She was ill for a 
long time. So that was my nearest, that was when I was twenty-one, 
now that was the first time of actually realising what it was. (Rose 
63, Deprived) 
My grandfather died of, em cancer, he died in 1962 of cancer rising 
from a wound or a wart and by the time he died .... I went to see him 
in Stobhill then Royal Infirmary for a year before he died and eh it 
was just awful I mean the whole side of his face it was a wound in his 
temple and it spread down into his shoulder. And I mean he was like 
that by the end and I mean it was just awful, you know, I mean it 
would be awful to see anyone but in someone you loved it was a very, 
very traumatic experience and I was fourteen or fifteen at the time. 
Em so I guess that left its mark (Colin 61, Affluent) 
8.5 Cancer Narratives 
8.5.1 Disease trajectory 
Participants provided many detailed examples of cancer among people that they 
knew. In terms of the general course of the disease, cancer was typically 
described as either a long, painful process or as an aggressive, fast moving 
disease that took hold quickly. Neither trajectory was positive, each bringing 
with it its own difficulty for family and friends. As Grace whose husband died of 
colorectal cancer, ten years after his initial diagnosis demonstrates:   
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What I’m scared of is if somebody tells me some relation or other has 
got cancer I hope they die quickly and didn’t go through what Bill had 
to because he went from fourteen stone to six stone and his watch 
strap wouldn’t fit me. I used to take the links out for him and his 
wrists were so thin that his watch wouldn’t fit me after he died. And 
I think to myself if they could avoid that, if they can’t be cured, if 
they could avoid that, going through what he went through and the 
agony and the pain and the indignity of colostomies and things like 
that, yeah it was, and if they could avoid going through that and sort 
of go quickly it would be a blessing. (Grace 63, Affluent) 
The above description of physical demise is not uncommon, others talked of 
‘wasting’ away or of sufferers being ‘shadows of themselves’ and cancer had 
completely ‘consumed’ them. Yet, the opposite was also true. Some participants 
were alarmed at the speed of the disease, particularly in what they regarded as 
largely asymptomatic patients. Angus describes the case of his brother who died 
of pancreatic cancer: 
What I think was, he turned yellow one day he went to the GP and 
the GP says “Oh you’ve got jaundice” and then a week later he was 
yellower and he just wasn’t himself. So basically I just said to him 
“No you’re no going back to the GP we’ll go down to the Hospital X” 
and they said “Right we’ll keep you in for an examination.” Within 
two days they transferred him to Hospital Y and the usual hospital 
‘Don’t worry it’s nothing scary’ but then basically,  really just within 
three days he died. (Angus 57, Affluent) 
8.5.2 Pre-diagnostic symptoms and delay 
This potential for individuals to be apparently healthy and then receive an 
entirely unexpected cancer diagnosis emphasised the unpredictable nature of 
the disease. The majority of stories though did involve symptoms, and how the 
sufferers responded to these symptoms also varied greatly. A number of 
participants talked about how the patient ‘wasn’t the type to sit about’ and 
sought help for symptoms promptly. Most sensed that something was wrong. 
Grace described her husband’s symptoms of colorectal cancer as ‘all you see on 
television’, yet her husband had not presented to his GP for many months. 
Although she did not question the potential importance of the delay to diagnosis 
in her husband’s death, Colin did question what might have happened if his 
brother had presented more promptly: 
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I mean if he’d gone to the Doctor when he was first aware he was 
unwell who knows he might have still have been alive today I mean 
I’ve got no idea but eh apparently by the time he got into [hospital] 
he was pretty well eaten away, you know. (Colin 61, Affluent) 
Most participants were clear about the importance of early diagnosis. The 
existence of screening programmes confirmed this. Screening for breast and 
cervical cancer was widely welcomed but led some to question why screening for 
other cancer sites was not routinely offered, particularly when it was thought to 
be relatively straightforward: 
Because some people think that everybody should get tested for say, 
bowel cancer and I think they are going to, well I think women should 
get tested for ovarian cancer because, that, apparently, is just a 
blood test (Kathleen 68, Affluent) 
The inference then appeared to be that early diagnosis would certainly improve 
survival and further that the extension of the screening programme would offer 
undoubted benefits: 
The health service could do an awful lot more in terms of screening 
and as far as I’m concerned that was the intention when it was set 
up. Prevention is better than cure and a damn site cheaper, better 
for the patient (Peter 67, Deprived) 
Participants regarded speedy treatment as a necessity and policy targets around 
waiting times drive this. Angus, whose brother had recently been diagnosed with 
a rare colorectal cancer, illustrates the alarm that can be felt by families of 
cancer patients: 
I think cancer is one of these things where I think we’ve discovered 
you have to move very quickly. How quickly is quickly? You know, 
that’s what I don’t know how quickly, quickly is? I mean it’s taken to 
get to the stage where Philip [brother] is now about to begin his 
treatment I would think within the next two to three weeks that’s 
probably been about three months. Now is that quick enough? I don’t 
know. Has that made it harder to treat the cancer? Should we do it as 
soon as we identify the type. The next day should you be in getting 
the treatment? I know it couldn’t be. the next day because what he 
said was he’s had to have ECG ‘s and everything because the chemo 
can kill you as well, but how long should you wait? Cause I feel three 
months is a long time, you know. (Angus 57, Affluent) 
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Practitioner delay was also introduced by participants and some general 
practitioners’ reluctance to thoroughly investigate symptoms. Some participants 
felt that long periods of time elapsed when ‘nothing’ was done. For some this 
was not an isolated incident. Julia, whose father had a brain tumour that went 
undiagnosed for “years”, reported that her father had been told that his 
symptoms were “all in his head”. Some years later her sister was treated by her 
GP for more that 12 months for dyspepsia and was eventually diagnosed with 
oesophageal cancer. The cancer was ‘untreatable’ by the time her diagnosis was 
received. Angus described the case of a colleague who had a ‘bad back’ and had 
repeatedly presented to his GP, who had suggested he attend a chiropractor, but 
received a diagnosis of renal cancer after the delay. Betty talked about the pre-
diagnostic phase in her mother’s illness, who died of gastric cancer: 
My mum, she was for two years going to the toilet, her bowels, going 
to the toilet all the time and her Doctor kept giving her eh, and I 
forget the name of the pills now,  eh to stop the diarrhoea, and not 
investigating the cause. (Betty 61, Deprived) 
8.5.3 Recurrence 
The possibility that cancer could and would most likely recur was frequently 
discussed. Participants presented a number of cases where cancer had ‘come 
back’. Often the recurrence was speedy and arrived unexpectedly, as Clare 
described her mother’s illness: 
Yes, I guess she had (sigh) she was sixty-four when she died I think 
she would have been sixty when she was diagnosed and she had a 
mastectomy and chemo and radium. But made a very good recovery 
and quite a swift recovery and, I suppose I mean with that because 
also, she was very determined not to let it kind of shut her life down 
and she had a very clear goal as well, something that she wanted to 
attend and be part of it, which was an active thing. So that seemed 
to have focused her hugely and I think to the rest of us it made us 
sort of think she was going to be okay. But em it did recur (Clare 42, 
Affluent) 
Lisa, whose husband had survived both a primary tumour and a recurrence, 
talked about how she had once thought that “it always gets you in the end”. She 
told how she had re-evaluated her position in light of her experience and 
expressed shame at her previous presumptions. Nevertheless, the supposition 
that recurrence is wholly negative was a commonly held view. Josephine is quite 
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clear of the benefits of early detection but also that if the cancer returns or 
develops into ‘secondaries’, there is little hope: 
Aye, I mean I know that you get a tumour or whatever it is you get 
and I know that there can be secondaries and I mean and I know that 
em if you catch it before it gets tae the, you know, before it spreads 
there is a chance. You know but em once the secondaries, you know, 
once it hits the other organs and you’re, you know, that it’s curtains, 
you know what I mean. (Josephine 61, Deprived) 
The horror of recurrence was not always borne out in reality. Two participants 
did provide examples of individuals close to them who had a primary tumour and 
a recurrence and had survived, one for many years. Here Phyllis describes her 
mother who, 87: 
She’s had cancer twice. She had cancer first at sixty-seven, she had 
breast cancer - smoked from she was thirteen until she was sixty-
seven and stopped immediately, of course. She survived that and 
then when she was eighty-two she had, em, cancer of the uterus, and 
she had a hysterectomy….. And eh she’s still here (Phyllis 58, 
Affluent) 
8.5.4  ‘Facing the worst’ - dealing with cancer 
The overall cancer narrative often included comments on the psychological 
impact that the diagnosis had on the individual concerned. Participants were 
keen to stress the importance of remaining positive following a diagnosis of 
cancer, and certainly if not positive then largely uncomplaining. Many 
participants talked about the manner in which sufferers coped with the disease, 
particularly emphasising the strength with which it was dealt with. This mirrors 
much of the literature reviewed in Chapter 3, that looked at cancer metaphors. 
Hope, resilience and positivity are all common narratives that illustrate the 
salience of morality in the modern cancer discourse (Lupton 1994; Hawkins 1999; 
Ehrenriech 2009). A recurring theme was ‘just getting on with it’ and ‘carrying 
on’ even when sufferers had to ‘face the worst’. Kathleen illustrates this with 
her experience of family members, and in particular a paternal aunt: 
Although none of them I suppose, they didn’t all react in the same 
way but I suppose all of them just got on with life. Had the 
treatment put up with the treatment, and just seemed to get on with 
their life, you know. The one that died having had the breast cancer 
first, she was actually invited to stay in the hospital for a longer time 
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than she did and eh, but she didn’t because she had quite a young 
family and she was the one that definitely just got on with it, you 
know putting up with having to go on public transport, you know to 
go for her treatment and then go back and, no matter how bad it 
was, when it was over having to get on with family life and I think I 
was aware of that as well. I wasn’t that close to her but I was aware 
of that. (Kathleen 68, Affluent) 
Again, this echoes the findings of Blaxter (1982), Cornwell (1984) and Balshem 
(1991) who show that their respondents were clear that not giving in to disease 
or lying down to it was critical. While few made a direct link between 
personality and survival, some had considered it but questioned what this meant 
for those who did not survive. Throughout her interview Lisa returned to the 
impact that her husband’s diagnosis had had on her overall belief system. This 
fits with Hunt and Emslie’s (2001) assertion that family experience will provide 
the most influential narratives. Almost all of her cancer beliefs and explanatory 
model had changed to accommodate a close and obviously traumatic 
experience:  
I: Do you think those kinds of things help with survival then, you 
know if you do have it?  
Lisa: Em, you know, I don’t know about that, you would need to ask 
me that before Alan was ill. Funnily enough, I think I would have said 
that but maybe because I have heard that so often that I have just 
accepted it as fact. You know, you hear people say, you know, she’s a 
right, sort of, got a really positive attitude, you know she’ll fight this 
kind of thing, as if people who actually die of cancer are weaker and 
less resolute than other people (Lisa 45, Affluent) 
By noting that her presumptions might suggest that “people who actually die of 
cancer are weaker and less resolute”, echoes the stories shared in Hawkin’s 
pathographies, where the weakness of those who succumb to cancer is inferred 
(Hawkins 1999). So while positive attitude has been championed and thought to 
help with survival, there were also those that were thought to have ‘given up’. 
Gary reflects on the case of his cousin, who had died in her 40s, and made a 
more obvious link between attitude and survival: 
She was eh in her forties and left a young family, a wee boy thirteen, 
I say young the daughter was twenty-one and the boy was fourteen it 
was really sad, you know. But she, there was other things involved 
there, but she seemed to gie up, you know, too easy, you know, you 
hear people fighting it and no wanting tae die but she gied up I don’t 
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know what happened I think just an abusive relationship there, you 
know. But, you know, how people get, after the fact, they make wee 
comments and all that but that seemed to be the general picture. 
(Gary 37, Deprived) 
Both Gary and Lisa use the word fight. The pervasiveness of military metaphors 
in relation to cancer is well-established (Sontag 1978, Seale 2001a). The idea 
that cancer was something to be fought, a battle entered into, was raised again 
and again. Even when facing a terminal diagnosis respondents were clear that 
the proper course of action was ‘not to let it beat you’ as Jessie, who 
volunteered in a hospice stressed: 
Well if you go into that atmosphere and found how these people have 
accepted their illness with great fortitude. They are very brave they 
have their sad moments, don’t get me wrong, its not all just fun and 
games but there’s very little doom and gloom, they seem to have 
accepted, they’ve got their diagnosis and its right lets get on with 
life, what we’ve got left (Jessie 68, Affluent) 
Yet, Jessie was so clear of the negative impact of a cancer diagnosis that she 
removed the mirrors from her house while she was caring for her mother, in 
order that her mother would not witness her demise. Some participants decided 
to withhold information about diagnoses, especially to elderly relatives. Betty 
told that her mother-in-law was terrified of cancer and asked that professionals 
did not disclose her diagnosis.   
Sontag (1978) first raised the notion that the stigma associated with cancer was 
as bad as the disease itself. While the depth of the stigma has been questioned, 
some of the participants, particularly those in the older generation allude to the 
continued fear of the most dreaded disease, in spite of the advances: 
We’re all still scared of it but then it wasn’t spoken about the same 
as it’s spoken about now. (Rose 61 Deprived) 
Balanced against the fear though was the idea that advances have been made 
and most participants were able to share success stories.  
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8.6 Success stories 
While most of the narratives were about cancer deaths, there were some 
positive experiences.  Some participants presented examples of sufferers who 
had defied medical opinion. Colin talked of a friend, who, when diagnosed with 
leukaemia in 1986, was given a ‘50/50 chance’ but is now ‘as fit as a fiddle’. 
Similarly Emily told of her father-in-law, who had also been disease free for 
many years, despite an initially bleak prognosis. Phyllis’ mother, had overcome 
cancer twice. More generally, there was widespread acceptance that, although 
they may not know many success stories personally ,improvements in survival 
and treatment were could not be denied: 
I think that’s the instantaneous thing because I know a lot more 
people who have died from cancer than have recovered from it. So 
while I automatically think, ‘Oh that’s terminal’ I actually know that 
it’s not, em because I have family members that have had cancer and 
are now fine (Rona 31, Deprived) 
Clare demonstrates that she sees beyond her immediate experience of losing 
both her parents and a close friend to cancer:  
I say that (cancer equals death) because that’s how it is for me, 
that’s the first thing that comes into my head because that’s what 
my very direct experience of it, has resulted in that. So I feel that 
but I know if people ask me,  do I think everyone dies of cancer? No I 
don’t think that at all. Em, the things that I tend to read and become 
aware of is the fact that more and more people live with it and 
survive it and get over it and don’t even really experience it and I 
suppose em been more aware of that, you know.  I couldn’t, I’m 
trying to remember any of the statistics but I know I have read about 
different things, about things actually, you know, rates of recovery 
improving and better systems of treatment and all of that kind of 
thing. And less invasive techniques as well when they’re actually 
operating. So yes my immediate view is quite negative but my wider 
view isn’t. (Clare 42, Affluent) 
8.7 Lay or expert accounts? 
Much has been said about the expert patient (Department of Health 2001; Shaw 
2002). Armstrong and Murphy (2008) describe the ‘weaving’ of lay and expert 
information in patient narratives. Undoubtedly those with a close experience of 
cancer had been privy to information about their loved one’s case and as such 
discussed cases with more of an expert tone. Terminology about treatment was 
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a central part of many narratives. Angus relates information from a consultant 
and describes the ‘revolutionary’ treatment planned for his brother: 
He (consultant) said the way forward was CHOP-R, which is, you’ve 
probably never heard of CHOP-R either. It’s some kind of 
chemotherapy with an additional chemical in it. And he says really if 
you use this it will kill everything in your body, it will kill it, it will 
also destroy your bone marrow so you will need a bone marrow 
transplant. One of the strange things the oncologists who he’s 
attending they said “We’ll use chemo, we’ll extract some of your 
bone marrow which is infected and then we’ll re-inject it into you 
after the treatment.” And he said “But it’s infected your re-injecting 
infection” and the Professor in London said “Yeah, have you any 
brothers?” and he said “Yeah” and he said “Well get some of theirs if 
they’re compatible get some of theirs and get that back into you. 
Very risky because your antibodies may go for it but it’s the best 
way.” (Angus, 57 Affluent) 
Although Angus’ example is a complex one, participants did speak a common 
cancer language that featured in most accounts. The expert stretches beyond 
the patient and extends to ‘lay’ audiences. Participants were aware of the 
chemotherapy, radiotherapy and the side-effects of some treatments, the most 
obvious being hair loss, remission and secondaries. The key stages of the cancer 
journey were well understood and medical jargon was employed easily 
throughout.  
8.8 Sources and quality of information  
By foregrounding stories of close family and friends, the participants 
demonstrated that personal experience contributes the bulk of knowledge to 
cancer belief systems. Yet personal experience is by no means the sole source of 
knowledge and information about cancer.  
There was a tendency for participants to mention information received without 
citing the source. Sentences often began with ‘They say…..’ without ever 
detailing who ‘they’ actually are. This was also found by Calnan (1987) who 
reported that in his study women from social classes I and II were more likely to 
use such terms, which he interpreted as seeking credence for their accounts. For 
participants in this study it was sometimes clear, when they were talking about 
individual cases that they were referring to medical professionals. Generally 
‘they’ was used to describe the wider research community and the media: 
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Well they say that mobile phones give you cancer (Rona 31 Deprived) 
Your lifestyle sometimes they say now, you know, obesity eh staying 
too near pylons (Gary 37 Deprived) 
Well they say it’s diet as well, it’s doon tae diet, you know 
(Josephine 61 Deprived) 
 
More often participants cited their information source. The media, in all its 
forms, was a widespread source of knowledge. Participants typically talked 
about newspaper articles, television documentaries and the Internet and 
gleaned information from all such sources: 
I read as well, I tend to kind of read medical articles and things like 
that and I watch documentaries, you know I went into a site, because 
actually one of my friends in fact she was at the meeting has had an 
operation for bowel cancer, I did go into a site, the bowel cancer site 
for the first time. (Kathleen, 68 Affluent) 
 
Some participants talked about the sheer volume of, often conflicting, 
information. While many recognised the need to inform people, some expressed 
the feeling that messages should be treated with caution. Concentrating on the 
fearful aspects of cancer is common in the media and the suggestion of ever-
more risk factors leads to the supposition that “everything causes cancer” 
(Clarke & Everest 2006; Niederdeppe & Levy 2007). There is a danger that 
messages can become counter-productive: 
I think it’s sometimes the little things that are so ludicrous that you 
think sometimes people feel bombarded with so many things that you 
should be doing, shouldn’t be doing. What’s next?  Oh don’t bother, 
this is as good as whatever and I think people get sick of the whole 
thing and I think oh whatever I’ll just do what suits me (Emily 37, 
Affluent) 
Or potentially harmful: 
I think there’s too many mixed messages for people because I think 
some people and I’ve got friends that do this. They look up things on 
the internet and they imagine they’re dying and they’ve got this and 
they’ve got that and I just think that sometimes too much 
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information for some can be a bad thing because they then take it 
literally and if they then know what symptoms are or what to look 
for and I don’t think they need to know because some people make 
them apply to themselves so if you’re getting mixed information then 
they are doing one thing but on the other hand they’re be doing it 
and they apply that literally to their life and then 6 months later 
they hear that that’s wrong and they are sent into a frenzy and a 
panic and they think that they’ve maybe done themselves damage 
you know about doing it you know. I think anybody can write reports 
on things and publish, can’t they? They can say whatever they want 
and I think things should be taken with an element of caution. (Rona 
31 Deprived) 
8.9 Celebrity 
Although the media report breakthroughs in cancer treatment and trail cures, 
and also engage in public health activity by highlighting risk factors, the 
majority of information centres around celebrities with cancer. Participants 
were asked in interviews to think about celebrities with cancer. According to lay 
epidemiology data is gathered from an array of sources and it was important to 
ascertain if celebrity experience filtered into explanatory models. Often 
however participants raised celebrity cases unprompted.  Celebrity stories are 
used as evidence in the same way as family and friends.  Their stories can have 
an obvious and lasting impression. As Chapter 9 details, Roy Castle has become 
synonymous with passive smoking.  
Although many celebrities were mentioned during the interviews, Kylie Minogue 
was introduced most frequently. Although the interviews took place some two 
years after Kylie’s diagnosis, it did receive a great deal of media attention. So 
much so that the impact was felt by health services (Chapman et al 2005). A 
celebrity cancer case can remain in the public eye for many months and 
effectively follow patients throughout their journey. Coverage of Jade Goody’s 
cervical cancer was analysed in a recent paper by Hilton and Hunt (2010). They 
show that although there were obvious increases in coverage according to 
changes in her status, for example there were more stories around the time that 
cancer ‘had spread’, stories continued across the time from diagnosis until her 
death in March 2009. It is not surprising then that Kylie’s Minogue’s cancer 
appeared fresh in participants’ minds.  Although anomalous cases will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 10, for some of the younger female 
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participants especially, Kylie Minogue’s diagnosis did not fit with typical 
explanatory model because she represented the typical embodiment of health:  
God, I can’t believe it because she does kind of present a kind of 
healthy looking em image, which not all celebrities do. I mean quite 
a few of them, although they might be slim and attractive, you feel 
that a lot of it is, well they may be cosmetically enhanced or they 
may have drug problems so their health, you know they, might not be 
looking after their bodies and I could be totally wrong about this 
because I don’t know a great deal about Kylie Minogue but she always 
looked to me as a very healthy person, you know her skin and her 
teeth and her eyes and she looks as if she eats very healthily, she 
looks like she looks after herself, and obviously exercises, I think I 
would have been quite shocked if it hadn’t been for my husband’s 
experience, yeah (Lisa 45, Affluent) 
Again I put that down to bad luck rather than anything else cause 
obviously she’s, well she looks like a healthy, she doesn’t look the 
type of person that’s going to get cancer but then I am aware that 
breast cancer can occur in younger women cause you read magazine 
about people in their twenties etc.(Emily 37, Affluent) 
There was acknowledgement though that Kylie represented a success story:  
But noo you hear of people getting cancer and beating it and you hear 
them on the telly noo like maistly mainly celebrities and stuff like 
that getting cancer and you hear of them. I think is it Kylie Minogue 
she’s one of the ones that just recently beat it, you know, so it makes 
you mair aware that it can be treated and people can beat it, you 
know.(Caroline 37, Deprived)  
Caroline’s repeated use of the word ‘beat’ raises the issue of cancer metaphors. 
Clive Seale (2001a, 2001b) concluded that sporting stories were as common as 
military metaphors when reporting individual cancer cases and often the two 
were combined. Kathleen introduced Jane Tomlinson and her ‘attitude’ when 
discussing how people deal with a cancer diagnosis: 
Oh look at that woman, Jane Tomlinson, her 10 year old son just got 
presented with her CBE  all the years she survived after she was 
diagnosed and I mean most people wouldn’t attempt, whether they 
had cancer or not would have attempted to do the sports things that 
she did for fundraising, these triathlons and things like that but she 
was still only in her early 40s but I think she was diagnosed at 28 or 
something like that and I don’t think she would have had anything 
like the life she had if she hadn’t had the attitude ….(Kathleen 68, 
Affluent)  
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Barry though had quite a different view of Jane Tomlinson: 
She made herself famous because she had it (Barry, 74 Affluent) 
Celebrity stories also introduced participants to information that they may not 
readily have had via their families. This strengthens Sanders et al’s (2003) 
assertion that people draw on only what is available to them when explaining 
their health belief models. In the following extract Betty demonstrates that she 
cannot provide a reason why ‘men’ get cancer : 
Eh well I don’t know how men get cancer eh likes of Bob Champion 
the jockey eh I don’t know how he got cancer, you know, in the 
testicles I don’t know is it chemicals that build up in the body, I don’t 
know.(Betty 61, Deprived) 
Celebrity was discussed in relation to cancer to  evidence that ‘everyon’ can get 
cancer and no one is immune. In particular that money is of no consequence, as 
Kathleen states: 
Well, money doesn’t matter does it? I mean King George VI, he died 
of cancer didn’t he, lung I think (Kathleen 68, Affluent) 
8.10 Differences in accounts of experience 
8.10.1 Age 
The majority of respondents in this study were over 55. They had seen 
remarkable changes in the social understanding of cancer. The transition from 
the ‘Big C’ to a more positive outlook was raised in many of the interviews. 
Given that age is a significant risk factor for cancer it is surprising that Murray, 
the oldest respondent, had so little direct experience or proximity via family and 
friends. Similarly, Karen, the youngest respondent had limited direct 
experience.  
8.10.2 Gender 
Conventionally, health is thought to be the preserve of women. They are often 
presumed to be the keepers of family health information (Graham 1984). In this 
study women were more likely to have been carers for cancer sufferers and a 
number described nursing parents or spouses. Though there were a handful of 
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male participants who had adopted an interest in cancer because of a close 
family cancer experience, the women in study gave more. A number of couples 
were interviewed, some together and others separately. Often, men looked to 
their spouses for more detail and confirmation. Typically women appeared to 
have greater general awareness and more complex explanatory models of 
cancer.  
8.10.3 Affluence and deprivation 
Those in more deprived communities are more likely to experience cancer and 
have poorer outcomes following diagnosis (Brewster et al 2001). This was not 
reflected in this study. While those in both communities had a wide range of 
experience of cancer those in affluent communities were more likely to have 
either a spouse or a sibling with cancer than those in the deprived community. 
There was also a tendency for those in affluent communities to describe closer 
relationships within families. Among the participants in the affluent community 
were a number of professional women in their 30s and 40s and this group tended 
to be most aware. They had all shared a close experience of cancer and as a 
group they were most articulate. Such a demographic group was not represented 
in the deprived community. If comparisons are drawn between older women in 
either community, those in the affluent community did not portray greater 
awareness. Similar men in both communities, with little experience of cancer 
had similar levels of awareness. An additional difference between the 
communities was that those in the deprived community were more likely to offer 
‘triggers’ as an explanation for cancer.  
Participants were aware that the study was being conducted across the two 
communities. This prompted some, particularly in the deprived community, to 
comment on the health differences between the two communities.  
8.10.3.1 The health divide: health determinants 
There was some disagreement at the extent to which cancer was socially 
patterned: 
 “ it (cancer)  just seems to have a certain predictability for people 
who are living in disadvantaged areas.” (Clare 42, Affluent)  
Chapter 8  123 
“Um, I don’t know if poverty, social deprivation have a role to play 
... I ruled those out yes because it seems, as far as I can gather 
cancer can strike right across the social spectrum and across income 
scales” (Murray 83, Affluent) 
Those in the affluent community attributed the health differences between the 
communities to behavioural differences. Those living in deprived communities 
had poorer health outcomes because they engaged in risky behaviours, in spite 
of being aware of the dangers. Lisa, initially at least, focuses firmly on 
behaviour but shies away from apportioning blame: 
“ I think, you know, people really, you know with that sort of, you 
know the lower socio-economic group who are really obese and 
smoking heavily and you know their lifestyle is quite likely to shorten 
their life dramatically. I think the message has pretty much filtered 
down, I think people pretty much know what they need to do but 
that’s not to blame these people either because, you know, to be 
honest I think if I lived in deprived community x  and didn’t have a 
job and no money and was living on benefits you know had no real 
life chances or opportunity to better my lot, I don’t really know that 
I would alter my lifestyle ....... I think people here (affluent 
communty) take a long-term view. You know, its just a stone cold 
fact that people here are, the vast majority of them are gonna live, 
you know, to a ripe old age and people in deprived community  are 
not. They just don’t have the same life chances, so I think you can’t 
impose the same requirements on people, I’m very much a believer in 
that.  (Lisa 45 Affluent) 
Well you keep reading about the different age that people will live to 
in the leafy suburbs of Bearsden & Milngavie, as opposed to over in 
the East End or something like that, so I think maybe, statistically a 
lot more people still smoke, I think unfortunately a lot of people who 
don’t have money smoke and its a shame because its such a waste of 
money but on the other hand once you’re hooked on smoking and 
that’s maybe the only pleasure you’ve got, you will try and find the 
money for cigarettes (Kathleen, 68 Affluent)  
 
Andrew sums up the differences and refers to directly to culture, and introduces 
the idea of fatalism: 
Well, the life expectancy in Shettleston is I think about 56 .... I think 
there’s a massive cultural education change needed. I mean it was 
nothing to me to fall out of a car drunk driving in the 70s, they 
should be doing that with drugs ... I don’t think drugs is as big a 
problem as they make out. They pick on easy things to improve; I 
think they need to improve people’s optimism, which is a hard thing 
to do .... Better education from 5 years and up and they could do 
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what they have done with smoking. Not even smoking, I can’t 
understand why girls are smoking more. One of my daughters said to 
me. I was picking her up from school and I was smoking up until 1990, 
and shesaid to me ‘Gonna no smoke, I don’t like my friends seeing 
you smoking’, now that’s good education, but that’s happening in 
Bearsden, I don’t know if its happening in the east end? The thing 
about the east end, just while we are talking here, there’s a fatalism 
about the east end you know, ‘I won’t get anywhere’, they will  not 
rise above their station and they have terrible fatalism about life..... 
Later, he then goes on to consider the temporal shifts in experience:  
Andrew:  Well, I wonder, if a 20 year old from the east end, you know 
... if you said to me in 1970, you know if someone said to me ‘He’s 
got cancer’, didn’t matter what type it was, you’d think he’s not long 
for this world and maybe, if you say to someone in Shettleston now, a 
20 year old, they’d say the same 
I: Because? 
Andrew: Because Shettleston now is not unlike ... well, Anderston 20 
years ago, uh huh. 
Andrew’s idea that there is effectively a trickle down effect from affluent to 
deprived communities with respect to health promotion messages is interesting. 
It ties in with Lawlor et al’s (2003) work that considered the relationship 
between lay epidemiology, the prevention paradox and smoking cessation. The 
variation in the experience of health in affluent and deprived communities is 
captured by epidemiological data. That aspects of health promotion may be 
received differently in different communities is not so widely accepted.  
Those living in the deprived communities were equally wedded to the idea that 
behavioural differences could explain the varied health experience. Gary was 
unemployed at the time of interview and could personally relate to some of the 
problems faced by those in the east end. Gary, summarises the multifarious 
problems associated with multiple deprivation: 
See I believe, see the noo,  eh we’re probably the poorest financially 
noo we’ve ever been, you know. Just because of finishing University 
and no a full time wage coming in for five years. See the stress wae 
that, that goes along wae that like,  really. It’s the first time I would 
say, I still widnae say we were living in poverty right we’re no rich by 
any manner of means but see the likes of Joe and Ryan and Ellie,  
they don’t go without a lot of things, they go without a summer 
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holiday we maybe go to the caravans, you know but we don’t go a 
foreign holiday. See the stress, no having tae worry aboot things like, 
certain things like I think that could be a big, big factor and they say 
the sun has got qualities like, we were talking aboot sun giving you 
cancer but the sun is also good for your skin, you know. And you 
probably find people go two, three different holidays a year … and 
they’ve probably got a lot mair room as well, you know, space wise in 
the hoose and eh they’ve probably got a better social life. Money gies 
you, we all know money disnae buy happiness,  but it gies you a lot of 
different options, you know.And like going back tae the food - people 
in the East End of Glasgow buy what they can afford.  Whereas 
people on that side of the city could buy anything they want, you 
know, no anything they want,  but you now what I mean they’re no 
restricted tae ….We’d like tae buy fresh fruit every day,  well if I had 
money I would buy it every day.  And you’ve been up and doon 
Shettleston Road there’s one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, 
there’s aboot ten pubs in less than a mile, you know, so a lot of 
people in the east end their alcohol consumption is probably a wee 
bit mair. Whereas if they had a wee bit mair money instead of having 
a spare fifteen quid going to the pub if they had a spare couple of 
hundred quid they’d maybe dae other things. So I think that’s a big 
factor. you know,  lifestyle’s definitely,  there must be something in 
that, you know, well it’s kind of telling us isn’t it if you’re living ten, 
twelve years more. (Gary 37, Deprived)  
Gary, perhaps because of his own situation tended to be more understanding of 
the lack of choice faced by those living in the east end. Rona talked about the 
importance of awareness: 
I think a lot of that is education, I think a lot of that is lifestyle 
people,  a lot of people thing that this is o.k. because I’ll not get it 
anyway, they tend to, and I live in the east end,  and I’m born and 
bred in the east end but people do tend to drink more, people do 
tend to smoke more and there’s people in the west end or Bearsden 
will take their children to museums,  will take their kids to 
restaurants,  whereas in the east end they get fried food and they 
get stuck in front of a computer game. Whereas if you even drive to 
Kelvingrove,  you will see kids playing football in the garden, running 
about, having fun, it doesn’t even cost anything and its free but 
people in the east end tend to put more of an emphasis, if you’ve got 
money,  then  you go and drink at the weekend and new outfits and 
the kids have the best computer games and for them that makes their 
lives richer, its priorities for whatever reason. A lot of it is how they 
are brought up as well and things are passed down as well. They see 
parents, you know its all right for them, but they hardly leave the 
east end so they don’t know that this other world exists two miles 
form their doorstep. Its ignorance a lot of it I think,  but a lot of it is 
not necessarily bad ignorance, its just unfortunate (Rona 31, 
Deprived) 
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Priorities were also touched on by Josephine: 
Josephine: What I mean,  so this is what I’m saying,  when you’re 
saying about em the poor health and all the rest of it I think a lot of 
it comes doon an all tae peoples ain perceptions eh whit’s their 
priorities, you know, I mean eh… 
I: So, do you think health isn’t a priority? 
Josephine: I would think that would be your number one priority but 
as I say they’ve got their drink and their drugs and, you know, all this 
before they think of food, you know what I mean? And Tollcross,  the 
east end has got a high percentage of drug use so everything else is  
all further doon the list of priorities, you know, like their heating 
and, you know, their food and their whatever.(Josephine 61 
Deprived)  
 
The extracts from Roan and Josephine rrepresent a departure from the findings 
in Blaxter (1982) and Cornwell’s (1984) work, where respondents were reluctant 
to apportion blame for ill-health on individuals. Indeed, while Lisa understands 
that those in deprived communities simply make the ‘wrong’ choice, she 
continues to place the onus of the individual rather than society. 
While most recognised the health differences between the communities, Charles 
questioned the validity of the statistics:  
Im just wondering where they get their statistics from honest to God, 
if you’ve never worked in your life, if your mother and father have 
never worked so your on that pool of not working, eat fruit nah don't 
bother with fruit, cigarettes, tonic wine, if you abuse your body its 
inevitable your not going to live long but to say that all the people up 
to Shettleston. We know a lot of, you want to try some of the housing 
associations go out and see some of the old folks homes see some of 
the old people that are in there in the east end of Glasgow,  its just 
the same as anywhere else I should imagine. (Charles 74 Deprived) 
Participants in both communities recognise that behaviour is socially patterned. 
Some, like Gary, see structural difficulties and barriers impeding the adoption of 
a healthy lifestyle in deprived communities. Most participants however saw the 
health and behavioural differences as the result of poor choices. All showed that 
the responsibility for health lies with the individual.  
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8.11 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has outlined the participants’ experience of cancer. The findings 
show that although those with a close experience of cancer provide more 
detailed information of individual cases, those with less direct experience also 
share stories, or borrowed narratives, that have aided the development of a 
cancer belief system. Commentators from Sontag (1978) to Clarke and Everest 
(2006) have depicted the fear associated with cancer and shown that this 
negative tag is tenacious . Although vast improvements have been made and 
participants recognise this advance, the uncertainty remains. Comaroff and 
Macguire (1982) suggest the existence of uncertainty in the context of hope can 
prove a difficult area to reconcile. Experiences, while individual were also 
universal and participants described a handful of common disease scenarios. 
Proximity to cancer is vital for in shaping views and beliefs and the paucity of 
opinions in those without close proximity is akin to Herzlich’s (1973) notion that 
the reserve of health is called on, only when a problem arises. Demographic 
characteristics are of little consequence in this context, though women typically 
offered more sophisticated and thoughtful explanatory models. The following 
chapter will return to some of these issues and focus on the meaning and 
understanding of cancer that participants have derived from their experience.  
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9. Meaning and Understanding of Cancer 
9.1 Introduction  
 
The previous chapter demonstrated that respondents drew on an array of 
different types of data when formulating their beliefs about cancer. Beliefs are 
articulated through a series of narratives, which are used as evidence (Scanlon 
2006). Though close proximity to cancer is important, stories were rarely 
confined to immediate personal experience and also include borrowed 
narratives. These are also interspersed with information from mainstream health 
education and the mass media. What emerges is a sophisticated and dynamic 
schema. It is this experiential schema that aids their understanding of cancer 
and it is from these stories that they have derived meaning. Though the schema 
is individual to them, the addition of mainstream information means that 
similarities can be found across narratives. This chapter will tackle the meaning 
and understanding of cancer among participants. It will focus on key areas: what 
cancer means and respondents understanding of why cancer happens.  
9.2 Meaning? 
Cancer meant many things. Respondents immediately mentioned research, 
science, illness, treatment, medical advance and death.  The general tenor was 
negative. Fear was paramount and cancer had connotations of unpleasant 
treatment, uncertainty and, for some respondents in this study, the death of a 
loved one. Cancer is synonymous with fear and this reaction from participants 
here is well-documented elsewhere (Sontag 1978, Balshem 1991, Lupton 1994, 
Scanlon et al 2006). Despite such negativity, most respondents articulated with 
clarity that much had changed in the landscape of cancer. There was recognition 
that advances made in survival and treatments necessitated a reworking of the 
meaning of cancer in the last 30 years.   
9.2.1 Changes in meaning: the move away from the Big C 
As has been noted in previous chapters, the majority of respondents in this study 
were over 55, which allowed for reflection on changing trends. It was apparent 
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that, at least in theory, cancer now held a different meaning. Many discussed 
the stigma that once surrounded cancer and the general reluctance to talk about 
the disease (Sontag 1978, Paterson 1987). The ‘Big C’ dominated the cancer 
discourse in their formative years. Often the word was ‘whispered’. It was not 
uncommon for participants to admit that they had not been aware until many 
years later that a relative or neighbour had died of cancer. Other tudies have 
similarly found shame and secrecy associated with cancer, particularly amongst 
older interviewees (Scanlon et al 2006). The source of such stigma was thought 
to be ignorance, particularly around causality. This was especially pertinent in a 
time when most major disease was infectious. Moreover, cancer meant death 
and death brought its own taboo. The following extracts symbolise the former 
status of cancer:  
I mean to me it’s a sort of biblical, mythical thing, the Big C ooh, and 
I’m sure that prevailed through ignorance and I’m sure from the 
medical profession as well. ‘Oh well ill just shut the door on that, 
the Big C.’(Charles 74 Deprived) 
See, when I was in my twenties if you had say Mrs Brown in the next 
close had cancer it was whispered and within what, maybe not even 
as long as a year, the poor woman would be dead, you know, that’s 
how…  She had cancer - that was the end. (Elsie 63 Affluent) 
When I was in my teens the ‘Big C’ you didn’t talk about it, if 
somebody got cancer- mind you didn’t hear of that many people 
because they didn’t talk about it. But eh I mean people died of 
stomach-ache whereas it was probably cancer that they had but you 
never heard about it. (Angus 56, Affluent) 
Because it was fatal in a very short time, or it was thought to be 
fatal in a very short time and there was something taboo about it for 
some reason.(Barry, 74 Affluent) 
Well-documented medical advances, less of a taboo surrounding death and the 
relative freedom with which cancer is discussed have all resulted in a shift in 
meaning. So while the meaning embodied in the ‘the Big C’ was clearly 
powerful, some participants reported that they now thought about cancer in 
terms of serious illness rather than certain death. Kathleen comments on this 
change: 
My initial reaction is not what it might have been say 20 years ago 
because I know that so much more can be done, survival rates are 
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better and I’ve actually got quite a lot of experience through various 
friends and things like that that have you who have had cancer and 
are still with us. So, I obviously think yes, it’s a worrying thing to 
have but I don’t think it’s the death sentence it used to be (Kathleen 
68, Affluent) 
It was not simply time that had challenged preconceptions about cancer, 
experience too could force a re-evaluation. Nearly all participants knew 
someone that had survived or was currently living with cancer. Lisa’s husband 
had recently survived cancer and she spoke frequently of her recent change in 
attitude: 
I: Had you always thought about cancer in terms of dying?  
Lisa: Oh yes, uh huh, definitely. Yeah, I did, in fact I’ve said to 
people in the past, I’ve had discussions with people which I’m now 
quite ashamed of, to the effects of, ‘Well, it always gets you in the 
end’ You know maybe people appear to have recovered you know? 
Because I’ve known some women of my own age, you know when I was 
younger, in their 30s, you know early 30s and had made a good 
recovery and everyone was like, ‘oh that’s great, oh her hair’s grown 
back, everything’s ok’ and then got a secondary and died. So, yeah, 
my definite perception was that um, it’ll get you sooner or later (Lisa 
47, Affluent) 
This reflection from Lisa illustrates an inherent contradiction in many of the 
interviews. A shift in attitude towards cancer has taken place and many would 
like to trust improvements but, instinctively, cancer remains frightening 
territory. The uncertainty, even accounting for improvements in survival, is 
pervasive (Commaroff & Maguire 1982). Among these participants, there is a 
need to be hopeful, not only because people close to them have cancer but also 
for their own futures. Hope has become a major cancer narrative (Lupton 1994; 
Ehrenreich 2009).  
9.2.2 Cancer as tragedy 
The idea that cancer meant tragedy was often referred to throughout the 
interviews. Janet recounts the impact of cancer: 
Yeah, Sally died of oral cancer.She had two wobbly teeth at the front 
and within a year she was dead. And that was really difficult it was 
horrible actually because, you know, she came to our wedding and 
that’s the last time I ever saw her and my uncle committed suicide 
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cause he couldn’t live without her cause it had all happened so fast. 
That was very tragic and em I was very close to her. (Janet 46 
Affluent) 
Lives cut unexpectedly short were frequently described. Caroline talked about a 
school-friend, who died of leukaemia when she was a teenager: 
Well she was a perfectly healthy young lassie until that it was a 
shock. aye. The only time that her Ma had said was a difference was 
she died on the 7th July and it was the summer and the only thing 
that she noticed was that she’d commented on several times was 
bruising,  she was bruising very easily. But she thought that was her 
just oot playing wae her shorts oan but that’s what they said that she 
was bruising very easy. (Caroline 37 Deprived) 
Age is an important caveat. There was a tendency for participants to see cancer 
in older adults, not as a tragedy but an acceptance that ‘you’ve got to die of 
something’: 
And although it was a terrible death for my mother, her actual death 
bed was excruciating to witness but my mother-in-law just slipped 
away, so I accepted that you’ve got to die with something, you know, 
that I would rather it had been that way than an accident (Betty 61 
Deprived)  
9.2.3 Cancer is unpredictable 
Experience of cancer often led participants to believe that cancer was largely 
unpredictable. This unpredictability manifested itself in many ways. Sudden 
onset of cancer or symptoms led Angus to claim 
You never know when you’ve got it.  I could have it just now and I 
don’t know, there are no signs until it’s usually almost too late. 
(Angus 54, Affluent) 
Angus’ views have been found in other studies, and to believe that cancer 
assumes a silent quality is common (Balshem1991; Scanlon 2006). The unknown 
nature of cancer was confirmed by many examples of events in seemingly 
healthy and asymptomatic individuals or a diagnosis in an individual with 
apparently benign symptoms. Karen provided an example of a 19-year-old school 
friend who had a ‘sore leg’ and died a short time later: 
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Just a pain in her leg she was having for a couple of months and went 
back to the Doctors, back and forth to the Doctors and I actually 
remember cause I met her in the Doctors one day, my friend had a 
wee girl, and we were taking her in to see the Health Midwife, no the 
Midwife the Health Visitor, and she was there again wae a sore leg. 
And a few weeks later she was dead, so that was cancer. (Karen 25 
Deprived) 
The unpredictable disease experience was discussed by some participants in the 
context of those who were now thought to be ‘clear of cancer’ or in remission, 
but the disease recurred and spread very quickly. Cancer was thought also to 
‘hit’ unpredictably. Participants offered many stories of cancer sufferers who 
did not fit the expected cancer profile, so for example, lung cancer sufferers 
who had never smoked. Equally, some had experienced cases where cancer was 
believed to be terminal, yet the sufferer had survived until many years later. 
These anecdotes emphasised the inability even of science to predict outcomes. 
The following extract captures the unpredictable nature of cancer: 
It’s a completely (sigh) random strange disease that affects people 
totally differently. Some people can fight it for ages, some people it 
crashes incredibly quickly and I don’t know how you make sense of 
that. (Clare 42, Affluent) 
9.3 Cancer: one disease or many? 
Cancer was first introduced in the interviews in general terms and this generality 
was reflected in responses. When providing individual narratives the focus 
tended to be on cancer, rather than a site-specific disease and often such 
information was only introduced on prompting. There were exceptions. For 
example, Lisa always referred to her mother-in-law's illness as “non-smoking 
related lung cancer”. Clare, who had lost both parents to cancer emphasised 
that these were different cancers, and this she believed was significant in terms 
of her own risk. Similarly, when reflecting on cause, cancer was often referred 
to collectively. Rarely was risk specified in relation to site when talking about 
environmental hazards, for example. Yet, more obvious links were made 
between smoking and lung cancer and sun exposure and skin cancer. Perceived 
protective behaviours, like drinking green tea, or eating broccoli, applied 
generally. This should not imply that an understanding of the site-specific nature 
of cancer was lacking because all participants gave examples of what one 
respondent called ‘varieties’ of cancer. It was not always clear if participants 
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thought about cancer as one disease that simply targeted many different areas 
of the body or if they saw cancer as an umbrella term for a host of diseases. 
There is some evidence to suggest the former:  
I think probably cancer is a kind of term that covers, but its usually 
something, I’m not medical, within the cells or something like that so 
I suppose it possibly is fair to just have one covering term, I tend to 
probably think of it as one disease striking in different places. (Eileen 
72, Affluent) 
Elsie though displayed some understanding of cancer assuming different 
properties depending on site: 
When you say cancer I think of a big lumpy tumour. Em, which 
shouldn’t be there eh and generally, well not generally, sometimes 
they’re inside the body, sometimes they come out of the body. So if 
they do come out in lumps then people notice them and can go and 
get them attended to. And further Me, oh dear I don’t know, well I 
presume for example, like leukaemia that type of thing, I think that’s 
different, that’s not, to me blood is flowing through the body while 
in tissue it’s stationary and it’s the cells that develop from it. (Elsie 
63, Affluent) 
Accounts of both common and rare forms of cancer were shared. Breast cancer 
was the most frequent and nearly all the participants could provide at least one 
example of someone with breast cancer. Breast cancer was also referred to in 
relation to screening, prophylactic mastectomies and heredity. Colorectal 
cancers too were common, though the commonest cancer, lung cancer was cited 
less frequently. The frequent appearance of breast cancer may reflect the 
relatively high profile of breast cancer (Gottlieb 2001). Lisa talked about the 
media’s treatment of breast cancer: 
There is more media coverage given to breast cancer, I would say 
now, maybe in retrospect,  it gets too high a profile.Not that it 
shouldn’t,  but I think that sometimes male cancers aren’t seen in 
the same, they are not as sexy and not dealt with in the same way, 
but I suppose when I think about it, and this has only just occurred to 
me now, I possibly thought of cancer as being something that 
affected women more than men which is probably nonsense (Lisa 45, 
Affluent) 
Lisa’s reflection, not only on the attention given breast cancer but on her 
previous assumption that cancer affects women is important. It suggests that she 
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had previously relied on societal level data to populate her explanatory model 
Her very recent experience with her husband’s cancer demonstrates that one 
‘new’ case can entirely change her viewpoint.  
9.4 Cancer is common 
Participants generally felt that cancer was common and was becoming more so. 
The well-documented change in attitude towards openness in cancer might 
suggest that cancer is not more common, but more public. Nevertheless, 
participants did not see this as an artefact, they believed that there was a 
higher incidence. The population risk of one in three was recognised by many, 
though this level surprised some. Yet, many felt that they heard about cancer 
‘more and more’. Josephine stated that she felt that people were ‘catching 
cancer like the cold’. This is echoed by Karen: 
“I feel as if cancer’s out there and it’s not budging and it’s just as 
you kind of go along if there’s not one person got it you hear of 
somebody else having it or if you could hear a conversation amongst 
other people whose talking about somebody whose got cancer, 
there’s quite a lot, a lot of people.(Karen 25, Deprived) 
Lisa described cancer as an epidemic but, as the following extract shows, when 
she considered cancer in the context of an overall increase in life expectancy, 
she shifts her position before returning to her original point: 
I mean, both before and after Alan was diagnosed, I do know so many 
people who have had it. Their parents have died of it and it seemed 
to me for a while I got completely swamped with it, it got to the 
stage that I thought, if one more person phones me and says that 
their mum or their dad is dying of cancer I’m going to crack up. I 
can’t take it, its like an epidemic that’s sweeping through the land 
and killing everybody I know. But, my friend who’s a health visitor, 
who is a very practical, down to earth, kind of nursey person, you 
know, no sentiment or anything like that said, ‘Don’t be so bloody 
stupid’ and she just kind of said quite bluntly: ‘You know, it’s the age 
you’re at, you know, lots of cancers are age related and as you get 
older and your friends parents get older, they are bound to die of 
something so you’re getting a bit, you are getting this out of 
proportion, of course your next door neighbour’s father died of 
cancer at 82’ she said, and I’m quoting her, “For god’s sake he’s 82, 
things wear out, things happen em, nobody is gonna live forever so its 
ridiculous to start thinking” but on the other hand she’s wrong 
because it does affect so many people so it is a kind of an epidemic, 
not contagious, as far as I know. (Lisa 47, Affluent) 
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Lisa’s final point here about cancer being contagious is interesting. Although it 
was a throw away comment and Lisa is aware that cancer is not contagious, she 
is hinting at the uncertainty many people experience when trying to explain 
cancer. Many of these difficulties are raised again in the following section on 
aetiological explanations. 
9.5 Aetiological Explanations  
Before exploring aetiological explanations more closely, it is worth mentioning 
the language of causality. In scientific terms, cause and risk refer to different 
concepts. Cause refers to absoluteness, a definitive link between A and B. Risk, 
though, applies to a possibility, probability, a contributory factor or a potential 
hazard. Participants in this study did not make such semantic distinctions. Cause 
was used to describe not only aetiology but also risk. Participants were more 
likely to say ‘pollution causes cancer’ rather than ‘pollution may increase your 
risk of cancer’. What they were actually alluding to was risk, not cause. 
Judgements about cause, in its truest sense, were made retrospectively, and 
links were made between cancers and known individual risk factors. Risk tended 
to be used more frequently in the context of overall population risk or in risk 
reduction. 
The following section considers respondents’ views about potential causes of and 
risks associated with cancer. These are grouped into behavioural factors, 
environmental factors, biological factors, and psychological factors.  
9.5.1  Behavioural Factors 
9.5.1.1  The embodiment of health. 
Although an examination of health behaviours was not intended in the 
interviews, many of the participants strayed into discussing ‘lifestyles’, while 
talking about cancer risk factors. Moreover, participants were not asked 
specifically about their own behaviour though most volunteered this 
information. Participants were plain about what represented a healthy, and 
consequently, an unhealthy lifestyle. The models mirrored the widespread 
health promotion messages and the typical description of a healthy individual 
was a non-smoker, who ate a balanced diet, rich in fruit and vegetables. Alcohol 
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and exercise were to be enjoyed in moderation. For many, moderation was the 
key and the need to think about enjoying life, rather than being ‘faddy’ or over-
anxious about health issues, was stressed, which echoes earlier findings (Backett 
1992a; Lupton & Chapman 1995). This attitude has been found in other studies 
where limits were set on sensible risk-taking (Roberston 2006). 
Well they don’t want you to sit in your house – well, they want you to 
exercise for everything don’t they – but you don’t want to sit in your 
house and be frightened to eat this, that and the next thing, I really 
think its all things in moderation. (Kathleen 68, Affluent) 
Some were keen to stress that they were healthy. In the following extract, Angus 
gives a detailed description of his diet, and emphasises that the lengths that he 
and his wife go to, to eat healthily are ‘crazy’: 
I mean we exercise we take lots of fruit and veg, all wholegrain stuff, 
we don’t overindulge in alcohol. I mean, I probably have two glasses 
of red wine a week Gavin’s even less he doesn’t, well he’s a wimp, he 
doesn’t like red wine, but red wine’s better for you, so my wife and I 
take red wine. We don’t junk food, we just don’t junk food, eh we 
maybe have a fish supper once every six months, you know. We walk 
down to Helensburgh Pier and have a fish supper once every six, you 
know, that’s so, we really eat healthily. We don’t buy anything like 
mince out the shop we buy a piece of pork and I cut every piece of fat 
off it and I mince it myself, you know, we’re really crazy. (Angus 54, 
Affluent) 
There was some ambiguity regarding the status of smokers. While they were 
often immediately branded unhealthy, there were exceptions. There was a 
tendency for smoking to be excused, particularly amongst family members. This 
was especially true if other behaviours were deemed ‘good’. This echoes 
Backett’s (1992a) finding that ‘good’ and ‘bad’ behaviours were often traded 
and off-set against one another.   
9.5.1.2  Smoking 
As with many of the large scale quantitative studies that gauge awareness of 
cancer risk factors (Breslow et al 1997, Wardle et al 2001, Redeker et al 2009) 
smoking came up again and again and the link between smoking and cancer was 
universally accepted. Smoking inhabited a unique position. It was the only factor 
that was afforded the status of cause, in its truest sense. Smoking was 
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mentioned, unprompted, by all participants. Many associated smoking with most 
cancers, irrespective of site, which confirms Wardle et al’s (2001) quantitative 
findings. For example, Janet, a nurse with experience of neurosurgery, made a 
definite link between smoking and primary brain tumours. Grace inadvertently 
made a link between childhood leukaemia and smoking: 
Em, Laura and John both had cancer but they both smoked heavily 
and it was their wee boy that had died of leukaemia.(Grace,68 
Affluent) 
Despite the unequivocal link between smoking and cancer, the fact that 
participants could cite examples of smokers who had never had cancer and non-
smokers with cancer, especially lung cancer, led some to reassess their 
explanatory models. Some participants raised the idea that ‘it must be more 
than cigarettes’ as the following extract illustrates. Here, Phyllis speculates 
about the cause of her friend’s colorectal cancer: 
So it may well be that she was in a really smoky atmosphere that…It 
sounds in our conversation to you smoking is the answer, you know, 
that if everybody stopped smoking there would be no cancer where 
that seems to be what we’re trying to put across. But there must be 
other things. (Phyllis 58 Affluent) 
Rose was clear about the irony of her position with regards smoking but was 
quick to raise alternative causes: 
But now here’s me sitting smoking which I know causes it, I’m still 
smoking. I sometimes think it’s genetic I mean I’m no educated 
enough to say whether it is or not but there’s so many genetic things 
going about.(Rose 62, Deprived) 
Colin, also a smoker, accepted the link between smoking and cancer but stressed 
that smoking was merely one, albeit important, risk factor:  
I mean because you smoke doesn’t mean that you do have cancer but 
there’s no doubting the stats that say, which says that you’re much 
more likely to get it at some stage and okay there are survivors and 
there are exceptions. Well I mean it’s not a rule that if you smoke 
you die of cancer (Colin 61 Affluent) 
Both Rose and Colin acknowledge the risks associated with smoking. Yet, they 
simultaneously were also keen to distance themselves from the risk. They may 
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not want to contemplate and adopt a stoical attitude (Scanlon et al 2006) or 
they wish to distance themselves from the stigma attached to smoking (Chapple, 
Zeibland & McPherson 2004).  
So established were the links between smoking and cancer that lung cancer in a 
non-smoker was particularly unexpected: 
 …. Many of my relatives lived into their 80s and had been heavy 
smokers. So, my grandfather died of lung cancer, but again he was in 
his late 80s and he had smoked 60 a day since he was 14, so it wasn’t 
really a great surprise that he died of lung cancer. So no, but I think 
that well, my mother-in-law, as well, … she died of non-smoking 
related lung cancer and again, she had been ill and she had problems 
with her chest but we never imagined in any way, because she had 
never smoked. (Lisa 47 Affluent) 
Despite offering anecdotes that highlighted cancer among non-smokers, and 
smokers who remained disease free, participants expected smokers to get 
cancer. They also accepted it when they did. Emily said of her mother-in-law, a 
smoker who died of breast caner in her early 50’s, ‘she knew the risks’. Lisa 
talked about cancer patients continuing to smoke: 
A few people that visited Alan in hospital, they’d say to me that 
they’d get annoyed with the people who were standing outside the 
hospital entrance, now it was the dead of winter and they were there 
with their dressing gowns on and some of them were obviously cancer 
patients, I mean you could see that, I mean some of them even had 
their drip stands with them, and they were still smoking and quite a 
few people who went to visit him commented ‘Does that not really 
upset you when you have to pass through that fug of smoke and these 
people who still won’t change their behaviour in any way, even when 
they are in hospital and they are so sick and yet they still won’t give 
up cigarettes’, you know’  (Lisa 45, Affluent) 
Chapple, Ziebland & McPherson’s (2004) findings are echoed here, as 
participants introduce an element of personal culpability when talking about 
smoking, particularly when others are considered blameless:  
It wasn’t long after my dad had died that I saw this old boy sitting in 
Glasgow we were out to celebrate the 4th of July and em he was 
coughing and smoking and he asked for money for cigarettes and he’d 
got a beer and I said to myself ‘why is he still alive and my dad’s not’ 
who led quite a good life. (Grace 63 Affluent) 
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Here Grace has decided that they ‘old boy’, by virtue of his behaviour has not 
led a ‘good life’. This clear introduction of moral judgements will be returned to 
later in this chapter.  
9.5.1.3  Passive smoking 
A number of participants mentioned passive smoking, which was implicated in a 
number of cases: 
 My brother, he never even came into my mind earlier, he had cancer 
of the throat five years ago, five or six years ago so eh he stays in the 
middle east so he travelled over from Bahrain he flew into the UK, he 
paid privately but he was in an NHS hospital right and he got a lot of 
his lymph glands, part of his throat, his cheek, part of his tongue 
everything all taken away, there’s only one gland going into his brain 
they all had been taken away but he was the doctors that see him 
said “How many cigarettes a day did you smoke?” he says “I’ve never 
smoked in life” and they said “You must have” and he says “I never 
smoked one cigarette in my life” and they didnae believe him so it 
must have been passive smoking.(Betty 61 Deprived)) 
The consultant said himself he was absolutely shocked (at the 
diagnosis of laryngeal cancer). And the only thing that my uncle put 
it down to is when he was a very small boy he had spent a lot of time 
with his father in pubs in the east of London that were really smoky 
environments. Em and that’s the only, as far as he was concerned, 
contact that he had with smoking in any way. (Emily 37, Affluent) 
As was shown in the previous chapter, celebrity cases of cancer had an impact of 
participants’ understanding of disease. Roy Castle was synonymous with the 
dangers of passive smoking and Patricia extended his narrative to other famous 
people.  
Well maist of the famous people when you think about cancer used 
tae go into clubs where smoking used tae be going on all the time and 
they say passive smoking is worse than normal smoking. (Patricia 62, 
Deprived) 
Moreover Roy Castle’s story was similarly borrowed to explain a further case of 
cancer. Here Emily talks about her husband’s parents, both of whom had cancer: 
but with the type of lifestyle that they had had when they were 
younger. His dad worked in clubs etc, he was a musician, so spent a 
lot of time in a smoky atmospheres, that kind of lifestyle they had at 
that point in time. (Emily 37, Affluent) 
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Peter was less certain about the effects of passive smoking: 
Eh, lung cancer is quite often attributed to smoking. I think there is 
enough evidence to suggest that smoking is related to lung cancer. 
Whether passive smoking has an effect or not, I don’t know. I suppose 
if you worked and spent 5, 6, 7 days a week in a smoky atmosphere it 
wouldn’t do you any good. (Peter 67 Deprived) 
9.5.1.4 Diet 
Diet was seen as important for a healthy lifestyle, but unlike the certainty 
attached to the dangers of smoking, fewer direct links were made between diet 
and cancer. This is reflected in larger cancer awareness studies (Breslow et al 
1997; Wardle et al 2001; Redeker et al 2009). 
I mean I don’t know what the risk factors are.Smoking versus a bad 
diet but I think generally when people think of cancer you think of 
smoking and not all the other rubbish that you put in your body 
including all the things in food that you probably don’t think about. 
(Emily 37 Affluent) 
Whether diet or exercise has got anything to do with cancer, I really 
couldn’t say because I wouldnae say anybody that I, I really don’t 
know anything about whether it’s, I cannae think of anybody that I’ve 
heard of that did various things, you know, either did a lot of 
exercise or didnae do exercise or who drank a lot or who smoked, 
well smoke you hear about but I don’t remember anything standing 
out in particular regarding diet. Could be I don’t know. (Rose 61 
Deprived) 
Few specific foods were labelled carcinogenic, though some danger foods were 
identified, most notably red meat. Charles attributed his grandmother’s 
longevity to her avoidance of red meat. He also highlighted the beneficial 
effects of fish and cited low levels of cancer in Japan as evidence. Other 
potential beneficial or protective foods were identified. A diet rich in fruit and 
vegetables was fundamental and there was widespread awareness of the 5-a day 
message. Antioxidants too were suggested. Obesity, as a result of a poor diet, 
was clearly acknowledged to be bad for one’s health but only on a few occasions 
was it offered as a direct cause of cancer. The exceptions were a small number 
of cases of colorectal cancer in individuals judged to be obese. It should be 
stressed that at the time of the interviews there were a series of press reports 
that focused particularly on obesity and cancer.  
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Rather than diet per se, the impurities, chemicals and additives found in foods 
were seen as potential carcinogens. Kathleen talked about the apparent 
increasing incidence of allergies in children and provided the example of her 
granddaughter’s allergy to genetically modified foods:  
I buy organic, I buy quite a lot of organic now because one of the 
reasons is I don’t want to have too many chemicals but another 
reason is that I have a granddaughter who is eight who can’t eat, well 
she can’t eat quite a lot of things she can’t eat cherry tomatoes, but 
she can eat organic tomatoes and she can’t eat coleslaw from any of 
the big supermarkets or Marks, but she can eat coleslaw from Iceland 
and the only difference I can see is that Iceland is GM free. I mean 
she ended up at the hospital with the tomatoes closing her throat 
and my daughter thought she hadn’t washed them enough but the 
doctor said that the chemicals would penetrate the skin and you 
don’t get that with organic. You are allowed some chemicals with 
organic but nothing like what we get in ordinary food. So the fact 
that just that amount of chemical, which the government tells us is 
safe, for her and I have hay fever allergies but not food allergies but 
for somebody to be able to have food that doesn’t have that minute 
amount of chemicals but can’t have it if its got it then I think maybe 
none of us should have those chemicals. (Kathleen 68 Affluent) 
Pesticides too were mentioned. This echoes Baghurt, Baghurst & Record (1992), 
who found that more than half of their survey respondents believed that 
pesticides in food were extremely important risk factors for cancer. A handful of 
participants in this study extolled the virtues of organic foods. The inference 
was that tampering with food must be harmful.  
I’m a great believer in organic a lot of things because nobody has 
ever, as far as I’m aware done research into all the fertilisers that 
were used 20, 30, 40 years ago in the ground and what affect they 
have on people so I try to buy fresh and whatever (Julia 65 Deprived) 
Equally, the reliance on convenience foods and the prevalence of processed 
foods in the modern diet were thought to be detrimental to healthy living. 
Although this was not always discussed specifically in relation to cancer it does 
tie into the ideas of cancer as a disease of modernity (Herzlich 1973; Salant & 
Gehler 2008). Many participants, especially older women, lamented the loss of 
cooking skills among they younger generation. Often this was described as a 
particular problem in areas of deprivation: 
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 “…… With diet, I know what people who think they’ve got no money 
do. You see them , they go in the shops, and I see them they buy pies 
and all sorts of things and they could make cheaper healthier meals 
for less money if they got taught. Now I got cookery at school and its 
still with me and I still cook my mince and my stew the way that my 
cookery teacher taught me and I worked in the kitchen with my mum 
because I was the eldest and I think they should be getting back to 
basics and making pasta and making things go further and things like 
that and I think that a lot of people don’t eat things because they 
don’t know how to get it and they don’t know how to cook it but I 
don’t honestly know if a diet would stop people taking more cancers. 
I think some part of it could be going back to when they used all the 
different fertilisers but then what would account for when the really 
young taking cancer (Julia 65, Deprived) 
9.5.1.5  Alcohol and Exercise 
Both moderate exercise and moderate alcohol were typically located in the 
‘healthy’ model’. Although exercise was clearly associated with health, lack of 
exercise was rarely offered as a risk factor and many thought that exercise was 
largely irrelevant. As Murray states:  
I think it plays a very, very small part, if any, in cancer. (Murray 83 
Affluent) 
Interestingly while excessive alcohol consumption was linked with unhealthy 
individuals, abstinence was also to be avoided. A number of participants thought 
that red wine especially was beneficial for health. The following extract 
exemplifies the strength of mixed messages surrounding alcohol when some 
document the beneficial health effects of alcohol (White 1996; Chadwick & 
Goode 1998):  
A couple of weeks ago there, there was a thing out about heart 
disease or cancer or something, in the papers, I mean nearly 
everything is bad for you I mean you may as well throw in the towel. I 
mean I always remember reading in the paper, Jock Stein the great 
Scotland manager died of a heart attack and people in the papers 
were saying how could that happen to Jock Stein? He didn’t smoke 
and he didn’t drink and he was an active man. And, there was a 
doctor in the paper, whatever you call these doctors in the paper, 
said, that was probably the thing. He would have been better off if 
he had taken a half a night … (Andrew 57 Affluent) 
Some were aware that made links between alcohol and cancer, specifically head 
and neck and gastrointestinal cancers. Kathleen attributed a close friend’s 
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recent colorectal cancer diagnosis to alcohol. This was the exception and few 
raised alcohol unprompted. Though on reflection some supposed that it might be 
a risk factor, as Emily suggests:  
Just same the principle, it’s still putting a toxin in there so yes but 
it’s not something that I would immediately volunteer to be 
attributable to cancer. (Emily 37 Affluent) 
9.5.1.6  Sun Exposure 
Like smoking, sun exposure was an accepted cause. Gary echoed Ness et al’s 
(1999) claim, believing that the sun is ‘good for you’. Unlike smoking, sun 
exposure was not raised unprompted by all participants. Rose provided the 
example of her brother-in-law who had skin cancer and attributed this to 
excessive sun exposure as a child. Others talked about sun safety messages, and 
how these were at one time little known: 
Well I thought the girl with skin cancer eh she never, ever used any 
lotions but I’m going back she’s dead now over twenty years, right. 
And she was in her forties as I say she was about forty-six and we 
didnae know about creams, you know, and she was a sun worshipper. 
She went to, she had a daughter was married to a boy in Tenerife, I 
couldnae remember the place, Tenerife, and they went there for six 
months at a time. (Betty 61 Deprived) 
Yet, the understanding of safe sun ‘use’ was not universal, as the following 
extract demonstrates. Lorna provides the narrative a close friend diagnosed with 
malignant melanoma: 
Lorna : Recently she developed this thing on her ear and all I kept 
saying, “That’s changing you better go and see about that” and she 
says “I’ve got skin cancer on my neck. … So I don’t think, no she 
disnae abuse herself, she disnae drink, she disnae smoke but there’s a 
big family thing there. 
I: Uh huh, and what about other risk factors for skin cancer like sun is 
she a…. 
Lorna: Oh sun uh huh, no she isnae a sun worshipper, I mean she 
certainly does em she gets very burnt when you go on holiday. (Lorna 
57 Deprived) 
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9.5.2  Environmental Factors 
Participants discussed a wide range of environmental factors that may be linked 
with cancer. Most knew someone who had previously worked in a hazardous 
environment and with toxins. Elsie’s husband, who was a smoker, had recently 
completed his cancer treatment yet she attributed his head and neck cancer to 
his habits at work. The following extract demonstrates how information from 
many sources is inducted into explanatory models. It might also be inferred that 
she sought an aetiological explanation other than smoking, which is known to 
attract stigma (Chapple, Zeibland & McPherson 2004): 
I’m inclined to have wee thinks to make up my mind I might be 
entirely wrong. He was a Commercial Artist and away back, well he 
used to take his paintbrush into his mouth and suck it to get a nice 
point to do the lettering and I thought, I think I’d read something or 
I’d seen it on the television there was a factory I think somewhere 
about Dundee, I think it was clocks they made, and the faces to make 
the face of the clock or the numbers luminous the women there who 
painted the dials had radioactive paint they used and quite a lot of 
these women apparently died of cancer. (Elsie 62 Affluent) 
Many participants cited work hazards. Asbestos was raised a number of times. 
For example, Grace talked about her brother’s exposure in car plants and 
subsequent death from asbestosis. Lisa, whose father worked for British Coal, 
talked about the dangers faced by miners and provided the example of her 
father-in-law who had died of lung cancer and had posthumously received a 
compensation payment from his employers.  
Nobody that I was in school with, or very few of them have parents 
who are alive now because their fathers all died in their 50s of lung 
cancer, of emphysema of pneumoconiosis because they worked down 
pits and the result of heavy industry (Lisa 45 Affluent) 
Angus, a former fire fighter, highlighted a number of cases of cancer among 
colleagues. What the extract shows is an uncertainty about exposure risks and 
links to specific cancer sites:  
I’ve lost some workmates and the only common denominator is that 
we were all senior officers in the fire service and when we joined 
breathing apparatus wasn’t used readily it was the exception rather 
than the rule. If you go into a fire you’re breathing in hydrogen sile 
and God knows what else. …. So all my thirty years in the fire brigade 
Chapter 9  145 
I just breathed in toxic fumes and they were the same. So probably 
on the work side the people that I’ve lost at work through cancer 
that may have been …  but none of them were lung cancer it was all 
other places but I don’t know how cancer works, you know. (Angus 
54, Affluent) 
My dad [died of bladder cancer] had worked in a laboratory for a lot 
of his life and had to deal with formaldehyde a lot. And the cause of 
cancer particularly applies (Laughs) so that was kind of where that 
one was so I sort of knew or that was believed to be the cause. (Clare 
41, Affluent) 
As well as individuals’ working environment the impact of industrial practices on 
the wider population was also raised. Pollution, nuclear plants and sites, 
chemical factories and electricity pylons were all introduced into the discussion. 
The following extracts show that respondents were fully aware of the implied 
connections between environmental factors and cancer. Yet, not all were 
convinced of the link:  
I think there is a link with cancer certainly a link between cancer and 
radioactivity, anybody who works anywhere near Hunterston or 
Sellarfield or even the North of Scotland up the top there as well. 
You probably find there's linkage to cancer, even cluster cancers, if 
you like (Charles 74 Deprived). 
I mean I’ve got another friend who lives in Canada now whose father 
died of bowel cancer many years ago. But she was brought up .. Oh, 
somewhere down in Ayrshire, near the ICI plant and she’s lived in 
Canada for 20 odd years but her dad died of bowel cancer before she 
went to Canada and then her mother, in the last couple of years, I 
mean she was 77, I can’t remember what type of cancer it was to be 
honest and she was saying ‘Oh, I know so many people whose parents 
have died of cancer, who come from that area, I think its got 
something to do with the ICI plant, they must have been polluting the 
atmosphere’. So. I’m not discounting that, there may be some factor 
like that, there may be clusters like that and people do, I mean you’ll 
know, loads and loads of research on these things to see if there are 
patterns and clusters but I mean what I said to Jenny at the time 
was, “You may well have a point but can I also say to you that I know 
an awful lot of people who didn’t live anywhere near an ICI plant and 
whose parents didn’t smoke and you know have led quite healthy 
lives and who still get cancer”. (Lisa 45 Affluent) 
I was aware there were concerns (about cancer ‘clusters’) but I’m 
also aware that I have enough training and stats to understand that 
you can do a lot of things with stats. I mean take the MMR, I think for 
example absolutely shite, right I mean there have been more damage 
done to more children by whoever irresponsibly raised that flag in 
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the first place. And, you know, how the bandwagon developed so that 
I mean Doctors were actually saying “Okay well we’re no going to do 
it”, you know, and f***, I mean, unbelievable. But I mean point at the 
electricity pylon that’s what I was going to say the electricity pylon 
stuff and mobile phones and mobile phone masts and all that. As I 
understand it there is as yet no hard scientific evidence, which says 
either mobile phone use or mobile phone masts do generate cancer 
hotspots……  But if you went through them carefully the actual 
proven, well there’s no proven instance or causal relationship I mean 
you can’t get that from just eclectic stats you can’t prove a causal 
relationship. But there are so many reasons for, you know, for 
clusters of cancer hotspots and I mean the geology of the event is a 
major factor for example or so I understood. That, you know, there 
are types of rock in which, you know, if you’re in constant contact 
and you live in a house built of granite, for example, well granite is 
radioactive. (Colin 61, Affluent) 
The above extracts show that environmental factors were usually synonymous 
with cancer ‘clusters’ or ‘hotspots’. Support for the presence of clusters was 
mixed and Colin provided a rational scientific reason.  
A number of participants mentioned the dangers of mobile phones and the 
possible connection with brain tumours. Two participants also reported that they 
had quickly dismissed friends/colleagues warnings that carrying phones in their 
breast pocket because they ‘might give you cancer in your heart’.  
Well, they say that mobile phones give you cancer and some other 
reports say that there is nothing to prove that a mobile phone has 
actually been the cause of a case of cancer. So again it’s what do you 
believe? (Rona 32, Deprived) 
Environmental risks associated with cancer are as likely to be the subject of 
media coverage as many health promotion messages (Trumbo, McComas & 
Kannaovakun 2007). The extracts above demonstrate the salient impact of the 
mainstream press. All of the environmental hazards featured more frequently in 
interviews than behavioural factors like exercise, and to a lesser extent sun-
exposure. Nevertheless, participants were more sceptical about the importance 
of environmental risks and some acknowledged the ability to manipulate 
statistics to produce the desired message. Supposed cancer clusters do have an 
impact. Guidotti & Jacobs (1993) found that residents in a community much 
publicised as a cancer cluster changed their health related behaviour.   
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9.5.3  Biological Factors 
 
9.5.3.1 Age 
Participants generally recognised the connection between cancer and age, which 
is at odds with findings in other studies that show that age is poorly recognised 
as a risk factor(Wardle et al 2001; Keighley et al 2004). Increased life 
expectancy was thought in part to explain the rise in cancer incidence. Yet, 
there was a tendency towards a curious paradox in discussions about cancer and 
age. Many expressed the belief that cancer in the elderly did not represent the 
aggressive disease or the painful death normally associated with cancer: 
I wonder the younger you are I think the speedier the tumour grows 
(Kathleen 68, Affluent) 
Older people were thought more likely to live with cancer for longer periods of 
time, and cancer was unlikely to kill them. One participant, Barry, reported that 
a family-friend, a nurse, had declared that ‘virtually everybody in their 80's had 
some sort of cancer’. His story then shifted focus slightly as he told of an elderly 
friend, who was 93, that he regularly went swimming with. He had noticed what 
he thought were suspicious moles on his friend’s back but had chosen not to 
raise this because of his friend’s age: 
Barry: As I say we go swimming, well his back is covered in brown 
blotches, now he’s 93. Who is worrying at this stage? But I don’t know 
what they are, I don’t know whether I’ve seen them probably or 
whatever or nobody has pointed them out to him but what are they? 
I: Does he have someone else at home? 
Barry: No. 
I: Because quite often with skin some people only get a diagnosis 
because they have somebody else that points out that there is 
something there, I mean I’m not saying that you should therefore 
suggest that but  
Barry: A younger person you would. (Barry 74, Affluent) 
Lisa adopts a similar position when discussing her aunt’s breast cancer: 
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My own aunt had actually died, she was diagnosed with breast cancer 
but um, again it sounds a bit odd to say but she was in her mid 80s 
and she smoked very heavily all her life so she was kinda dying 
anyway, you know she had lots of other illnesses and she had been in 
and out of hospital and eventually someone said ‘Oh by the way, 
she’s got breast cancer as well’. So it was like, ‘Oh God, not that as 
well’, but em, in a sense, you know somebody said to me at the time, 
you know she’s not gonna die of it at that age, she’ll die of other 
things (Lisa 45, Affluent)  
Cancer in older people was more readily accepted. Older people were often 
judged to have ‘had their life’. Some participants used phrases like ’you’ve got 
to die with something’, hinting that among the elderly, cancer was not so tragic 
and more palatable. Betty who had said that her mother had had her life went 
on to say:  
Although it was a terrible death for my mother, her actual death bed 
was excruciating to witness. (Betty 61, Deprived) 
9.5.3.2  Hormones 
A number of women talked about the hormonal causes of breast cancer. One 
talked about the benefits of breast-feeding but as this extract reveals, 
disconfirming evidence had caused her to re-evaluate her beliefs:  
I’ve had four friends, sorry, I forgot about my other friend in 
Edinburgh em, I always thought that if you breast fed you had less 
chance of developing breast cancer and the three in (local 
community) did not breast feed – not because they didn’t want to but 
because they couldn’t and my friend in Edinburgh, she breast fed and 
she developed breast cancer so my theory is sort of out the door in 
that respect (Jessie 68, Affluent)  
9.5.4 Psychological Factors 
9.5.4.1  Stress 
Although Pollock’s (1988) in-depth study of the lay perspectives of stress found 
that participants made few associations between cancer and stress, stress has 
been linked with cancer in other studies, both quantitative and qualitative 
(Blaxter 1982; Wardle et al 2001;Scanlon et al 2006; Redeker et al 2009) though 
the relationship is often thought to be tenuous. In this study stress was rarely 
cited as a specific risk factor. Phyllis mentioned stress and then dismissed it: 
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Well you don’t know I mean I think stress too has something to do 
with cancer and yet when you see babies and young people getting it 
you wouldn’t imagine that they would lead stressful lives (Phyllis 58, 
Affluent)  
It was however thought to be a cause in a handful of individual cases, 
particularly when other potential, usual causes were thought lacking. Clare 
believed that perhaps ‘emotional issues’ were responsible for her mother’s 
cancer because she didn’t fit the typical cancer profile: 
My mum’s breast cancer I guess that was more of a surprise, a big 
surprise because she was a very healthy person, very fit active 
healthy, good diet I mean all the boxes you think you should ticking 
so that was a big shock. But I suppose in retrospect em although my 
sister and I have looked at it and thought there was a lot of 
emotional issues and wonder whether there wasn’t a psychological 
element going on there. (Clare 42, Affluent)  
Although both Patricia’s parents were smokers, she was certain that her 
mother’s cancer had been triggered by a single traumatic event, a mugging and 
the cumulative effect of many years of domestic abuse: 
“…. she was pretty bad wae the last one(beating) she got and it was 
just efter that they found oot she had the cancer.” (Patricia 62 
Deprived)  
Later in the interview Patricia questions the role of stress in the development of 
her father’s cancer:  
“ Maybe it [stress]  could have, it could have but then my dad didnae 
have the stress, well maybe he had the stress, he’d be stressed he’d 
actually got taken intae a wee room when he was on his own and telt 
my mum had the cancer when he was attending for his heart. And he 
was in shock wae that so in that way maybe although it was a few 
year later before he contracted cancer. I don’t know.” (Patricia 62 
Deprived) 
The absence of stress or happy lives was postulated as reasons for avoiding 
cancer. Murray attributed all cancer to smoking, although both of his parents 
had lived long and escaped cancer. His explanation for this is bound up with 
many things, including a happy life: 
Luck, I think so, I can’t think of anything else, both lived happy and 
fulfilled lives, I think that may have been a factor but I don’t know. 
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Um, my mother was a very, very active woman, my father much less 
so (Murray 83 Affluent) 
9.5.4.2  Personality 
The apparent centrality of personality factors in cancer narratives and the need 
to remain hopeful and positive is ubiquitous (Balshem 1991; Blaxter1982; 
Ehrenreich 2009). Many of the individual cancer stories retold in the media 
introduce personality, generally in terms of ‘fighting spirit’ (Seale 2001a, 
2001b). If personality is so important in fighting disease, is it also relevant in 
hosting it in the first place?  Participants typically dismissed this proposition. 
Yet, this did give way to some discussion of pessimists, or worriers possibly being 
more prone to disease. Elsie concluded that a tendency to worry was the only 
common feature in two of her friends with cancer: 
Two of them I can think I would say are the type that sort of 
worriers, you know, one is particularly pessimistic (Laughs) I would 
actually say I don’t know whether that’s got anything to do with it or 
not. (Elsie 62, Affluent)  
Much of this is related to notions of morality, and the importance of not ‘lying 
down’ to disease (Blaxter 1982) and perhaps the feeling that it is best not to talk 
about the disease, for fear of ‘inviting it in’. Activity and hard work are thought 
to be important protectors against disease (Balshem 1991), cleanliness too is 
important. Barbara, when talking about people ‘that you least expect’ to get 
cancer, reported her shock on hearing of a colleague’s cancer diagnosis because 
she had always been ‘so well turned out and pristine’, again hinting at the 
importance of morality.  
9.5.4.3 Genetics and familial factors 
The identification of disease specific genes has elevated the gene to the status 
of ‘cultural icon’ (Nelkin & Lindee 1995). The discovery of BRCA1 and BRCA2 
genes linked with breast and ovarian cancers has led to a fixation with familial 
element in cancer (Henderson and Kitzinger 1999) Knowledge of cancer genes is 
widespread and most participants believed there to be a familial risk, 
specifically for breast and colorectal cancers. Grace, whose husband died of 
colorectal cancer, told that her GP had said that her husband had “inherited 
cancer, though he couldn’t prove it”, and recommended that her sons be 
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screened from the age of 40 onwards. Others were aware of the links with breast 
cancer and a number of female participants whose relatives had had breast 
cancer were clear that the risk was associated with a certain type of breast 
cancer thought to appear in younger women. None placed themselves at an 
increased risk of cancer because the cases in their families were ‘different’.  
More generally, the participants extrapolated the family links to all cancers. 
Participants typically talked of cancer ‘in the family’, irrespective of cancer 
site. Identifying diseases as family traits has been explored and reported on 
previously, especially in the west of Scotland (Hunt Emslie & Watt 2001). One 
participant described how her friend, recently diagnosed with skin cancer, felt it 
was inevitable that she would get cancer because of her family experience: 
Her mum died wae cancer, her dad died wae cancer, her mother’s 
four sisters died of cancer, her father’s two brothers died of cancer, 
Her own brother died of cancer at forty-seven and she’s been saying 
for years, she’s had a lot of gastric surgery this girl, and she’s been 
saying for years “It’ll definitely get me I’ll no get away wae it, it will 
definitely get me.” (Lorna 57 Deprived) 
This was not uncommon. A number of participants knew of families with many 
examples of cancers in different sites and thought this must be more than 
coincidence.  In the following extract the Josephine recounts the story of her 
neighbour:  
Josephine: Well there’s a lassie up the next close …  there’s been a 
whole lot of members of her family have died wae cancer and her 
man’s really worried and he’s wanting her tae go and get checked. 
But just like everything else you put your heid in the sand and say 
‘Naw, no me’ but I think she’s feart tae go. 
I: Uh huh, how old is she? 
Josephine: She’s in her fifties. Noo, there’s been one just died wae, 
em,  breast cancer, bowel cancer, eh ….  Hodgkin’s., Aye, so it’s all 
different cancers it’s no just one type of cancer. 
I: But that’s all in her family? 
Josephine : That’s all in her family. 
I: And do you think her man’s right to be worried? 
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Josephine: Aye. Well I would think I’d want tae be checked oot as 
well, know what I mean? 
For some participants the presence of a familial element was thought to be at 
least as important as lifestyle factors in determining cause: 
I eh … (pause) I think there is a very strong hereditary strain in 
cancer and people who don’t have that-  If someone is suffering from 
cancer and I don’t know them well - my first two questions would 
probably be – is it their lifestyle or is in the family? (Andrew 57, 
Affluent) 
Equally, cancer was thought to ‘not run’ in families. Some participants pointed 
out that cancer was not in their family. Often this was qualified by suggesting 
that in their family they had an alternative ‘problem’ like ‘the heart’ or 
cholesterol. Implicit in these statements was that a family could have only one 
serious illness although different illness could appear on each ‘side’ of the 
family (Hunt, Emslie & Watt 2001; Sanders et al 2007). The following extract 
shows that Gary, despite his father’s prostate cancer, did not see his family as a 
‘cancer’ family: 
As I say, ma dad had prostate cancer eh I was thinking aboot his 
brothers dying nane of them had cancer. One of them has got 
Parkinson’s just noo but apart fae that ma Ma’s side is pretty 
healthy. They’ve got Alzheimer’s on their side, you know, ma Ma’s 
got that the noo she’s in a home eh but cancer disnae seem to be the 
one but apparently ma Dad’s family’s got heart trouble, you know. So 
I think I’ve got a choice between heart or (Laughs) Alzheimer’s (Gary 
3, Deprived) 
Not all participants were convinced that cancer was hereditary. Interestingly 
those with close family experiences of cancer did not think that this put them at 
a higher risk than any other individual. There are two possible reasons for this. 
First, it might be that because of their experience they have more knowledge 
about specific risk because they have been confronted with cancer (Beebe-
Dimmer 2004). It might also be that wish to distance themselves from 
heightened risk, much like cancer sufferers wish to distance themselves from 
culpability (Linn, Linn and Stein 1982). 
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9.5.4.4  Triggers and the dormant gene 
As well as familial genetic links and hereditary factors, participants introduced 
and understood genes in another way. Aetiology was attributed to genes but this 
was distinct from family patterns. Articulated in numerous ways, many 
participants asserted that cancer was explained by the presence of a faulty or 
cancer gene. This idea is present in many of the studies reviewed in theis thesis 
over many years and appears to be an enduring belief (Cornwell 1984; Calnan 
1987; Mullen 1994; Scanlon et al 2006; Goldman et al 2008). For some 
participants, this was apparent in everyone, while others believed that it could 
be found only in certain individuals. The presence of this faulty gene was not 
associated with familial links. Rather the cancer gene was innate and appeared 
by chance. In order for cancer to then develop the gene needs to be activated. 
Activation requires a trigger and triggers could take many forms.  Psychological 
distress, either as the result of a single event or repeated long-standing abuse, 
could act as a catalyst. Physical events too were implicated with a knock, 
another illness or surgery being offered as possible triggers. Non-activation 
explained the absence of a cancer event. Angus offered the theory of a dormant 
disease described cancer as a ticking time-bomb and provided the following 
analogy:  
Or is it, I mean, is it just a time release thing, you know, like you can 
use the time release fertiliser in your plants, your pot plants you 
stick it in and over time it slowly lets out the fertiliser. Is that in our 
system where the cells work properly on a time release system and 
then when it gets to a certain time it’s just says ‘oh I don’t want to 
work properly anymore’ and then it produces the cancer. (Angus 56, 
Affluent) 
9.6  Cancer: a disease of modernity? 
Participants in this study demonstrate a changing perception of cancer. Often, 
the change had been dramatic. For most this was a temporal change, a natural 
evolution that keeps pace with scientific advances. For others it was 
experiential, a forced change needed to acknowledge a new reality. Regardless 
of the reasons for the change it is clear that cancer does, at least on the surface 
mean something different now than it once did. Once universally stigmatised, 
cancer assumed a largely ‘folk’ nature. It meant death and few were aware of 
why it happened, what caused it and often who had it. In the early 21st century 
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cancer is a public disease, the subject of much media attention and research. 
Information about cancer is readily available, knowledge of cancer is improving 
constantly and some participants felt sure that most forms of cancer would one 
day be cured.  
Yet, this modern view of cancer extended further. Much like Herzlich’s (1973) 
participants almost 40 years previously, most thought cancer was now more 
common; being described as rife, epidemic, and as ‘common as the cold’. 
Participants thought that incidence had genuinely increased rather than 
believing that the increase was an artefact of openness. Again echoes of 
Herzlich’s work can be found in explanatory models. Nearly all participants 
talked of pesticides, food additives, pollution, mobile phones and phone masts, 
and electricity pylons in relation to aetiology. All of these are features of 
modern living. Gary talked about the now widespread use of disinfectants, 
rendering immune systems powerless in the face of modern germs, and claimed 
that those in his father’s generation had a stronger immune response. Caroline 
talked about the potential iatrogenic effects of modern vaccines. Such 
discussions merely represented hypothesising but were, in part, buoyed by the 
idea held by many that, ‘if you look hard enough, everything causes 
cancer’(Niedereppe & Levy 2007). The ‘everything’ however is synonymous with 
social changes: mobile phones, pollution, pesticides, genetically modified foods, 
convenience foods. The negative impact of modernity on health has been found 
elsewhere (MacFarlane & Kelleher 2002; Salant & Gahler 2008). Moreover, it is 
the availability of knowledge in the information age that heightens this 
awareness. Cancer then has shifted from a largely folk model of disease where 
little is known about cause or cure to more sophisticated model that 
incorporated the dominant bio-medical and scientific model.  
9.7 Narratives and metaphors as a means of obtaining 
understanding  
9.7.1 Use of narrative 
Research in the area of psycho-oncology often seeks to describe and explore the 
patient and carer experiences of various aspects the cancer journey. It is 
customary for such experience to be recounted in the form of stories or 
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narratives (http://www.healthtalkonline.org). Narratives though are not the 
preserve of the patient or carer. As previously noted, participants frequently 
used narratives or more accurately a series of narratives to provide contexts for 
their views and beliefs. Narratives were offered as evidence. Some, depending 
on the proximity to the patient, were retold in great detail others were less 
comprehensive. Yet, each interview holds at least one narrative that is used to 
frame their explanatory model.  
Clare had recently dealt with the death of both her parents and her close friend 
and admitted that she had re-assessed her pre-conceptions. She now believed 
cancer represented a random, unexplainable event, and illustrated this through 
the following story: 
I think more and more now I’m just accepting that life is just a 
random set of events and some people ....  I mean the surprising 
thing, I mentioned that neighbour of my parents, Jeff .... he was a 
heavy smoker and he actually always, he was one of those people who 
sort of looked ill, he had a bit of a pallor. Now, even though I can’t 
remember when he was diagnosed with cancer but I know my parents 
knew he had cancer and was fighting it long before either of them 
were diagnosed with having any kind of illness and he outlived both 
of them (Laughs). So I think I mean there’s like, a lot like that 
because I just think cause, you know, that’s it it’s a completely (sigh) 
random,  strange disease that affects people totally differently. 
Some people can fight it for ages, some people it crashes incredibly 
quickly and I don’t know how you make sense of that. (Clare 41 
Affluent) 
9.7.2  Use of metaphor 
Metaphors are common in cancer narratives (Sontag 1978; Lupton 1994). 
Participants here are no different and many used metaphors when talking about 
cancer. The most liberally used metaphors were combative, which is not 
surprising given their dominance in the media (Seale 2001a, 2001b, Clarke and 
Everest 2006). Lisa explained why she felt that military metaphors were 
appropriate: 
I think that there is a grain of truth of it being a battle because it 
certainly is, you know when you are undergoing treatment and 
chemotherapy and whatever, there is a, I’m maybe putting myself in 
the place of someone who has actually suffered it but there is, 
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people I know do tend to see it in terms of them against the disease 
and they do sort of see it as a battle (Lisa45 Affluent)  
Josephine recounted a conversation with a friend about a mutual friend’s recent 
cancer recurrence. They referred to cancer in human terms, giving it personality 
characteristics, describing it as devious. Other participants described cancer as 
mean. Metaphors were also used to illustrate the affect that cancer had on 
sufferers. It was common for participants to use terms like ‘eating away’ or 
wasting away. Some metaphors went further, Peter’s entire explanatory model 
was based on a metaphor: 
I liken, and this is just a personal, simplistic explanation. I liken 
cancer to growing plants, I’m quite a keen gardener and some seeds 
germinate, some don’t, some grow better than others some live 
longer than others and some sort of whither away. I see cancer as 
sort of withering away of the cells and we are all gonna die at some 
point anyway. Cancer, is a sort of, if you like, accelerated dying. 
(Peter 66, Deprived) 
9.8 Challenges to meaning and understanding 
Far from being poorly understood (Scanlon et al 2006), participants appeared to 
know and understand a great deal about cancer. Though the views expressed in 
the interviews were not always biomedically accurate or expert, they did display 
a thoughtful approach to the formulation of explanatory models. Yet there were 
aspects of the cancer experience that defied such logic. Prominent among these 
were childhood cancers and the role of luck or random events. 
9.8.1  Childhood cancers 
Among the most challenging aspects of understanding cancer was cancer in 
children. Participants often spoke about cancer in children in an entirely 
different way to adult cancers. Childhood cancer represented the unthinkable 
and the unexplainable. Few participants were close to a child with cancer and 
one participant, Emily, surmised that not having to confront or think about it 
obviated the need for explanation. This confirms the ideas held in the 
psychological notion of ‘availability heuristics’ (Tversky & Kahneman 1981; 
Kapodi et al 2003), which claim that ideas can only be formed from the 
information available. Yet, the lack of experience made it no less frightening 
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and many participants referred to childhood cancer as particularly ‘mean’ and 
‘cruel’.  
Childhood cancer was most frequently linked with potential environmental 
hazards and many participants saw cancer clusters as synonymous with childhood 
cancers. A number did question maternal behaviour and proposed that children 
were exposed in to carcinogens antenatally:  
Well, you don’t know, what the mother’s been doing during the 
pregnancy, I just wonder sometimes if the mother has been doing 
things that she shouldn’t do during pregnancy, you know have they 
come in contact with anything, I mean you just don’t know. Because I 
have never questioned anybody and I really don’t know anybody who 
has had a child that’s had cancer, so I really don’t know. (Jim 64, 
Affluent) 
What was striking about childhood cancers was the explicitly raised assertion, 
frequently repeated, that children simply did not deserve cancer. As Jessie’s 
borrowed narrative shows: repeatedly: 
Oh .. children (sighs) well .. I know that my friend was having 
radiotherapy and there was a little one of three and she just thought 
‘what harm has she done anybody?’ I mean children don’t deserve it 
and I don’t know why they get it, I really don’t … (Jessie 68 Affluent) 
The logical corollary of children not deserving cancer is that some people do 
deserve cancer. Moral judgements were introduced into discussions about 
children, and this will be returned to in the next section.  
9.8.2 Luck or random events 
All participants alluded to the role of luck, though not all were willing to elevate 
its importance: 
Well I don’t want to use the word luck so it’s got to be genetic; the 
cancer gene isn’t there for it to be started up. (Barry 74 Affluent) 
Luck was often the last explanation offered when all other plausible or logical 
positions had been exhausted. The presence of cancer in those adopting ‘good’ 
behaviours and the escape of those engaging in bad behaviours served to 
emphasise the significance of luck. Irrespective of the terms used, whether luck, 
Chapter 9  158 
random events, or fate, there was an overwhelming view that behaviours can go 
some way to reducing risk but there is nothing that can guarantee that any 
individual will or can escape cancer: 
I don’t think that if you are healthy that you necessarily escape 
things. I don’t think that there is a rule you know because you’re 
healthy you don’t get anything bad happening to you, I think 
ultimately, its just the luck of the draw, I suppose. (Rona 31 
Deprived) 
9.9  Morality 
The stigma surrounding cancer, apparent in many of the participants’ formative 
years, was attributed to fear of the unknown. Cancer equalled death, which only 
strengthened the taboo. Today the openness around cancer and its causes has 
led to a shift in the source of shame. Health promotion messages place the 
responsibility firmly with individuals (Chapple, Zeibland & McPherson 2004). The 
pervasiveness and profile of such messages leave few able to discount the risks 
or claim a lack of awareness when opting to engage in risky behaviours. This was 
not true a generation ago when the ill effects of risky behaviours, like smoking, 
were not fully realised. The emphasis on individual responsibility renders those 
that ignore advice behaviourally immoral. Peter captures cancer’s socio-cultural 
status: 
I don’t have any hang ups at all about cancer I don’t see it as a stigma 
the way some people do. It’s not something you get by misbehaving 
or doing something wrong. Your lifestyle may contribute to it, and 
then again may not and people say that smoking causes cancer but 
people get lung cancer who have never smoked in their life and how 
do you explain that? There are all sorts of ailments and all sorts of 
things can be attributed as a cause of cancer but its not anything to 
feel eh, that you’ve done something wrong. Yet, a lot of people 
won’t talk about it, won’t discuss it and it can hit anybody and it 
doesn’t matter whether you are rich poor, young or old or whether 
you live a healthy lifestyle or don’t. I suppose more people who don’t 
live healthy lifestyles are at risk and the statistics would show that if 
you have a low income and a poor diet and you drink too much and 
smoke too much and live a riotous life, you’re more likely to get 
cancer. But there’s no guarantee that anyone will or won’t get 
cancer. (Peter 67 Deprived)  
Moral judgements about behaviour feature strongly in many interviews, often 
explicitly. In the following extract Jessie is searching for possible explanations 
Chapter 9  159 
for cancer events, and although she referred directly to heart disease and 
strokes, her view hints at her broader moral position on behaviour: 
Again, stress of every day life and work, that can cause strokes and 
heart but that’s not to say that these people are leading a bad life. 
They’re not smoking, drinking and going out at night and what have 
you but they’ve got a lot of stress of work and that can cause …. 
People that are not in work that have no worries at all (laughs) they 
seem to be the ones that are getting away with everything they don’t 
have to worry about the heating, the lighting and they’re the ones 
that drink and smoke and what have you. (Jessie 68, Affluent) 
This was not the only reference to worklessness; in the following extract Jim 
draws comparisons between drug-misusers and the working population and 
comments on fairness:  
Junkies, they’ve no veins to inject they’re into in here, they’re into 
their legs right down and they’re still injecting they’re still getting 
the treatment and they’re still alive and there’s other folk they’re 
no doing any harm they’ve worked all their way through life and 
they’re away, you know. But that’s just, life isn’t it fair. (Jim 64 
Affluent)  
The inference here is that some people do not deserve cancer. Echoes of this 
notion are found in discussions about childhood cancer where the overwhelming 
assertion was that children do not deserve cancer. If children are regarded as 
undeserving, is the corollary of this that some people do deserve cancer? 
9.9.1 Who deserves cancer? 
Participants did not openly suggest at any point that individuals deserved 
cancer, although those that were judged to have behaved badly or ‘abused’ 
themselves were hinted at frequently. Cancer, as has been shown elsewhere in 
this chapter, is understood to be an unfair and fundamentally tragic life event. If 
children are undeserving because of their innocence, are the guilty deserving? 
Who are the guilty? The emphasis on individual behaviour in aetiology has 
elevated health choices to the status of moral positions. By engaging in ‘bad’ 
behaviour individuals have rendered themselves susceptible to cancer and 
ultimately to blame for their illness. Yet for some this went further than health 
behaviour. Lisa described her anger at her husband’s cancer diagnosis, 
particularly as he had done the ‘right’ things:  
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Lisa: I said in relation to (husband), I was bloody mad, ‘Its not fair, 
why did that have to happen to him, he’s a good person, he’s never 
done anything to deserve that so, you know that made me very angry 
I…..You said there, you know you would get quite angry and say that 
he didn’t deserve this, does that suggest that some people do?  
Lisa: No, (pause) no that’s it, I think its not a rational way to 
think, no you’re quite right (laughs) I suppose it would be a really 
nice world if people that abused children and were really horrible got 
cancer and died, that would be lovely but I mean I know that’s not 
the case, but whether or not some people deserve it.   
I I just mean … earlier on you said, people, they lead good lives and 
yet they get cancer 
Lisa : Yeah, some people do (laughs)  Uh huh there are people who 
do all the wrong things and I don’t necessarily mean morally, I mean 
behaviourally, and seem to get away with it. (Lisa 45, Affluent) 
The discomfort felt when the natural order of life is disrupted is evident in the 
following extract. Jim and Phyllis, a couple interviewed together, talk generally 
about illness and they move quickly from discussing age to behaviour. Both in 
the context of morality:   
Jim: My sister died at eighteen and I was very bitter, very angry, very 
bitter, very anti-church, anti-Christian type 
Phyllis: There’s no answer to that. 
Jim: No, I know there’s no but what I meant was it changes your 
outlook and your attitude tae things, you know.  You’re saying young 
people go and die of cancer. Why has that young person gone and the 
old granny whose had a good life and still there, you know. 
Phyllis: Or worse than that people who do really bad things.Those 
that are in jail locked up (Jim 64 & Phyllis 57, Affluent) 
9.10 Degree of difference or similarity in accounts of 
meaning and understanding 
What was striking about the data generated from the interviews was the 
similarly in accounts. Although participants were of different ages, genders, 
socio-economic backgrounds, and had different personal and professional 
experiences of cancer their views were typically homogenous. Ordinary views of 
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cancer, even amongst those with a close experience of cancer, are dominated by 
a combination of media publicity and health education messages. Experiences 
too, despite individual nuances were remarkably similar. Even within single 
accounts participants provided a number of examples that confirmed their view 
of cancer. Angus described his brother who died suddenly of pancreatic cancer, 
and of another brother suddenly diagnosed with mantle cell, and this fixed his 
view that ‘you never know when you have it (cancer)’. Subsequent narratives 
generally served to strengthen his evidence. This model appears again and again. 
As has been shown elsewhere in this chapter experiences provide the storyline 
for explanatory models, and they are compared with established bio-medical 
explanations. All of the explanations for cancer that might have been 
anticipated were explored during the interviews. Most were introduced 
unprompted by the participants. The relative importance of causal factors varied 
among participants but this was not socially patterned.  
Beliefs about, and experience of, health is socially patterned and some of these 
patterns are mirrored in this data. Women were over-represented in the sample 
and they also had more experience on which to draw. As such women tended to 
offer more information and have more complex explanatory models. This may 
simply reflect their experience. If a male participant had a close personal 
experience they too had much to offer. Males relied more heavily on scientific 
explanations and most believed that everything could be explained. Males were 
most likely, for example, to be sceptical about clusters. The youngest 
respondent certainly had given the least thought to cancer, yet the same is true 
of the eldest, probably because neither had little direct experience of cancer.  
9.11 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter a detailed description of participants’ explanatory models of 
cancer have been outlined. The findings show that while the fear and dread 
associated with cancer is paramount, there have been very real changes during 
the second half of last century. Nevertheless, cancer continues to mean fear. 
For most cancer means tragedy, though this is most likely the result of media 
portrayal rather than personal experience. All participants were aware of 
someone who was now ‘living with cancer’. Both smoking and sun exposure were 
recognised universally as risk factors but knowledge of other risk factors was 
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patchy. The role of alcohol and exercise in particular were not recognised. 
Other, what are often called mythic factors, were cited including environmental 
and social factors. Most participants were generally cautious about making 
aetiological links between many of these factors. There was, particularly 
amongst the female participants, a tendency to be nostalgic for a time when life 
was more ‘natural’. Clearly behavioural factors are often at the heart of 
explanatory models, though fatalistic ideas of luck and randomness are 
introduced when no other cause can be located. Allied to this is the idea of a 
dormant gene, triggered by a series of factors. Essentially this represents a 
quasi-scientific interpretation of luck. The findings show that underlying moral 
judgements are often implicit in conversations about health. 
What does this data tell us about the utility of lay epidemiology and cancer? 
Chapter 10 focuses on how the data generated in interviews relates to the lay 
epidemiology model.  
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10. Lay Epidemiology and cancer 
10.1 Introduction: lay epidemiology revisited 
This chapter concentrates solely on lay epidemiology. Chapters 8 and 9 looked 
first at the participants’ experience of cancer, before going on to consider what 
meaning and understanding of cancer they had derived from their experience.  
What these chapters demonstrate is that although personal experiences of 
cancer varied, there are a relatively small number of common, typical narratives 
that characterise the cancer experience. The original concept of lay 
epidemiology referred to a system that drew on information from a variety of 
sources in order to formulate ideas about CHD risk: 
“ …… refers to a scheme in which individuals interpret health risks 
through the routine observation and discussion of cases of illness and 
death in personal networks and in the public area, as well as formal 
and informal evidence arising from other sources, such as television 
and magazines” (Frankel, Davison & Davey-Smith 1991:428) 
The mechanism central to the model is ‘candidacy’, which allows the 
identification of individuals thought to typify the most or least likely candidates 
for heart disease. Key, is that individuals recognise that candidacy is fallible. 
Fallibility is operationalised through the evocation of anomalous deaths and 
unwarranted survivors. Irrespective of its flaws, candidacy provides the basis for 
an estimation of risk, both in oneself and others. 
This final chapter of findings presents the data generated in interviews, using 
the concepts embedded within lay epidemiology as an analytic framework.  The 
key areas of explanatory models, risk and candidacy will be reflected on.  
10.2 Explanatory models: the need for explanation 
It is accepted that people need to better understand events and often construct 
models to explain the cause of illness (Kleinman 1980). The participants in this 
study were no different, and while they may not reach definitive answers, those 
with close family members affected by cancer describe a process where they 
searched for explanations or meanings. A criticism of qualitative work and of 
content analysis is that it decontextualises narratives and fails to account for the 
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potential influence of biographical circumstances on findings (Wilkinson 2000). 
‘Proximity’ attempts to address this potential shortcoming. As already 
described, proximity refers to the level of closeness to people with cancer. Of 
course there is a need to be cautious because perceived ‘closeness’ varies within 
families. For example, Janet described the shock of a paternal aunt dying of oral 
cancer and how the event had forced her to re-evaluate her own behaviour. 
Meanwhile Lorna reported that she felt lucky that cancer did not appear in her 
family but went on to recount details of the cancer deaths of a paternal aunt 
and uncle. Allowing for such caveats, the findings show that those with a closer 
proximity to cancer discussed the general subject in a more thoughtful way; 
they tended to be more proactive in seeking information and were more dogged 
in trying to establish causes. Blaxter (1982) advised that any discussion of 
disease typically results in a discussion of causality and the subject turned to 
causes very quickly in most interviews. Yet, proximity can refer not only to 
familial ‘closeness’ but also temporal closeness. Grace, whose husband had died 
of colorectal cancer six years before the interview, seemed to be less concerned 
with understanding than other participants in similar but more recent positions.  
If an event is relatively fresh it is possible that participants remember more 
detail. Instead, Grace conveyed a general feeling rather than precise detail. 
Indeed, Grace’s husband was first diagnosed ten years before his death, so her 
experience could reasonably be termed historical.  
Previous chapters demonstrated that participants used narratives to express 
their views and to provide evidence for their positions. This method of discussing 
cases anecdotally was also found by Scanlon et al (2006) in their focus group 
study that considered the experience of cancer amongst the Irish community in 
the UK. Embedded in such narrative accounts within this study were questions 
and ponderings about why the disruptive event, namely cancer, had occurred. 
Understandably, this need was felt most keenly among those with a closer 
proximity to cancer. Peter suggested that this goes beyond cancer and may be 
applied to other illness experiences: 
I think people don’t think a great deal about cancer if there is no one 
they know, or in their family or their good friend who has had it or 
has lost someone from it or is suffering from it. It’s really when 
someone they know takes it that they really start to think about it 
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and that’s true of a whole lot of things, not just cancer (Peter 67 
Deprived) 
What Peter is describing here, only thinking about an illness when confronted 
with it, is not uncommon. Salant & Gehlert (2008) reported that this was the 
reason given by their focus group participants for not considering their risk of 
breast cancer. More generally this is a notion which fits in with health being 
synonymous with an absence of disease and need only be tackled in response to 
an illness event (Blaxter 1990).  
Cancer, as illustrated in previous chapters, continues to represent fear and 
unpredictability. Making better sense of the event might help to deal with 
traumatic episodes. The following extract captures Clare’s search for meaning 
about mother’s case and her need to gather relevant information to bolster her 
explanatory model. It also shows that Clare, though not “actually really 
researchingit”, does admit that she will now read articles she may previously 
have thought irrelevant to her: 
My mum’s breast cancer, I guess that was more of a surprise, a big 
surprise because she was a very healthy person, very fit active 
healthy, good diet. I mean, all the boxes you think you should ticking 
so that was a big shock. But I suppose in retrospect em although my 
sister and I have looked at it and thought there was a lot of 
emotional issues and wonder whether there wasn’t a psychological 
element going on there. And I suppose em, you know, in terms of just 
in a more general picture I’m quite, I guess I’m quite open about it 
because I think well there are some quite clear physical things that 
are going to make the risk factor, the risk of getting it greater. 
There’s also the genetic line and there’s also I think a psychological 
or emotional element involved in it as well. And I don’t know 
whether I’ve come to that view because I’ve experienced more of I, 
em cause my dad’s mother, my grandmother, also died of cancer but 
she was a good age it wasn’t sort of ...  Em (sigh) or and I suppose I 
have probably, I haven’t like actually really researched it despite 
what I have experienced but I guess I’ve read articles, you know, if 
I’ve come across stuff in newspapers and things, I mean now I would 
probably read it. So I guess maybe that’s why I have more a mixed 
view about some of the causes. (Clare 42 Affluent) 
10.3 Developing a personal evidence base 
The lay epidemiology scheme described by Davison is mirrored in the data 
generated in this study. A similarly complex model of information gathering and 
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analysis was apparent and within interviews participants’ talk often flitted 
between descriptions of close personal experiences, examples from discussions 
held within wider social networks, established health education messages, and 
information gleaned from the mass media. The data presented show an 
unquestionable level of sophistication in their explanatory models.  
The above extract from Clare encapsulates the model in action. Her mother’s 
cancer event challenges her previous knowledge about cancer. She is required to 
consider alternative explanations, and does so in light of information from 
legitimate sources. Her explanatory model is adapted to accommodate new 
experience. It is no surprise that this formula has a role in the search for 
explanation. It seems logical that individuals will consider their most recent 
experience, compare it with the data that they already hold both from past 
experience and wider information sources, and reshape their belief model 
accordingly. Individuals construct their own personal ‘evidence base’ by 
synthesising what they ‘know’. Such a base is not static; it is adjusted to 
incorporate new data, both contradictory and confirming. In this respect it is 
comparable to traditional scientific approaches to dealing with evidence.  
10.3.1 Gathering evidence 
Evidence took many forms. As detailed in previous chapters, evidence was not 
confined to close experience, nor did participants rely solely on official sources. 
Instead it was a hybrid. Personal experience, instances from social networks and 
the community, cases reported in the media, information from professionals, 
research (as presented by the media) and health education have all been shown 
to have a role in informing the model. Not all sources were given equal weight:  
You read what you read in the papers and you usually take what you 
read in the papers with a pinch of salt, but it does put the thought 
there like the mobile phone masts and things. But it’s not, I don’t 
drive around and think ‘Oh look at all this pollution that’s causing 
cancer.’ I don’t drive around or, ‘there’s a telephone mast I bet folk 
around there have got’. (Emily 37, Affluent) 
The relative weight of importance given to each source depends on proximity 
and individual experience, which is subject to change. Participants reported 
frequently that their views had changed. Often a single disconfirming event was 
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all that was required to reshape their explanatory model. As already detailed, 
Clare provides an account of how her mother’s breast cancer event had changed 
her view because she could not ‘tick’ any of the expected ‘boxes’. Similarly, 
Emily discussed her uncle’s unpredictable throat cancer and reported that this 
had forced her to look beyond lifestyle factors when judging causality. More 
specifically Jessie tells of her re-evaluation of the protective benefits of breast-
feeding: 
I always thought that if you breast fed you had less chance of 
developing breast cancer and .my friend in Edinburgh, she breast fed 
and she developed breast cancer, so my theory is sort of out the door 
in that respect. (Jessie 68, Affluent) 
What all three of these participants highlight is that information need not be 
received from a close family event to force a re-evaluation. Although for Clare 
her mother’s cancer had prompted the search for alternative explanations and 
cast doubt on her received view. Emily however, talked about her uncle, who 
she also described as being in her wider family. This was partly because he did 
not live locally and more importantly because he was not actually ‘related’ to 
her. He was her uncle by marriage. Finally, Jessie is describing information from 
her social network. These are three distinct levels of relationship at varying 
distances but all experiences had significantly altered explanatory models.  
10.3.2  Expert sources of information: the certainty of science 
A coronary candidate is recognised both by the lay epidemiologist, and the 
‘expert’ alike. The term lay epidemiologist referred to the means employed, like 
the gathering and ordering of evidence, by ordinary people to arrive at a risk 
estimate for CHD. Among the South Wales cohort there was a clear acceptance 
and understanding of the current ‘expert’ risk factors for CHD. Ultimately 
Davison’s model of lay epidemiology for coronary candidacy is reliant on such an 
understanding amongst the lay public. For Davison and colleagues the challenge 
posed by lay epidemiology was in the realm of health promotion, and in 
particular the ‘certainties’ it promoted. The lay epidemiologist is adept at 
making risk assessments. Moreover, by acknowledging the failure inherent in the 
candidacy model they arrive at a position, according to Davison, that makes it 
easier to prevaricate about behaviour messages. What if the lay view is more at 
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odds with the scientific view? What if the epidemiology of cancer is less well 
understood? Some participants were slightly sceptical about the knowledge of 
science in the area of cancer. The unpredictable and random nature of cancer 
meant that many participants felt that science could not explain cancer and that 
‘they’, the doctors, were sometimes no surer: 
I think again, I think, maybe I’m completely wrong here, but what I 
can glean from the media and the newspapers is that maybe they are 
getting closer as regards some specific cancers but they are totally in 
the dark about others (Lisa 45, Affluent) 
I think bit by bit you can find associations and manage types or 
whatever maybe find preventative like gene therapy that kind of 
thing but I’m not quite sure whether science will ever be able to take 
away the risk completely (Emily 37, Affluent) 
I think there’s a lot of things that science can’t prove or disprove and 
some things aren’t logical. I mean why does homeopathy and 
acupuncture and things like that work for some people and not 
others? Is it faith? I’m not a greatly religious person but you can’t 
explain some of the things that happen (Peter, 67 Deprived) 
Colin often expressed his faith in science and in particular his scepticism about 
the environmental causes of cancer. Ultimately though Colin questioned the 
certainty of science: 
I mean, point to the electricity pylon that’s what I was going to say. 
The electricity pylon stuff and mobile phones and mobile phone 
masts and all that. As I understand it there is as yet no hard scientific 
evidence which says either mobile phone use or mobile phone masts 
do generate cancer hotspots…… but my understanding is that em 
medical science still does not properly understand where cancer 
comes from eh what causes it, you know, what the physical triggers 
are and so on although, you know. We know that certain 
circumstances will make its instance more likely (Colin 61, Affluent) 
Although this represented a contradiction, it does hint at the cultural position of 
cancer in society. Cancer is represented by uncertainty both at an individual and 
at a population level. Many possible causes, some controversial, are trailed in 
the mass media and although often controversies are easily dismissed, the lack 
of certainty looms large.  
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10.4 Comparisons with Coronary Heart Disease  
As Davison’s original theory of lay epidemiology emerged from an ethnographic 
study with Coronary Heart Disease (CHD) as its focus, it was judged appropriate 
to ask participants in this study to compare CHD and cancer. There was universal 
agreement within this study group that CHD was ‘easier’ to explain than cancer. 
Participants seemed surer of CHD causality. Like Davison’s cohort, CHD was 
perceived to be caused by behaviours, primarily diet, but a strong family link 
was also apparent. The following extracts are typical of those found throughout 
interviews: 
I think heart disease, if you don’t exercise and eat lots of fatty food 
and if there is a predisposition of heart disease in your family then I 
would say possibly the chances are you’ll get that yes, uh huh. (Elsie 
62 Affluent) 
Heart disease again, heart attacks run in some families and not in 
others. Diet is a big contributory factor and lack of exercise, fatty 
foods, eh, eating the wrong types of fatty foods em, I (pause) don’t 
know if I can explain it. Cancer I think is much more complicated and 
there’s more varieties, versions of it. (Peter 67, Deprived)  
Whereas in heart disease, again as I as a total lay person, as I 
understand it then, you know, the physical causes of heart disease 
are quite clearly understandable and the physical actions or inactions 
that lead up to these things being in place are understandable and 
understood and so in that sense it’s yeah it’s better understood and 
so on. I mean the actual genus of cancer may not be understood but 
the circumstances in which it’s likely to arise pretty well understood I 
think. (Colin 61, Affluent) 
There was also a tendency to believe that heart disease was easier to control or 
protect against:  
I’d be more likely if you asked me if diet and exercise were likely to 
influence your chances of dying from heart disease, I’d be more likely 
to say. Now again, I’m totally unscientific, I don’t have any medical 
knowledge at all but I would say that its easier to affect your life 
chances from the point of view of heart disease than of cancer 
because to me it just seems totally random, you know children that 
get leukaemia and things like that, they don’t all live beside a 
chemical plant so, I don’t know, I honestly don’t know. (Lisa 45, 
Affluent) 
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These extracts illustrate participants’ confidence in a better understanding of 
CHD. The perception is that CHD is relatively simple and the mechanisms that 
result in CHD are easily explained. The same is not true of cancer. This 
resonates with Balshem’s (1991) findings, where participants saw heart disease 
as ‘a matter of mechanics gone wrong’ (Balshem 1991:158) while participants 
response to questions about cancer ‘touched on universal mysteries’ (Balshem 
1991:158). Cancer’s relative complexity was also displayed in the pictorial 
images offered by participants in Weiss’ study (1997). Davison suggested that lay 
knowledge and understanding of CHD was good. Typically studies suggest that 
lay knowledge and understanding of cancer is poor (Randhawa & Owens 2004; 
Scanlon et al 2006) both in terms of cause and risk, and when unpicked many 
persistent misconceptions are uncovered (Dein 2004).  
Essentially this provides a significant challenge for those tasked with spreading 
messages about cancer prevention. Davison and colleagues commented on the 
width of the candidacy concept. Any factors, even those at opposite ends of a 
spectrum, for example no physical exercise and over-exercise, could be used 
retrospectively as an explanation for a cardiac event. With the exceptions of 
smoking and sun exposure, the risk factors associated with cancers, in 
comparison with CHD, are relatively poorly understood. Thus explanations based 
on misconceptions like stress or triggers become more plausible.  
10.5 Assessing risk 
The estimation of risk is at the crux of the lay epidemiology model and this will 
be returned to repeatedly in the remainder of this chapter. Davison and 
colleagues concluded that while it was relatively straightforward to 
retrospectively decide causes in relation to a CHD event, deciding the future 
probability of an event is more challenging. Davison and colleagues thought this 
applied equally to oneself and others. The entire scheme rests on individuals 
basing judgements about risk on evidence and consequently forming a reasoned 
opinion about relative risk. At the centre of this risk assessment is the creation 
of an ideal type or what Davison referred to as ‘candidacy’. Comparing oneself 
and others to the candidate profile allows future risk assessments to be made. 
Before going on to explore candidacy, participants assessment of risk will be 
looked at in more detail.  
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10.5.1  Population Incidence 
Participants were initially asked about their awareness of the population risk of 
cancer. At least half of the participants believed the risk to be one in three, in 
line with current health information. The interpretation of risk among some 
participants was noteworthy. Angus was one of four siblings. His elder brother 
had already died of pancreatic cancer and another brother had recently been 
diagnosed with a rare form of colorectal cancer. Both he and his youngest 
brother remained healthy. Angus understood the statistic quite literally:   
Well the (sigh) the one in three, right, I reckon from my generation, 
of my family, according to one in three, I’m safe now. But according 
to my family, my wife, my daughters, one of the four of us in that 
group should have cancer of some type. But that’s what should, if you 
go by the stats (Angus, 57, Affluent) 
In previous studies of cancer awareness the link between age and cancer is 
poorly recognised for certain cancer sites (Paul et al 1999; Keighley et al 2004). 
Some participants in this study did make such associations. Here, Kathleen 
makes a distinction between ‘lifetime’ risk and absolute risk:  
Well according to billboards and things like that, they say three in 
five. Bowel cancer I think they say one in seven or one in eight or 
sometimes as low as one in six, depending on, you know if you have 
cancer already in your family. So, its not surprising if you stop and 
think about that. I do know quite a lot of people over the last two or 
three years who have had cancer and also your risk gets higher as you 
get older and more of us are living, I don’t feel as if I’ve lived my life 
yet, but more of us are living longer, so we are going to have people 
being diagnosed I suppose, you know in the later, I mean your risk for 
breast cancer is much greater once you’re over 50, I think it is 
(Kathleen 68, Affluent). 
Others studies (Humpel and Jones 2004; McMenamin et al 2005; Linsell et al 
2008) have found that participants both under-estimated and overestimated 
their risk and both positions were found among participants in this study. Peter, 
for example: 
I would have thought you’ve got a 50/50 chance of having some form 
of cancer or not. (Peter 67, Deprived) 
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The previous chapter revealed that most participants felt that cancer was 
common and was becoming more so. Nevertheless, many were surprised that 
that overall population risk was as high as one in three. Some perceived this to 
be an extremely high level of risk. This was particularly true in the deprived 
community.  
10.5.2 Personal Risk 
Assessment of personal risk had three distinct, but often overlapping, 
components. Participants thought about the risks associated with their behaviour 
and family history but also their estimation of risk in light of the perceived 
commonality of cancer.  
Participants were not asked directly about their behaviour but often the 
discussion strayed into that area. Typically the conversation about behaviour 
centred on diet and exercise. Health education messages about consumption of 
ample fruit and vegetables, and drinking within sensible limits, were well 
established. Most participants reported that they were ‘good’ most of the time, 
but there was a tendency to think about behaviours in terms of ‘moderation’, as 
Backett (1992a) also found in her Edinburgh cohort. This was strongly bound with 
the notion that denying oneself ‘the odd treat’ could ultimately prove 
detrimental to one’s health. The key to health was a balance. In the following 
extract Peter echoes what Davison found in Wales, that being too fit could be 
equally damaging:  
There’s nothing wrong, I think, in having the odd unhealthy meal and 
who’s to say its unhealthy but not if you were eating it breakfast 
lunch and dinner, seven nights a week. Chinese takeaways or Indian 
takeaways then you’re asking for trouble with weight, with health 
and other things and I think the secret is having a balanced diet but 
no matter what you do you could still. I mean look at the number of 
people that go out jogging and drop dead with heart attacks, yet to 
all intents and purposes they are very fit. Fitness and health are not 
necessarily the same thing. People can be healthy and unfit and 
people can be fit and unhealthy (Peter 67, Deprived) 
Again Kathleen and Jessie both emphasise the value of moderation: 
I think it should always be said that, well they don’t want you to sit 
in  your house  well, they want you to exercise for everything don’t 
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they? But you don’t want to sit in your house and be frightened to eat 
this, that and the next thing. I really think its all things in 
moderation. I had an iced-bun last night and I will have another iced-
bun - because it was a pack of two (laughs) but I do eh, use Bertoli 
and I use semi-skimmed milk. In fact, I buy organic. (Kathleen 68, 
Affluent) 
Oh, I’m very careful with my diet, we do have a Chinese carry-out, 
don’t think that we’re goody goody every night, we do have a Chinese 
carry out and we go out for a meal every now and again but at home 
its good basic food and we’ve got biscuits in the house (whispers) but 
we try not to. If someone gives me chocolates, I eat them (laughs) 
because its bad manners not to but I shouldn’t really. Och, a little bit 
of what you fancy, everything in moderation. I just say, everything in 
moderation and if I get it, I get it but if I don’t I’ve worked hard not 
to get it. (Jessie 68, Affluent) 
Many of the participants reported that they engaged in healthy behaviour 
because that is what they enjoyed. The avoidance of cancer or other diseases 
was not the motivation for their habits. In the following extract Colin highlights 
what he sees as the basic rules, before going on to give his reasons for following 
the rules: 
And, you know, eat a sensible diet and take sensible exercise and 
breathe some decent air once in a while, don’t sit in your car all the 
time the normal basic rules and em your likelihood of having 
problems is reduced but that’s about as far as it goes isn’t it?  
Later he adds  
But no, I mean I didn’t start off being self conscious about my health, 
I started out by being self conscious about doing things that I enjoy 
doing and just by and large they just happened to be healthy things. 
(Colin 61, Affluent) 
A few participants were less positive about their risks and were aware that their 
current lifestyle was unhealthy and may increase their risk of cancer:  
Well, certainly higher (risk) than my wife’s and higher than my 
brother’s because of the amount of alcohol, and food, I mean I don’t 
eat enough vegetables – I take a vitamin tablet now and again. I will 
go over the 20 units of alcohol, I’m not saying I’m proud of that but I 
probably have 35 or 40 a week. (Andrew 57, Affluent) 
I mean likes of just noo I’m overweight the noo I’m aboot four, five 
stone overweight. I’m no eating right and I’m maybe drinking a wee 
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bit mair than I usually drink. If I go on a diet and start eh eating 
properly and daen a wee bit mair running, I could easily go oot 
running eh and that will kind of help me against it. (Gary 37, 
Affluent) 
Smoking was seen as a major risk factor and only a handful of those interviewed 
smoked. Those that did smoke were clearly aware of the damaging effects of 
smoking. Colin, who outlined the basic rules above described his behaviour, in 
terms of smoking, as “stupid” but reported that he had “cut down” and had 
previously attempted to give up. He was keen to bring attention to the healthy 
behaviours he did engage in and his belief that he was “healthier” than most 
people, thus offsetting the overall risk of smoking. Josephine, who also smoked, 
was instead keen to stress that other factors as well as smoking were important:  
Don’t get me wrang, I mean I dae say, aye smoking’s a contributory 
factor but it’s no the be all and end all. (Josephine 61, Deprived) 
All of the smokers excused their continued smoking by discussing additional 
health problems. Careful monitoring of cholesterol, for example, was seen as a 
more immediate challenge than the threat posed by smoking. Not surprisingly 
smoking was always negative. Some participants talked about family members 
who had smoked and were eager to portray their relatives in a manner that 
removed smokers’ culpability. Murray was clear that, as he put it, “avoiding 
carcinogens” was the key to avoiding cancer. Tobacco was foremost among those 
carcinogens. Murray went on to report that both of his parents had smoked but 
placed their behaviour in its historical context, which he felt was important: 
Well my parents would have started smoking I suppose as most people 
do in their late or mid teens which would put it back to the First 
World War and the risks I think were not generally known, not even 
amongst the scientific community at that time. So, you know, I don’t 
think they were foolish (Murray 83, Affluent)  
Murray was fairly vehement in his anti-smoking stance yet towards the close of 
the interview he returns to his mother’s death:  
Well interestingly enough when my mother, although I don’t know 
why a post mortem was asked for, I didn’t ask for it, it must have 
been my brother but she had a tumour on one lung but on the other 
hand it was the kind of tumour that grows very, very slowly and it 
Chapter 10  175 
probably wouldn’t have killed her and she lived to be 92 anyway. 
(Murray 83, Affluent) 
Here Murray reveals that his mother did indeed have lung cancer, but he is keen 
to stress that it remained undiscovered and would not have killed her. Murray 
was rare in that he began the interview by stating that he knew no one ‘close’ 
with cancer and that he had little to offer, though evidently his mother had lung 
cancer. That she had not died of lung cancer perhaps negated the need for him 
to incorporate this into his explanatory model.  
Risks were not confined to behavioural choices. As per participants’ explanatory 
model, a series of factors were taken into account when estimating risk. Most 
prominent was a family history. Those with a ‘family history’ of cancer did not 
necessarily always believe that this automatically elevated their risk.  In the 
following extract Clare discusses her risk: 
No, I don’t I mean I suppose it’s one of those situations where I sort 
of think,  well if you put me in the sort of risk category boxes in 
terms of diet, lifestyle, stress, drinking,  any of those kinds of things. 
Well it’s no to all of those, em family history well yes there has been 
cancers in my family but all of them have been different. 
Later she adds: 
(Sigh)  Well I think it means that there’s no way you could sort of say 
“Well it’s likely I would have breast cancer or bladder cancer or 
cancer of the uterus” just because that’s turned up in the family. I 
think it’s quite likely I might have cancer just because it’s quite 
likely I might have cancer,  I mean I think that and I don’t think it’s 
not going to happen because I can tick all these boxes in the lifestyle 
thing. (Clare 42, Affluent) 
What was important for Clare was that the experience was of ‘different’ 
cancers, and it might be inferred that she might feel differently if there had 
been multiple occurrences of the same cancer within her family. Yet the 
occurrence of cancer in her family, despite healthy lifestyles has led her to re-
evaluate her risk. In light of her experience, she now thinks it likely that she 
might get cancer because lifestyle choice provides no guarantee and because 
cancer is common. Angus, who had also experienced more than one cancer in his 
immediate family, initially voiced some concern at the possible genetic link but 
later dismissed it: 
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I don’t know I actually phoned my GP and said  “You know, I’ve got no 
signs, nothing’s happening,  I don’t feel any different. Well that’s 
two brothers died of cancer now and my niece has got cancer, now is 
there a family link? Should I be looking at anything should I take a 
pro-active approach or just wait and see?” And she came back and 
said “Well I’ll refer you to the Genetics Unit” or something. 
He added 
I’m not bothered it’s eh I’m quite sort of I don’t know optimistic, I 
don’t know what you would call it, optimistic, I’m optimistic that 
it’ll never happen to me. And that’s the mental attitude I’m taking, 
it won’t happen to me because I’m doing all the right things and if it 
does happen to me I’ll fight it and I’ll win. (Angus 54, Affluent) 
Angus believed that his ‘good’ behaviour will supplant any possible familial links. 
Although Clare and Angus adopt different positions they do so in the context of 
more than one case of cancer in their immediate family. Both have considered 
the possibility of genetic links and both have dismissed them, though they arrive 
at their positions for different reasons. They also arrive at different conclusion. 
Other participants, who believed themselves to be in ‘cancer families’, thought 
that their risk was elevated. Kathleen thought of herself as being in a cancer 
family and although the majority of those cancer events were not amongst her 
immediate relatives, she regarded them as so. Her family status effectively 
cancelled out her ‘good’ behaviours:  
Kathleen: So, I think my risk might be slightly higher, I would have 
said my risk was higher than my friend who is going into hospital 
today (for colorectal cancer surgery) 
I: You would have said your risk was higher? 
Kathleen: Yes, well the number of people in my family, in the 
immediate sides of my family except that I have probably not drunk 
or been as overweight, you know, as her, but looking at in anything 
you might get through your family line I would have said that my risk 
was higher than hers (Kathleen 68, Affluent) 
The majority of cancer within Kathleen’s family had been among her aunts and 
uncles. Pauline also had aunts and uncles who had died of cancer but she did not 
regard this as her “family”. This re-emphasises the importance of perceived 
proximity when considering the impact of family experience: 
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I suppose I’ve got the same risk as everybody else but it’s no 
something I worry about maybe because it’s never been in the family. 
(Pauline, 57 Deprived)  
Assessing one’s own risk in the comparison to someone else was more usual than 
thinking about oneself in the context of absolute risk. Moreover, because risk 
was often over or underestimated when compared to the actual population 
incidence, personal estimates were vague and ill-defined. Yet, it was unusual for 
participants to report that they felt that they were at an especially high risk of 
cancer. It was more usual for participants to state that their risk was low. 
Murray, perceived his risk to be low and attributed this directly to his behaviour. 
The following extract is especially interesting because as the earlier section 
showed Murray’s mother had lung cancer. Though clearly because she did not die 
of lung cancer, this has not entered into his explanatory model:  
Very low. Because nobody in my immediate family has or has had 
cancer and I think there is a genetic element in there somewhere. 
Also I reduce my risks of not getting cancer by not being a smoker, 
never have smoked (Murray 83, Affluent) 
Participants were not always rational or logical in their reasoning around 
personal risk assessments. Elsie whose mother and husband both experienced 
cancer talked about her strategy for avoiding cancer. Here, she hints at the 
importance of attitude as well as behaviour: 
I mean my mother was eighty-five when she got it, she only lived 
another two years. But I just think to myself “No that’s not for me” I 
don’t know, I just say “No I’m just going to lead my life and go out 
and do my walking and go to my wee keep-fit class and go and meet 
my friends and I’m not going to get it”. Maybe that’s stupidity on my 
point or naivety. (Elsie 62, Affluent) 
 
10.5.3  Risk of other individuals  
As has been shown in Chapter 9, there was not universal acceptance, with the 
obvious exceptions of smoking and sun exposure, of links between behavioural or 
environmental factors and cancer. Rather, there was a universally recognised 
model of ‘healthy’. Many of the cancer sufferers known to the participants fitted 
that ‘healthy’ typology, which ultimately made the estimation of risk in others 
difficult. There was the easy identification of those who should, according to 
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their behaviour, get cancer. Clare sums up the difficulties associated with 
estimating risk in others: 
I think, you know, there are things like that, you know, big killers 
like heart attack and that seems to be, that can seem to be quite 
random as well but then you can look at other people and say oh yeah 
but you’ve got all the factors that’s a high likelihood. So I think I’m 
seeing a lot of diseases as yeah there’s one’s that people who tick a 
lot of the boxes and have the risk factors and another set of people 
who don’t really and yet they can still be affected in some instances 
(Clare 42 Affluent)  
As Clare states the relationship between known risk factors and disease 
occurrence was often not borne out in experience. As Julia notes when talking 
about a neighbour who was diagnosed with cancer and expresses her surprise at 
the diagnosis because she had always looked “healthy”: 
Because, she was always so healthy looking and working hard and 
everything else and that was their retrial. They had sold up and 
moved to Millport to retire, even although she’s a fair number of 
years younger than me and she took cancer (Julia 65, Deprived) 
As previously noted the model of lay epidemiology provides a vehicle for an 
estimation of risk. Central to that estimation was the identification of a 
candidate who is thought most likely to suffer CHD. The following section on 
candidacy will explore the estimation of risk further.  
10.6 Candidacy  
Davison regarded candidacy as a critical ‘cultural mechanism’. Coronary 
candidacy broadly captured the public’s view of the kind of people who are 
likely to experience or escape heart disease. Participants in this study rarely 
talked about cancer in such terms. Although it was plain that there were a series 
of factors that contribute to candidacy for cancer they were generally resistant 
to the idea that there was a ‘type of person’ who got cancer. In thinking this 
through, Gary made a direct comparison between CHD and cancer: 
You’re talking about diet and lack of exercise and everything. A lot of 
people are stressed and say “They’re gonnae kill themselves, they’re 
gonnae have a heart attack” but you don’t hear people say “He’s 
eventually gonnae get cancer.” (Gary 37, Deprived) 
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Gary’s statement is easily recognisable and encapsulates the universal language 
used when talking about disease. Within it there is recognition that we talk 
about heart disease and cancer in different ways and neatly illustrates many of 
the points made by those who consider the cultural position of disease (Sontag 
1978; Lupton 1994; Weiss 1997).  
This crucial difference between cancer and heart disease is also highlighted by 
Lisa:  
Do you know, its funny that, its not something I have ever thought 
but just doing a kind of quick inventory of all the people I’ve known 
who have had cancer, you know I can’t think of one single person, I 
would say, well yeah that was coming, no I can’t. No. I’ve known, as I 
say, I’ve known people who have maybe had a heart attack and died 
and I’ve thought “ Oh God yeah, I mean he was 48, two stone over 
weight and smoked 60 a day and you know was in an extremely 
stressful job as a lawyer” and you know when he dropped dead in the 
office you thought  hm, yeah, no surprise but not as regards cancer. 
(Lisa45, Affluent) 
Lisa, in her description of the CHD sufferer, includes all the characteristics 
included in the coronary candidacy model described by Davison. Features of CHD 
candidacy are common in everyday illness narratives and Lisa demonstrates this 
by making direct comparisons with cancer. As both Gary and Lisa testify, the 
easy evocations of CHD candidacy tend not to apply to cancer, either universally 
or by participants in this study. Though Davison does allude to the problematic 
nature of the term candidate, in so far as one is essentially being ask to 
nominate oneself (or someone else) for a serious disease, coronary candidacy, 
especially in others is well-established.   
The reluctance of participants in this study to ‘single’ people out and ascribe 
candidacy points to the status of cancer in our society. The dreaded nature of 
cancer is well documented. Cancer was once stigmatised primarily because of a 
widespread lack of understanding of cause and almost certain death (Sontag 
1978, Patterson 1987). Although stigma remains it has shifted focus slightly 
because of the emphasis on individual responsibility in disease prevention and 
avoidance. Nowhere is this more evident than with smoking. The attitude 
towards smokers displayed by some of the participants in this study resonates 
with other studies looking at smoking and personal responsibility (Muzzin et al 
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1994, Chapple, Ziebland & McPherson 2004). Yet, there continues to be a 
significant segment in the cancer puzzle unaccounted for which furthers 
misunderstanding and fear (Comaroff & Maguire 1982). The uncertainty and fear 
that shrouds cancer was sufficient to discourage some participants from making 
candidacy judgements:  
I don’t think you kind of single out so many people and say “Right I 
don’t think she’ll get cancer because” or “I think they two will have 
cancer” I widnae kind of single people out to say I think they would 
get it. (Karen 25, Deprived) 
Karen describes what Davison referred to as prospective candidacy. As previously 
noted, Davison conceded that retrospective candidacy, where candidacy is used 
as an account for past events, had more salience. The same was true for 
participants in this study. It could be argued that using retrospective candidacy, 
as a mechanism to explain past illness events, seems obvious. It appears logical 
to deliberate known risk behaviour and judge whether they fitted the relevant 
disease candidacy type. So cancer candidacy was accepted for smokers, sun 
worshippers, those with unhealthy lifestyles and those exposed to environmental 
hazards. In the following extract Lisa discusses the candidacy profile of an 
elderly aunt who had breast cancer. Eventually, Lisa concludes that breast 
cancer was not responsible for her aunt’s death but given her age and behaviour, 
judged her to be a likely candidate for breast cancer.  
My own aunt had actually died, she was diagnosed with breast cancer 
but um, again it sounds a bit odd to say but she was in her mid 80s 
and she smoked very heavily all her life so she was kinda dying 
anyway, you know she had lots of other illnesses and she had been in 
and out of hospital and eventually someone said “Oh by the way, 
she’s got breast cancer as well”. So it was like, oh God, not that as 
well but em, in a sense, you know somebody said to me at the time, 
you know she’s not gonna die of it at that age, she’ll die of other 
things because it’s hormone driven, which again, I didn’t know. (Lisa 
45, Affluent)  
Similarly, Kathleen discusses her close friend recently diagnosed with colorectal 
cancer. Elsewhere in her interview Kathleen tells that she had sought 
information about colorectal cancer for her friend and in the following extract 
describes risk factors that coincide with her friend’s behaviour: 
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She’s overweight, she has always been a bit overweight, she drank, I 
think always quite a lot, and em but had stopped smoking maybe 
about 30 years ago but had done things maybe like the Atkins diets 
sometimes and all that fatty stuff you know, which I don’t think 
really is a help to anybody. (Kathleen, 68, Affluent) 
What is interesting about Kathleen’s description of her friend’s candidacy for 
colorectal cancer is that when previously asked about her own risk, Kathleen had 
stated that she had thought her risk higher than her friend’s. She based this on 
her own family history. Kathleen had not previously recognised her friend as a 
candidate. But in the event of cancer and with the presence of risk factors, 
Kathleen had retrospectively applied candidacy.  
Betty also talks about a friend’s behaviour. Here Betty is retrospectively 
applying candidacy, which is framed by newly available information. In this 
context prospective candidacy would not have been possible because, as Betty 
states, the links between sun-exposure and skin cancer were not widely known. 
Betty is however able to make a judgement of candidacy in light of new 
evidence.  
Well I thought the girl with skin cancer eh she never, ever used any 
lotions but I’m going back, she’s dead now over twenty years, right  
… And she was in her forties as I say she was about forty-six and we 
didnae know about creams, you know, and she was a sun worshipper. 
She went to, she had a daughter was married to a boy in Tenerife, I 
couldnae remember the place, Tenerife, and they went there for six 
months at a time. Eh, so as I say, I felt she could have done 
something, she could have stayed out of the sun. (Betty 61, Deprived) 
Only once did a participant express surprise at someone having escaped cancer. 
Josephine’s husband had died of CHD but she had been sure that he would 
develop colorectal cancer: 
I always thought he would take it, you know, wae the history of his 
mother and faither having it and him being overweight. (Josephine 
61, Deprived) 
Candidacy judgements are not confined to those whose behaviours one has 
knowledge of. In the following extract Grace discusses the case of John Wayne, 
who also died of cancer. Though Grace is unlikely to be aware of his risky 
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behaviours, she made a link with widely known and supposed environmental 
risks:  
John Wayne died of cancer of the throat and em he was down in 
Nevada or something where they’d been testing the nuclear, he was 
doing a film down there and quite a few of the people who were in 
the desert filming spaghetti westerns and things like that died of 
cancer where they were doing the nuclear tests. (Grace 63, Affluent) 
Although judgements of candidacy were not always obvious or transparent, 
smokers were almost universal in being seen as cancer candidates. Before going 
on to explore candidacy, it is worth focusing on the importance of smoking and 
its significance for candidacy.  
10.6.1 Smoking – a special risk factor 
While certain behaviours, like the all-encompassing unhealthy lifestyle, were 
linked with cancer, smoking was afforded a special status.  When recounting a 
cancer narrative, the sufferer’s smoking status was always disclosed at the 
outset. Davison noted the importance of weight or physical build for CHD 
candidacy and smoking assumed a similar role for cancer. Although it is useful to 
draw parallels between weight for CHD and smoking for cancer, the two differ in 
an important way. Physical stature or weight presents an immediate visual 
predictor of candidacy. In the current climate, particularly where smoking is 
prohibited in many social settings, an individual’s smoking status is not so widely 
known. Therefore, it was not uncommon for participants to seek confirmatory 
details of a sufferer’s smoking status from a spouse or partner not participating 
in the interview. Thus smoking, or non-smoking, was almost always at the centre 
of the explanatory model. If the individual was judged to be a ‘heavy’ smoker, 
the search for additional explanatory variables ceased. Though most participants 
did not articulate connections between smoking and all cancers, others were 
clear of the importance of smoking in any model of cancer candidacy: 
No, I don’t think there’s a type (to get cancer), if one excludes the 
60-a-day smoker type, I don’t think there’s a type. (Murray 83, 
Deprived) 
As has already been noted, smokers have been found to experience stigma in 
response to a lung cancer diagnosis (Chapple, Ziebland & McPherson 2004).The 
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stigma attached to smokers and the consequential judgement on personal 
culpability was also seen in this study. Some participants were eager to 
downplay the importance of smoking in their otherwise healthy relatives’ cancer 
diagnosis or assumed that stopping smoking prior to diagnosis removed any 
potentially harmful effects. The following extract details Jessie’s response when 
asked to comment on retrospective candidacy:  
I: Is there anyone that you have known who has had cancer that you 
might have thought, well, yes I can see why they would get cancer? 
Jessie: No, not amongst my friends or relatives. My mother maybe yes 
because of her smoking but I sort of put it aside because she was 
always a very healthy lady (Jessie 68, Affluent)  
Earlier in the interview Jessie had talked about smokers in the context of her 
own risk: 
So I eh, eat fruit and vegetables and wholemeal bread because I want 
to try and avoid it but if I can’t, I can’t and that’s it. You know. I 
don’t know about normal people, I mean you go out and you see 
people smoking away like (laughs) chimneys and if you don’t die of … 
I mean I attend [hospital] and if they don’t die of lung cancer they’ll 
die of pneumonia because they are out there in the cold in their 
dressing gowns smoking (Jessie 68, Affluent) 
Jessie makes no attempt to hide her disapproval of smoking. By highlighting 
smoking outside the hospital she hints at issues of personal culpability and 
displays the significance of moral judgements when arriving at explanatory 
models of disease. Elsie was similarly keen to absolve her husband of culpability, 
as the following extract shows: 
I’m inclined to have wee thinks to make up my mind, I might be 
entirely wrong. He was a Commercial Artist and away back, well he 
used to take his paintbrush into his mouth and suck it to get a nice 
point to do the lettering and I thought, I think I’d read something or 
I’d seen it on the television there was a factory I think somewhere 
about Dundee, I think it was clocks they made, and the faces to make 
the face of the clock or the numbers luminous the women there who 
painted the dials had radioactive paint they used and quite a lot of 
these women apparently died of cancer. And I said to him, it wasn’t 
till after, it was quite a long time after, I said “ Do you know what I 
think?” and he said “I never thought about that” and he said “Right 
enough the water was mucky and you just put your paintbrush in and 
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you went like this and you got the paint”. So maybe that is quite 
entirely wrong. 
I: Can you think of any other cause? 
Elsie: No. Well, he smoked. 
I: Right. 
Elsie: He doesn’t smoke now and he’d actually stopped the year 
before the cancer was detected, he did smoke so caused by smoking 
yes, smoking, uh huh, yes, uh huh. 
Elsie presents a narrative that she is comfortable with and is acceptable to her. 
She had established that her husband’s environmental exposure at work had 
been important in the aetiology of his cancer, albeit that it stemmed from his 
own individual way of working. She had decided to dismiss smoking but 
introduced it nevertheless. Smoking could be ignored because he stopped prior 
to his diagnosis, though arguably he had retired many years before giving up 
smoking.  
10.6.2  Explanatory hierarchy 
If smoking was not implicated as a cause, participants searched for additional 
variables that could reasonably be entered into the explanatory model. Much 
like Davison originally found, participants in this study question a series of 
possible explanatory factors that are entered into a model to provide a profile of 
the individual. This may then explain why they got cancer when they did, in 
essence what set them apart. Once the smoking status of the sufferer is 
established, the search moves to other plausible risk factors. Rather than 
specific behaviours, with the exception of sun-exposure and skin cancer, it is a 
more holistic enquiry about general health. This included a health history and 
family connections. The current weight, diet and alcohol consumption of the 
individual also acted as possible reasons for the occurrence of cancer. The 
relative importance of each element for the explanatory model was individually 
tailored. This is a striking difference with candidacy for CHD. CHD is a single 
disease with a limited range of risk factors, which are well established among 
the lay public. Cancer is more complex, so while candidacy for lung cancer, for 
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instance, may be well-established, participants in this study struggled to 
explain, and arrive at, candidacy for other cancers:  
I must admit in my naivety, I don’t know what causes prostate 
cancer, cancer of the colon, all these, I don’t know what’s causing 
them. (Andrew 57, Affluent) 
How do you take breast cancer? You can have someone who doesnae, 
smoke, doesnae drink, doesnae do anything and yet they can take 
breast cancer, men and women. (Julia 65, Deprived) 
The explanatory hierarchy, with smoking at the apex, allows for some cancer 
events to be easily accounted for. Other cancer events are more challenging. 
Given that causal links are not well-established for all cancer sites, candidacy is 
limited and restricted to those areas where links are clear. Other behavioural 
characteristics by themselves could not predict cancer candidacy.  
10.6.3 The scope and limitations of candidacy: anomalous deaths 
and unwarranted survivors 
According to Davison the explanatory model for CHD is ‘wide’. Anyone can be a 
candidate. Davison provides examples of individuals, equally at risk, but at 
opposite ends of a spectrum: those who engage in no exercise or those who do 
too much, high powered executives prone to stress and manual labourers subject 
to over-work. This suggests that a wide range of behaviours can contribute to 
heart disease. Cancer was not described in similar terms in this study. If cancer 
sufferers did not smoke and led ‘healthy’ lives, the event was largely 
unexplainable, so in that respect candidacy was relatively narrow. It was typical 
for participants to identify sufferers that did not meet any candidacy criteria: 
Oh God no, she didn’t smoke, doesn’t drink, eats well, exemplary 
lifestyle so to speak, and eh not conducive to cancer of the colon. 
(Andrew 57, Affluent) 
We did have a dear friend who nobody looked after themselves better 
than this lady and she took cancer and she died. (Phyllis 58, Affluent) 
I’ve a friend and to me she lived a very, you know, she ate well, she 
didn’t smoke she just drank moderately had quite a lot of exercise 
she was out doors and she died of cancer (Elsie 62 Affluent) 
Chapter 10  186 
What these extracts capture is an important feature of ‘candidacy’. According to 
Davison, individuals recognised that while those that engage in risky behaviours 
can be event free, equally those who ‘do all the right things’ continue to 
experience illness events. This serves to reinforce the fallible nature of 
candidacy. Although many participants offered examples of people that ‘ticked 
all the right boxes’ for cancer, the majority of the stories were of individuals 
who did not fit their previously conceived model. Therefore it is the fallibility of 
candidacy that is the overwhelming experience of cancer for participants in this 
study. Davison identified such cases as ‘anomalous deaths’ and many anomalies 
are found in participants’ narratives. In the following extract, Angus provides 
the example of two of his brothers, one of whom he viewed as the epitome of a 
‘candidate’: 
James was an ideal candidate, eh heavy smoker, heavy drinker, 
didn’t really eat healthily, fish suppers, pies that sort of thing, fry 
ups. Joe’s like me he’s totally the opposite, don’t smoke, drink 
occasionally … red wine, fresh fruit, vegetables every day, wholemeal 
bread all that sort of thing, you know, exercise, kept fit and yet he’s 
got this version of cancer. (Angus 57, Affluent) 
Here, both candidacy and the fallibility of candidacy are captured succinctly. All 
of the extracts point to anomalous cases that went beyond simply avoiding risky 
behaviours. They were described as extremely ‘health-conscious’, as bucking a 
trend, as always having been healthy before anyone knew it was important to do 
so. Essentially, they appeared to be the absolute opposites of typical 
candidates. The appearance of cancer in this ultra-healthy group challenged the 
received wisdom of causes of cancer. The following series of extracts 
demonstrates the disparity between what participants now know and what they 
once thought:  
I mean he’s always been the fittest guy you ever met, you know, he 
was in the first fifteen in rugger at school and university and, you 
know, a runner and I mean I climb mountains  he (leukaemia sufferer) 
does fell walking or fell running or whatever, you know. I mean he 
runs up the bloody things (laughs) but no he’s always been really, 
really fit. (Colin 61, Affluent) 
My husband has always had a really healthy diet from before I think 
these things were generally accepted. I mean he, all his life, he has 
eaten, and I mean he came from a family where they had a kind of 
healthy diet because he lived in the country, didn’t have a lot of 
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money, um his father smoked quite heavily but his mother didn’t. 
But, they ate, they grew a lot of their own vegetables and didn’t 
probably eat a lot of red meat, because they didn’t, you know it 
would be a kind of Sunday dinner kind of treat for them, so um, and 
eh, so relatively healthy. I mean not sort of sports fanatics but he’s 
always been slim, he’s never been over-weight, he eats a lot of 
brown bread and all the right kind of fibre, he eats a lot of fruit and 
vegetables, you know he ate brown bread long before it was kind of 
fashionable to do it, um, and doesn’t really drink that much. So, you 
know, um if anything that’s kind of going against the survey and I 
suppose that’s reduced his chances so much, I mean I don’t know very 
much about, um I mean, you probably know a lot more about, you 
know being genetically disposed towards certain cancers, um, but no, 
it’s a complete mystery with him. I mean he, as I say, he’d sort of 
followed all the rules and did all the right things and still got cancer, 
which I think in a sense, to me kind of fosters maybe a wee bit more 
of a fatalistic attitude towards myself. (Lisa 45, Affluent) 
One of these people that was extremely healthy she was vegetarian, 
you know, she ate all the right foods, she exercised, they were 
Liberal Democrats they used to go all round Falmouth in Cornwall 
delivering leaflets and you couldn’t have met a woman who was more 
healthy and health conscious and always had been. Really you 
couldn’t have met a more health conscious woman than auntie. 
(Janet 47, Affluent) 
She didn’t drink you see that’s forty year ago we’re talking about 
right enough. My auntie Bessie didnae drink, she didnae smoke it was 
just her and her husband and the one son. She’d worked all her days 
till she got married and then had her son and after she had that, 
after she’d had her son she concentrated on her house, her home, her 
home, her husband and her son. (Rose 61, Deprived) 
I found oot like that lassie that didnae drink, didnae smoke got it I 
thought she’s the last person I would have thought that would have 
took it because at that time they were saying the smoking causes it. 
And I knew that lassie didnae drink, she didnae smoke neither she did 
and she didnae go intae a pub where people smoked either so I knew 
nothing like that and I thought she’s the last person I would ever 
have thought would have caught that. (Patricia 62, Deprived) 
I’d an uncle who died of throat cancer last year at 50, em so that was 
a shock and he was a non-smoker, never smoked in his life and very 
fit, healthy man. Didn’t work in a smoky environment. That was a 
shock, that was a real shock and that was a kind of turning point for 
me, where I thought well actually that can affect anyone as opposed 
to lifestyle. Both my in-laws smoked so I suppose you kind of thought 
well your risk is much higher but this uncle of mine was one of the 
fittest, healthiest, body-conscious men I’ve ever known in my life. 
(Emily 37, Affluent) 
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The narratives borrowed for these examples all leave previous health status 
unquestionable. All these cancer sufferers were healthy and fit and yet despite 
this the cancer event occurred. The extracts also show participants’ surprise and 
how in some cases they have changed their views. The extract from Lisa 
indicates that her very recent experience of cancer via her husband has forced 
her to reappraise her entire cancer belief system, and concludes that her 
attitude is now fatalistic.  
10.6.4  Challenges to candidacy: triggers 
The extracts above demonstrate that such cases forced participants to reassess 
their explanatory models and pursue other possible aetiological explanations. 
Reworked models included genetics, secondary events and trauma, both physical 
and psychological. As outlined in the previous chapter, many participants, 
particularly those that lived in the deprived community, suggested the presence 
of a ‘faulty’ or cancer gene as a possible explanation. Rose is unable to provide 
a definitive cause but does introduce the idea of a set of dormant cells early in 
her interview: 
No, I widnae say I would know what causes it. I’ve heard different 
theories of cancerous cells in your body that was one of the things I 
was, I don’t know who told me that but somebody somewhere said 
that to me, that we all carry cancerous cells. Whether that’s true or 
not and if you’ve got a weakness it attacks them, I was told that. 
(Rose 61 Deprived) 
It is interesting that Rose, like many of the other participants, is unable to 
locate the source of this information. Although a number of different terms are 
used and the way in which, what Angus described as a ‘ticking time-bomb’ is set 
off varies, the idea is fundamentally the same. As Gary explains: 
Like certain people might have the, like again, I’m talking in 
laymen’s terms, it’s like a gene where it might no be it might be 
faulty or might be waiting tae be whit dae you call this word noo like 
activated sort of thing, you know, and that might happen. (Gary 37, 
Deprived) 
Clearly then the circumstances necessary for activation varied. Again this was a 
retrospective activity and as such tailored to unique personal situations. 
Nevertheless, participants applied a typical series of common ‘triggers’. 
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Trauma, either physical, in the form of accidents or psychological in the form of 
stress, was thought to be a trigger or activator for a subsequent cancer event. 
During the interview Patricia made a link between cancer and accidents: 
But every one of them, except maybe my young cousin, I know had 
been in an accident of some kind as I said my mum had that beaten 
up. And my dad had actually fell and broke his leg and then it was 
just healing when they found oot he had the cancer. All the other 
ones, they’ve had an accident. (Patricia 61, Deprived). 
For some participants the gene was apparent in everyone but for others it was 
only apparent in some individuals. Such an idea gives fuel to the idea of cancer 
families and also helps account for unwarranted survivors, namely those who 
behave badly but ‘get away with it’ regardless: 
I know and that’s when I kind of think is there something in the body 
that maybe I don’t know, that maybe triggers cancer or I think 
everybody’s open to it no matter how healthy you are or whatever. 
(Karen 25, Deprived) 
I think everybody probably has, but I think some folk have a bigger 
chance because of, maybe their background or their genes if you like. 
Well maybe the background they come from, I mean if their father 
had married someone else or their mother had married somebody 
else, it may have been a different medical outcome but then there 
are people, you know the lifestyle, there are people who have a 
healthy life style and can develop it. But maybe they would have 
developed it sooner, if they hadn’t had that, you know. (Kathleen 68, 
Affluent) 
I think, I think maist people has got that in them and it just takes a 
certain something, maybe something that’s no healing right, maybe 
you’ve had an accident and it’s no healing right, things like that 
maybe. (Lorna, 57, Deprived) 
I think it’s genetic I do, I’ve got this strange idea in my head that 
really, really it’s there in everybody but it’s just something, you 
know, it is there and it’ll kick in something will just trigger it off at 
some point.( Pauline, 57 Deprived) 
So although cancer candidacy in one respect is narrow, the faulty gene 
supposition renders it even ‘wider’ than in Davison’s original scheme. The idea 
that cancer is ‘in you’ lying dormant, has been reported many times(Cornwell 
1984; Calnan 1987; Mullen 1994; Scanlon 2006). While Davison demonstrated 
that almost any characteristic could suggest CHD candidacy, the participants in 
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this study describe an explanatory model that is fundamentally a quasi-scientific 
presentation of ‘luck’. If triggers can take many forms, including behaviour, the 
appearance of cancer is entirely random. Participants possess a customised 
model that can explain any case, even the most unlikely. Such a model provides 
a legitimate reason for each event encountered. The idea of trigger is akin to 
the links between cancer and secondary events that was uncovered by Blaxter 
(1982). The extracts also demonstrate that those in deprived communities were 
more likely to introduce the idea of dormant genes or cells and triggers in 
aetiological explanations of cancer. A degree of fatalism is attached to the idea 
that dormant cells and triggers explain cancer. Often it is assumed that working 
class fatalism is a particular barrier to health promotion and the engagement 
with good lifestyle choice (Balshem 1991). 
The corollary to the anomalous case is the unwarranted survivor, which equally 
challenges established explanatory frameworks. Unwarranted survivors are those 
who ‘do all the wrong things and get away with it’. While anomalous cases 
formed a significant part of many of the participants’ stories about cancer, 
unwarranted survivors did not feature so strongly. Most participants, when 
asked, could provide an example of someone that they believed had failed to 
‘look after themselves’ but had managed to escape cancer or other serious 
disease. A number of participants thought that this was extremely common:   
I’m just saying that any illness as you rightly said are going along two 
or three stones overweight, smoking and they get off scot-free, good 
luck to them I don't grudge them that (Eileen 72, Affluent) 
Most of them (clientele in social club) were walking adverts for 
cancer (Laughs) most of them are still going. (Emily 37, Affluent) 
(Laughs) I can think of one particular person who to me has not had a 
healthy, mind you he’s in his sixties and he’s not had cancer. He 
smoked, drank a lot, still does as far as I know, and eh I don’t think 
he really bothered too much about food didn’t eat very well and he 
seems alright. (Elsie 62, Affluent) 
 
74 and he’s smoked fae he was a teenager, in fact pre-teens he 
smoked. I think he smoked when he was 12  my Dad’s a kinda walking 
miracle cause he’s like, fried foods, and he’s got angina. (Gary 37, 
Deprived) 
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The extracts show that often the description of unwarranted survivors took on a 
humorous tone. While Davison found that candidacy for CHD was often related 
with humour, in this study humour was reserved for unwarranted survivors in 
discussions about cancer. The idea that cancer is not something to be joked 
about once more symbolises the fearful attitude towards cancer prevalent in 
modern society.  
Participants could not explain unwarranted survivors. No justification beyond 
‘luck’ was offered. Health education messages were not discredited by the 
existence of such individuals and many participants were cynical about the 
significance placed on them:   
That’s just,  you’ve won the lottery, you know. You’ve been lucky, 
we have all read in the papers people who say, I’ve been a heavy 
smoker all my life, I’m perfectly alright and this sort of thing and 
therefore all this stuff about smoking and lung cancer is nonsense 
because I’ve beaten it, well these people have just been lucky it 
seems to me. Doubtless there are causal factors, of which I am 
unaware, which would explain why they have been lucky but I think 
the ordinary man or woman on the street would think, well, old Joe 
has been pretty lucky, hasn’t he, like men who went through the first 
world war in the trenches and emerged totally unscathed at the 
other end. (Murray 83, Affluent) 
It’s crap, it’s crap and okay there are survivors and there are 
exceptions. Well I mean it’s not a rule that if you smoke you die of 
cancer I mean so there will be people who can say ‘I’m ninety-five 
and I’ve smoked forty capstan full strength a day for the last eighty 
years and look at me’. But that’s not an argument of anything is it? 
(Colin 61 Affluent) 
This insight, that, what Davison termed Uncle Normans (Davison, Frankel & 
Davey Smith 1989), are simply epidemiological aberrations, has been found 
elsewhere. Emslie reported similar findings in their west of Scotland study on 
heart disease (Emslie Hunt & Watt 2001a, 2001b; Hunt, Emslie & Watt 2001). 
Their participants were aware that such aberrations should have little impact on 
the perceived importance of healthy behaviours  
10.7 Individual vs. population risk 
The above extracts show that some participants were sure that while for some 
risk behaviour had not been damaging, this could not be extrapolated to the 
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wider population. Such an understanding was not widespread among 
participants. A number of participants, while not dismissing the significance of 
tobacco, believed that “it must be more than cigarettes”. It was customary for 
participants to fix on the cases known to them and extrapolate to the wider 
population. Julia failed to account for her sister’s oesophageal cancer in the 
context of known risk factors and presumed that the information was ‘wrong’, 
rather than accepting flaws in bio-medical explanations: 
I don’t honestly know if lifestyle or, likes of my young sister smoked, 
she smoked from when she was about 11 but she didn’t take cancer in 
her lungs she took it in her oesophagus which they say is drink related 
and I’ve got another young sister who is a recovered alcoholic and 
smokes like a chimney, she’s fine, she’s well,  so how do you 
associate it? (Julia 65, Deprived) 
10.8 What evidence is important? Formulating a model of 
candidacy   
Previous chapters and sections within this chapter have shown that a wealth of 
information is integrated into participants’ models of cancer beliefs. Further, 
the manner in which participants develop an ever-changing personal evidence 
base is sophisticated and personally logical. Clearly there are similarities 
between the data generated from this study and the lay epidemiology model 
first described by Davison. Yet the basic scheme that refers to the way in which 
information is gathered and processed, is merely one component of Davison’s 
theory. Deeper within the theory lie a series of related and essential elements, 
principal among them is candidacy. Coronary candidacy, while no doubt a 
sophisticated amalgam of information, does as Davison conceded, incorporate 
many of the risk factors found in epidemiological models. When arriving at a 
judgement of coronary candidacy personal behaviour was first considered. 
Invariably an estimate was made based on physical stature. Other factors like 
family history, employment and temperament were also sought. Rarely however 
do lay epidemiologists have to look beyond well established risk factors to arrive 
at a candidacy judgement. Cancer candidacy is at once more simple and more 
complex. Evidence of smoking status was essential but many of established 
epidemiological risk factors are poorly recognised. Smokers were identified as 
the only true candidates. It was rare for participants in this study to highlight 
any non-smokers as candidates. While a healthy lifestyle was judged important, 
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few unhealthy non-smokers were identified. As has already been highlighted a 
handful of participants were appreciative of additional risk factors like diet and 
exercise and these were drawn on to arrive at a tailored candidacy model. Yet, 
obesity for example, which is an established risk factor for cancer and CHD, 
seems only to feature in coronary candidacy.  
10.9 Personal responsibility and risk elimination in the 
face of luck 
Though the influence of luck in cancer events was frequently stressed, this did 
not engender feelings of abandon with regard to health behaviours. As the 
following extracts show: 
My feelings now are that a lot of it is probably luck, if you like, you 
know, almost predisposed that you’re going to get it or you’re not 
going to but I think there are factors that can, you know, put you at a 
higher or a lower risk, if that makes sense. I think you can kind of, 
there are things you can do preventive, but that’s not a hundred 
percent guarantee that you’re not going to have the disease 
basically. (Emily 37, Affluent) 
I think, you know, it must be a combination there’s a lot of genetic 
links as well and they say that if you have a genetic link of breast 
cancer in your family then don’t smoke, don’t make it worse for 
yourself, you know. Em, don’t drink too much alcohol, you know, if 
there’s bowel cancer in the family cut down on red meat that kind of 
thing. So I suppose you’ve just got to be aware and cut down on your 
risks as much as possible. Look at your diet and look at your lifestyle, 
look at exercise. (Janet 47, Affluent) 
What the extracts from Emily and Janet show is that they simultaneously provide 
luck with an important role in their explanatory model but also imply that luck 
can be manipulated. Emily’s idea that individuals are pre-disposed to cancer 
echoes Calnan’s (1987) finding among women in his sample. Like Calnan’s 
cohort, Emily lives in the affluent community and Calnan believed that 
predisposition was distinct from ‘its in us all’, which he found was common in 
women from social class IV and V. Arguably however the ideas are the same but 
articulated differently. When discussing the importance of luck and fatalism, 
Davison reported that participants in his study did not greet this with absolute 
fatalism. Rarely did fatalism encroach on behavioural choice. Rather it was an 
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understanding that not everything could be controlled (Davison, Frankel & Davey 
Smith 1992).  
The above extracts, and Davison’s findings, hint at the almost universal notion 
that disease risk cannot be eliminated. This is contrary to what Davison 
suggested regarding the common currency of prevention of CHD. For participants 
in this study, following a healthy lifestyle offered no immunity to cancer; it 
simply served to reduce one’s risk. This idea was found repeatedly within 
interviews:  
You can protect yourself, doesn’t mean that you won’t get it, but you 
can try and do what you can to, to minimise the risks. (Kathleen 68, 
Affluent) 
Em, I think you can take steps to reduce your risks but I don’t think 
that you can, it’s a difficult one … because I don’t have cancer I 
would probably say that you could prevent it but I think if I was put 
in that uncle’s position I would be saying “Well I did everything, I did 
the text book of what to do to not have cancer and I’ve still got it.” 
(Emily 37, Affluent) 
In the following extract, Lisa, whose husband had recently been diagnosed with 
cancer, describes a family conversation the previous evening, outlining how she 
communicates risk to her young children: 
Funnily enough we were talking about this last night because there 
was a news item about um, the usual kind of thing diet and exercise. 
.....weight, not just obesity, but even a very minor level of being 
overweight can affect your chances, you know and fatty food so they 
were basically talking about diet and exercise and you should be as 
thin as you possibly can .....So yes, we were talking about this last 
night when we were eating our dinner because I was saying to the 
boys, I mean I have always been very open and honest with them 
about cancer, I mean we don’t shy away from the topic at all and I 
was saying given your genetic disposition, I mean we don’t know how 
much of a link there is genetically but if there is there’s nothing you 
can do about that, you can’t change that, your genetic makeup but 
what you can do is influence it by diet and exercise, you know. So, 
you should try and do whatever you can in your lifestyle to try and 
reduce your chances. (Lisa 45,affluent) 
Gary made a distinction between behavioural risks for some cancers and other 
cancers that could not be avoided:  
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So I think, my personal opinion is, the way I think aboot in my heid 
obviously. Is that there is certain types of cancer which you can avoid 
but there’s other types of cancer that it disnae matter how you live 
your life you’re gonnae get it, you know. Just because of the way 
maybe and I keep saying genetically, you know, I’m using the word 
genetically and I don’t know much aboot it, you know. (Gary 37, 
Deprived) 
Estimating one’s own risk of cancer appeared to be removed from the reality of 
actually considering getting the disease. It was difficult to engage participants in 
such a conversation and some participants seemed superstitious at the mere 
thought of it. For example one participant’s mother who was present at the 
interview but did not contribute simply said: 
My granny used to say “if you fear it you’ll get it”. (Marjory 78, 
Deprived) 
Yet many also approached it with bravado, ‘what will be’ attitude: 
C’est la vie, if I get it, I get it (Jessie 63, Affluent) 
Well, I think if it’s coming, it’s coming (Pauline 57, Deprived) 
Here the ideas around ‘what’s for you won’t go by you’ were touched on. This 
was a fatalistic view that if cancer was in your ‘destiny’ it could not be 
controlled. A number of participants did say ‘it won’t happen to me’, ‘that’s 
something that happens to other people’ and one, Angus, claimed that if he got 
it he would fight it and win. Yet Angus was wedded to the notion that there is a 
faulty cancer gene that requires activation, suggesting that he acknowledges the 
role of luck and uncertainty in the progress of cancer. Nevertheless, he was also 
clear that he was doing everything he could to reduce his risk, given his family 
experience, and he employed militaristic metaphors to emphasise his ability to 
defy luck.  
10.10  Fatalism 
Although Davison’s original paper on lay epidemiology did not discuss fatalism, it 
was introduced in additional papers that drew on the same data. Participants, 
both in this, and Davison’s study, discussed disease risk in fatalistic terms. Often 
fatalism has been held responsible for the failure of health promotion messages 
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in some communities (Pill and Stott 1982, 1985, 1987). However, the assumption 
that fatalism is associated with apathy is misplaced. In this study the discussion 
of fatalism, or more properly the randomness of disease, is realistic and 
confirms the distribution of disease described by epidemiology. Many of those in 
a high-risk group will remain disease free and vice versa. Therefore to settle on 
the notion of the importance of the unexplainable is not fatalistic or irrational 
but instead based on observation.  Moreover, participants in this study often 
discussed the perils of being pessimistic or ignoring advice, as the following 
extracts illustrate: 
That’s when I said before the fourth one (risk factor) would be 
random, you know just accept it, you know a bad thing is to be 
fatalistic, because if you’re fatalistic, its not good for you long term, 
you know, people who are fatalistic don’t survive as long as people 
who are positive but I’m quite fatalistic in the randomness of illness. 
(Andrew 57, Affluent) 
Well, if your name is on the bomb its going to get you so there’s no 
point going down to the shelter, I suppose it’s a form of fatalism, 
yes, I suppose it is. That shouldn’t mean that one shouldn’t take all 
sensible precautions against it of course. (Murray 83, Affluent) 
10.11 Chapter Summary 
Fundamentally, lay epidemiology refers to the method of collecting and 
processing information to arrive at an explanatory model of disease. Davison and 
colleagues reported information from many layers of social relationships and 
interactions were utilised. Data from this study confirms that a similar method is 
employed in relation to cancer. Cancer events are experienced within families, 
are discussed in social groups, are presented by the media, albeit within limited 
narratives. Throughout the interviews in this study all of these sources are cited 
naturally and clearly all of the layers have a role. According to Davison the 
information is digested and provides the means to make risk assessments by 
arriving at coronary candidacy. Candidacy, Davison described as a cultural 
mechanism and data presented from the ethnographic study in South Wales 
continues to reflect what is easily recognisable as the everyday way that CHD is 
discussed. Such everyday discussions mirrored mainstream epidemiology. Data 
from this study shows that though there may be a similar everyday talk 
associated with cancer, candidacy rarely emerges. The notable exception to this 
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were smokers, who were easily marked as candidates. The success of the 
coronary candidacy idea is aided by a widespread recognition and acceptance of 
risk factors for CHD. With the exception of smoking, and to a lesser extent sun 
exposure, cancer does not benefit from equal levels of understanding. As such 
candidacy is a more elusive concept. The reasons for this are many. First, in 
comparison to CHD, cancer is perceived to be a more complex disease. Allied to 
this is that the lay public link a set of well-established risk factors to CHD. 
Smoking excepted, cancer risks are less well appreciated and are often, at least 
in the public’s mind, subject to change. Finally, cancer, unlike CHD is a feared 
disease. Davison highlighted the different perceptions of CHD and cancer: 
“ … it should be noted that sudden heart stoppage is something of a 
preferred form of death. ‘Dropping dead’ from a heart attack is 
widely seen as a quick, natural and relatively painless death (in 
comparison with cancers, respiratory disorders and traumatic 
accidents” (Davison, Frankel & Davey Smith 1991:10) 
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11. Discussion: Reflections on Research 
Questions 
11.1 Introduction  
This chapter will first offer some reflections on the study as a whole and 
consider the main strengths and weaknesses of the study. The discussion will 
then turn to the specific research questions detailed in Chapter 4, before going 
on to reflect on other important study findings. 
11.2 Reflections on the study  
This study set out to uncover and explore ordinary views of cancer. Though it did 
not seek to be generalisable, inherent in its aim was discovering a typical view 
of cancer, if one existed. The suitability of the sample population was therefore 
vital and many of the strengths and weaknesses of the study are to be found in 
the study sample. It is a merit of the study that it attempted to access an 
‘ordinary’ view of cancer. The extent to which any patient population can truly 
be regarded as ‘lay’ has been reviewed by Shaw (2002), who suggested that 
patients become experts over the course of their illness. Indeed, modern health 
policy encourages the development of the ‘expert patient’ (Department of 
Health 2001). Although sampling randomly from a general practice population, 
which excluded cancer patients, might have generated a useful sample and with 
hindsight would have eased the sampling process, it was felt that it may 
compromise the ‘lay’ aspect of the study. Distance from mainstream health 
professionals and healthcare providers, was important. Moreover, the study 
aimed to access community views, if these were present. A general practice 
sample, though located in a geographical community would not guarantee 
people with a sense of community. By sampling through community groups like 
churches, tenants associations, community councils and leisure based groups, 
study participants had social networks that included others from their local 
communities. Groups with a health focus were deliberately avoided, again to 
distance the study from ‘healthcare’ and those with a particular interest in 
health.  
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Sampling via community groups however was challenging, particularly in the 
deprived community. A wide range of organisations were contacted in both areas 
but few agreed to participate. As outlined in Chapter 6 on methodological design 
the original target was to carry out 40 interviews, 20 in each community. 
Unfortunately this was not met after extensive efforts to bolster numbers. A 
total of 31 interviews were undertaken.  
 In an age where a wealth of health information is available to the general public 
and is constantly increasing, achieving a genuinely lay viewpoint is unlikely, or 
arguably undesirable. If study participants were truly blank slates they would 
have had little to offer. Often the patient perspective is assumed to be the lay 
view. Few studies aim to report an ‘ordinary’, but crucially, non-patient view. 
Many of those interviewed did possess what they described as a ‘close’ 
experience of cancer through that of a relative or friend and such proximity 
could potentially place them in an expert position. However, given the high 
incidence of cancer, recruiting a sample that had no such proximity, might be 
problematic. Indeed, it could be argued that this does reflect an ordinary or 
typical view. Any entirely self-selected sample is bound to attract those with an 
interest, irrespective of subject matter. It is worth noting however that one 
volunteer withdrew because on reflection she judged it best ‘not to talk about 
cancer’, not because it was upsetting but for more superstitious reasons. 
Admittedly, some may find cancer a distressing topic for a range of reasons. 
Other features of the sample are also worthy of mention. Although the ages of 
the sample ranged from 25 to 83, most of those interviewed were in the 55–70 
age-group. While this allowed participants to offer insights into the changes they 
had witnessed in cancer outcomes over half a century, the study might have 
benefitted from the views of younger participants who may have normalised the 
more recent positive advances in cancer treatment and outcomes. Although 
small, the sample included both men and women.  
Participants were accessed via community groups in two communities in 
Glasgow, one affluent, one deprived. Due to the difficulties associated with 
sampling, interviews were undertaken almost consecutively, first in the affluent 
community and then the deprived. As an iterative method of interviewing was 
followed some of the issues raised in the earlier interviews were fed back only 
into the interviews in the deprived communities. It is not certain whether some 
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of the slight nuances between the two communities were simply an artefact of 
the interview process.  
11.3 Reflections on the research questions 
11.3.1 What are typical views of cancer?   
Although participants’ experiences of cancer varied widely, a number of typical 
views of cancer were expressed. Most commonly cancer was seen as something 
to be feared, a view which has been widely reported (Sontag 1978;; Herzlich & 
Pierret 1987; Patterson 1987; Scanlon et al 2006). Many of the study participants 
were able, because of their age, to reflect on how views of cancer had changed. 
While cancer was once the stigmatised ‘Big C’, rarely discussed and poorly 
understood, it now represented the possibility of a more hopeful outlook. 
Medical advances have precipitated a shift in metaphor. As both Lupton (1994) 
and later Ehrenriech (2009) have demonstrated the ‘hope’ and ‘positivity’ 
narratives now dominate the culture of cancer in an attempt to counteract the 
ever-present fear. This contradiction is reflected in these interviews. The data 
generated in interviews illustrate a largely superficial hope because cancer was 
represented by a handful of typical, less positive narratives. Principally, cancer 
equals tragedy. For some this held true even if the eventual outcome was 
positive. Often, though not always, tragedy was reserved for the young rather 
than old and most participants could give pertinent examples of tragic events as 
evidence. Cancer in older adults was viewed with more ambivalence. This 
echoes findings in Emslie, Hunt and Watt’s (2001a) work where similar views 
were expressed about CHD in the elderly. In their study CHD was thought to be a 
relatively quick and painless death, and viewed by some as the ‘way I’d like to 
go’. This is not reflected in discussions about cancer, where the two key disease 
experiences were either a long, drawn out suffering, or a quick and sudden 
shock. Cancer has two important facets that set it apart from the typical view of 
CHD. First, cancer is not immediate even if it results in a relatively ‘quick’ 
death. Sufferers must confront their diagnosis. Second, cancer is believed to be 
painful. Although CHD is undoubtedly painful, it is immediate and assumed to be 
over in minutes. While shock could equally attend an unpredicted coronary 
event relatives are assured that their loved one was spared ‘suffering’. A further 
common cancer narrative was that of unpredictability. Indeed, the two typical 
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illness trajectories described for cancer serve to emphasise the unpredictable 
nature of the illness. In the ‘quick’ narrative a seemingly healthy person falls 
prey to cancer quickly, leading many to assume that they ‘had’ cancer ‘without 
knowing it’. Therefore it can strike at any point with symptoms arriving only 
‘near the end’. This adds to the supposition that cancer is ever-present in 
everyone simply waiting for an appropriate trigger. In the ‘long-drawn out’ 
narrative individuals are often reported to have lasted longer than predicted, so 
again cancer has even defied the professionals. Linked to this was the dread 
associated with recurrence. Many participants knew of cases where patients 
were apparently cured only for a ‘quick’ recurrence to ensue. While it was 
widely accepted that ‘cures’ were possible, this was thought unlikely in the 
event of a recurrence. Yet there was no sense of the recurrence being 
predicted. Even in positive stories the unpredictableness of cancer is discussed. 
Surviving in spite of bleak prognoses was equally random. Participants often 
stressed the uncertainty that came with cancer. Arguably this was a novel 
experience for those that had grown-up in a climate where cancer meant certain 
death. The uncertainty produced by advances in treatments resonates with 
Comaroff et al’s (1982) work on childhood cancer. They demonstrated that it is 
the lack of certainty that is most challenging for families and that the hope 
narrative, a consequence of improvements in survival, augmented rather than 
ameliorated distress. They claimed that those questions that remain 
unanswered, however small in the context of advances, are more frightening by 
virtue of their unfathomableness.   
As well as being unpredictable cancer is also assumed to be common, with an 
ever-increasing incidence. This perception reflects epidemiological reality. As 
many as three in five of us will suffer some form of cancer and incidence is 
increasing. However, much of the epidemiological reality can be attributed to a 
growing ageing population. As already noted cancer is assumed to be tragic but 
only in young people, and it was rarely described by participants as a disease of 
older people. One participant believed that cancer was as common as the  cold, 
another referred to it as an epidemic. Both metaphors portray the widespread 
fear of cancer. Epidemic, in particular, conjures images of a disease out of 
control, while curing the cold has long defied experts.  
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These typical cancer stories are told in common cancer talk. Many of the 
familiar metaphors associated with the disease appear liberally throughout the 
interviews. In particular military metaphors were used frequently. More striking 
was the way in which cancer patients were discussed. The particular importance 
of maintaining a positive outlook throughout was raised repeatedly. This cancer 
language also incorporates expert jargon about treatments and outcomes. While 
Armstrong & Murphy (2008) reported that their participants deftly intertwined 
lay and expert terms throughout their interviews, theirs was a patient 
population. Participants in this study, like those in Emslie, Hunt and Watt’s 
(2001a) study, used lay and expert terms interchangeably when discussing 
disease.  
As well as typical views about how cancer presented and progressed, there were 
also typical views about cancer aetiology. Participants were clear that cancer 
was a disease with many different causes. Behavioural risk factors were 
invariably the first to be mentioned, specifically smoking. Smoking was the only 
behaviour discussed in all interviews. Beyond that, understanding about risk 
factors was haphazard. Only a handful of participants could be regarded as very 
well informed about the various behavioural risk factors linked with cancer. 
Instead most possessed a view of what constituted healthy or unhealthy 
lifestyles, and presumed that unhealthy behaviours were linked with cancer.  
This applied more to diet and alcohol consumption and less to physical activity. 
Balance was central to the maintenance of a healthy lifestyle and many stressed 
that excess, either of good or bad behaviours, was unhealthy. None of the 
participants were wedded to the idea that behaviour alone, with the exception 
of smoking, could explain cancer causality. Many of the widely reported 
controversial risk factors like pollution, power lines, chemicals and pesticides 
and mobile phones were introduced. All were regarded sceptically and cancer 
clusters were largely dismissed. Yet, despite scepticism of individual agents 
there was the sense that cancer was a ‘modern’ disease and though none of 
these elements alone could offer aetiological explanations, together, these 
modern phenomena could be at least partly responsible. Invoking modernity as a 
catch-all explanation is found in many studies of health beliefs in diverse social 
groups (Herzlich 1973; MacFarlane & Kelleher 2002; Scanlon et al 2006; Salant & 
Gehler 2008).  
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What is interesting is that participants held a contradictory view of history. 
Initially they talked about the Big C and the stigma associated with cancer which 
referred back to a time when cancer was rarely talked about even within 
families. Cancer was feared because it was poorly understood, and crucially 
people were unsure of its cause. It was evident in the interviews that changing 
attitudes towards cancer were welcomed and none of the participants were 
wistful for a return to such times. Yet the advent of openness and freely 
available information brings uncertainty. There are more cases available to 
discuss, many more reported risk factors but few definite causal explanations. 
Many of these apparent risk factors are features of modern living, so many 
participants were wistful for the return to a purer life, where cancer had fewer 
opportunities to develop. Instead of isolating individual risk factors participants 
talked about risk more holistically. Often this was expressed as an unhealthy 
lifestyle, but often this extended to an unhealthy way of life. This confirms 
Herzlich’s (1973) early work where city-dwellers assumed that life in the 
countryside was more health-giving and Salant & Gehler (2008) conclusion that 
participants were nostalgic for a time that was thought to be risk free. What 
these studies have in common, including this one, is the identification of modern 
dangers, which went beyond unhealthy behaviours and extended to stress, 
pesticides, convenience foods, and pollution. The perceived risks associated 
with all of these dangers, not individually, but in totality, leads to the link 
between cancer and modernity. Essentially the benefits associated with 
modernity - scientific advances, and improvements in survival - must be offset 
against its inherent dangers.  
 
This study did uncover typical views about cancer. Despite medical advances 
cancer continues to induce fear, principally because it remains uncertain and 
unpredictable. From this perspective it inhabits very different ground when 
compared to CHD. CHD has been found to be linked with a ‘good’ death and 
cancer is in direct opposition to this. Much of the uncertainty associated with 
cancer generally is a result of continued uncertainty about causality. Smoking is 
the exception which was rarely doubted as an important factor. Other risks were 
less well understood but there was a tendency to resort to a more holistic view 
of causality that placed modern living at the centre of aetiological explanations. 
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11.3.2  How important are personal, social, cultural, biomedical 
and environmental factors in the formulation of beliefs 
about cancer and cancer risk?  
The data generated in this study shows that information is gathered from a 
variety of sources, including personal and social networks, health education and 
the media. Personal experience is clearly important. This is axiomatic. Direct 
experience provides evidence for stories and participants in this sample used 
stories to illustrate their expressed beliefs. Proximity to cancer was highlighted 
as an important marker for the levels of detail offered by participants’ cancer 
narratives. Equally though, distant proximity provided narratives from wider 
social networks that could have lasting impressions on beliefs about cancer and 
explanatory models. Much of the literature on health beliefs suggests that health 
is only confronted when problems arise but people naturally talk about others’ 
events and problems. This talk also provides material to feed into explanatory 
models and participants frequently describe this process. Moreover, they show 
that the models are dynamic and updated in light of new evidence. Social 
networks though, like the media have a tendency to focus on the newsworthy 
and the tragic, and it is this type of narrative that remains in the memory. These 
are also the stories that are likely to be passed on, making the lay observer akin 
to a tabloid journalist, rather than an epidemiologist, in this context.  
It is clear from this study that cancer has a strong cultural resonance. Just as 
Davison found that talk about CHD was easily recognisable and familiar, the 
same is true of cancer. Arguably though the two are represented by quite 
different cultures and this has consequences for the way in which each disease is 
understood. Personal, social and cultural tragedies are talked about amongst 
families, work groups and in the media. One need only think about the case of 
Jade Goody to see how cancer can be dealt with in the media and irrespective of 
the effect of that episode on attitudes to cervical screening and uptake 
(Metcalfe, Price & Powell 2010) it was likely to provide cervical cancer with the 
more publicity than any health promotion activity. Although Jade Goody’s death 
happened after the interview process in this study, it was evident that media 
stories had a far reaching impact. For participants in this sample, passive 
smoking was synonymous with Roy Castle, so much so that stories similar to his, 
of working in smoky environments, privided explanations for familial cancers. 
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There can be no doubt that the media have a key role in shaping and sustaining 
the cultural position of cancer. A useful example is the understanding of the role 
of genetics in cancer. Henderson and Kitzinger (1999) attributed the over-
estimation of the genetic element in breast cancer by women in their study to 
the way in which the media covered the subject. Coverage can distort the image 
of the ‘everyday’ experience of cancer. As was shown in Chapter 3, while once 
the American Cancer Society attempted to persuade the US public that cancer 
was not a disease associated with old age they have in essence become victims 
of the success of this campaign. Many awareness studies highlight the failure of 
the public to make links between cancer and ageing (Breslow et al 1997; Paul et 
al 1999; McCaffrey, Wardle and Waller 2003; Keighleyet al 2004). Many different 
narratives were offered in these interviews, and most referred to older people, 
yet age was rarely mentioned as an important risk factor.  
Biomedicine provides the backdrop for the understanding of cancer. Germs, 
cells, and the biology of cancer are well recognised. As well as an understanding 
of the biology of cancer, biomedicine also plays another key role. The 
association between cancer and genes was important and this was understood in 
two distinct ways. First the idea of heredity was common and there was 
widespread recognition about the links between breast, ovarian and colorectal 
cancer and familial genes. Although previous studies have pointed to the over-
estimation of genetic factors and familial risk amongst women, this was not the 
case here. A number of women in this study were clear that there were different 
types of breast cancer and their risk was not heightened by virtue of their 
familial experience. However there was a belief, expressed by many in this study 
that cancer families could be identified. This echoes other work in the west of 
Scotland and the UK that reported the identification of disease specific families 
(Emslie, Hunt & Watt 2001a; Scanlon et al 2006). In this study, this was more 
likely to occur among those who thought they did not have cancer in their 
‘family’. The explanations for this are likely to be twofold. First, those in 
‘cancer families’ were more likely to have paid close attention to their risk 
estimation in light of this information and so were simply better informed about 
the reality of genetics. Second, placing oneself at risk was challenging and 
having no cancer in the family provided much needed distance. Genetic 
understandings extended beyond familial links, however. The frequency with 
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which participants expressed the view that cancer takes the form of a faulty 
gene that can be activated by varied factors was unexpected. The language used 
differed by participant but they were essentially referring to the same concept. 
It is worth noting that some participants believed that not everyone was born 
with the gene. Regardless, the presence of a dormant gene that can ‘trigger’ 
cancer at any point provides a convenient catch-all aetiological explanation. It is 
essentially a quasi-scientific reworking of luck. Many studies have previously 
found versions of what is essentially the same aetiological explanation (Cornwell 
1984; Calnan 1987; Mullen 1994; Scanlon 2006  
The way in which ordinary views of causality and risk are expressed is important. 
Rather than talking about risk factors in a biomedical manner, participants 
tended to discuss all risk factors in terms of ‘causes’. For example, it was not 
uncommon to say ‘everything causes cancer’, or ‘mobile phones cause cancer’. 
Although this distinction may seem semantic it is important in the context of lay 
epidemiology. Risks are based on probability, while cause is definite. According 
to lay epidemiology, risk estimation is based on observation, and the implication 
of that is that the lay public are likely to remain unsure about the validity of 
risks that have not, for them, made the transition, via observation, to cause. So 
it is clear that most people will unreservedly accept the risks associated with 
smoking because most people will have known someone who smoked and died of 
a smoking related cancer. It is easy therefore to establish cause, and 
consequently accept risk.  
 
11.3.3  Does lay epidemiology offer an aid to our understanding of 
beliefs about cancer and cancer risk?  
At its most basic level the lay epidemiology model describes the way that 
individuals gather and reorder information to arrive at their own explanatory 
model, and estimate risk. Clearly participants in this study dealt with 
information in much the same way as described by Davison and colleagues with 
reference to CHD. Throughout the interviews participants talked about the 
development of their explanatory models. Those events in the family had most 
resonance but some explicitly talked about seeking out information in response 
to family events. Others talked at length about the examples of individuals in 
their wider social circles and the media. Often all of these layers of information 
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were included in one story. So both proximity and distant proximity were 
important which confirms the method of data synthesis described in the original 
lay epidemiology model.  
Davison is not explicit about the fixedness of beliefs about CHD. Coronary 
candidacy is so successful because of a universal acceptance of CHD risk factors 
that have remained unchanged. Information about cancer, partly because of its 
multisite and multi-causal nature, gives the impression of being ever changing. 
This flux is reflected in ordinary explanatory models. Participants in this study 
describe models that adapt to incorporate new material and evidence. Indeed, 
because cancer is a multi-site and multi-causal disease it demands more from its 
explanatory model. Each individual model, while holding typical information, is 
nuanced to reflect personal experience. Though this is likely to be true of CHD 
the potential for a convoluted model is enhanced with cancer. It could be 
argued that just as Davison’s model demonstrated the sophistication of ordinary 
views, the findings from this study highlight both the sophistication and 
complexity demanded of the lay epidemiologist when arriving at an explanatory 
model of cancer. 
How beliefs are formed and developed is only one element of lay epidemiology. 
Candidacy, anomalous deaths and unwarranted survivals are vital to the 
operation of the model. These will now be looked at in turn. 
 
11.3.3.1  Is there any notion of candidacy in relation to cancer? 
Davison described candidacy as the ‘cultural mechanism’ that allowed 
estimations of risk to be operationalised. As such, the candidacy model relied on 
CHD having a strong and familiar culture. It clearly does. Many studies (Preston 
1997; Wiles 1998;Emslie, Hunt & Watt 2001a; Frich et al 2007; Weiner 2009) 
have shown that a strong recognisable candidate apparent in beliefs about CHD. 
Emslie, Hunt and Watt (2001b) demonstrated that women were missing from the 
model, and Ruston and Clayton showed that women underestimated their risk 
because they assumed that only men were coronary candidates. All of this 
confirms what Weiner (2009) described as the ‘tenacity’ of the coronary 
candidate.  
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Cancer too has, as this study reflects, a strong cultural base and a common talk. 
Yet it is precisely this culture that may impede the identification of a cancer 
candidate. There are areas where candidacy is strong. Smokers were cancer 
candidates. Much like the discussion of CHD sufferers’ physical stature, smoking 
status was central to any discussion of cancer candidacy, though smoking does 
not provide an immediate visual cue. Leaving smokers aside, are there other 
cancer candidates? 
 
Within the original lay epidemiology model, although the coronary candidate was 
easily recognisable, Davison identified four different types of candidacy. 
Candidacy could be either retrospective or prospective and could be applied to 
oneself and to others. The strongest and most successful application was 
retrospective candidacy applied to others. A similar pattern emerges for cancer. 
Davison described candidacy as a ‘wide’ concept which was applied by 
scrutinising well-known risks and arriving at the most appropriate explanation. 
Such a discreet risk profile is not so well-known or recognised for cancer, so with 
the exception of smokers, endless possibilities combine to make the cancer 
candidate. In their study of candidacy and cholesterol, Clarke, Crotty, & Pearson 
(1997) found that their participants recognised a series of candidacy profiles 
that included an array of risk factors but the cohort failed to settle on one 
universal profile. Physical stature was included in all profiles. Smoking status 
was likewise consistent in the cancer candidacy profile, but unlike Davison or 
Clarke, Crotty & Pearson cancer candidacy profiles were not reached.  
Using the candidacy model to assess the future risk of cancer was challenging for 
participants in this study. There are a number of possible reasons for this. First, 
cancer risk profiles are not familiar enough, with the exception of smoking. More 
importantly, as one participant stated ‘you just don’t talk about cancer in that 
way’. Again this is testament to the different cultural understandings of cancer 
and CHD in our society. Davison acknowledged that the term ‘candidacy’ itself 
may be problematic. Candidate is associated with elections, and to bestow 
candidacy on someone or oneself is to ‘put forward’, so essentially candidacy 
refers to nomination. You are proverbially throwing your hat (or in this case 
someone else’s) in the ring. As Emslie, Hunt and Watt (2001a) demonstrated in 
their west of Scotland study, many of the participants reported that a quick 
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painless CHD event was their preferred ‘way to go’, no such parallel is drawn 
with cancer. Participants in this study were not comfortable ‘singling out’ those 
that might get cancer. Cancer is not a disease that you would wish for yourself 
or anyone else. Though, as already stated smokers were readily identified as 
candidates, as were those who were ‘sun worshippers’. Arguably, the risks of 
both behaviours are so well documented that by continuing to participate in 
them smokers or sun worshippers are nominating themselves. Personal 
culpability is easily introduced into the candidacy model. It has long been 
established that the public separate disease into those in which sufferers are 
thought largely blameless and those which could be avoided if certain 
behavioural regimes were adhered to. Blaxter (1979) and later Cornwell (1984) 
found that some cancers were judged blameless, with the exception of lung 
cancer, where blame was apportioned to the sufferer. Davison suggested that it 
was ‘common currency’ that CHD was preventable through ‘good’ behaviour. 
Smoking was strongly believed to be a basis for candidacy, and although some in 
this study were keen to emphasise distance between smoking and cancer, no one 
denied the very clear links. Nevertheless, participants in this study seemed 
uncomfortable predicting the probability of future illness in those who in 
essence got ill ‘though no fault of their own’. The corollary of this position is 
that candidacy raises fewer challenges when sufferers, or likely sufferers, are 
thought wholly responsible. The idea of highlighting someone as a candidate for 
a dread disease, particularly one that they are believed to have no control over, 
feels unethical. Indeed, perhaps reticence is experienced when making such 
judgements because candidacy could apply equally to the judge as well as the 
judged. Candidacy may not therefore be an entirely useful concept when 
considering beliefs about all cancers.  
11.3.3.2 To what extent are anomalous deaths and unwarranted 
survivals employed?  
Candidacy’s failure to be as salient for cancer as CHD has obvious implications 
for anomalous deaths and unwarranted survivals. Given that smoking was seen as 
the primary risk factor, then most cancer deaths among non-smokers were 
anomalous. Indeed, even among some of the smokers, death was judged 
anomalous because the individual was thought to be otherwise ‘healthy’. 
Candidacy for CHD was reached first by considering physical stature. Thereafter, 
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a wide spectrum of behaviours, for instance, too much, or too little exercise, 
were taken into account. Chapter 10 suggests that candidacy for cancer is 
similarly wide, especially if faulty genes that merely require triggers for 
activation are present. In this respect, everyone is at risk of, or a candidate for, 
cancer. Yet most stories were presented as anomalies. Therefore, the 
difficulties associated with establishing candidacy for cancer serve to increase 
the profile and number of anomalous deaths. Moral judgements were implicit in 
many of these narratives. These were ‘healthy’ people who did not deserve 
cancer, rather than cancer candidates. Only true candidates, by virtue of their 
behaviour were deserving of that label.  
Much less common in this study was the evocation of ‘unwarranted survivals’. In 
Davison’s study this typical ‘Uncle Norman’ stereotype was introduced in 
humorous tones, and on the few occasions they were talked about in these 
interviews a similar humour and fondness was employed. However, this was an 
area of difference between the affluent and deprived community. Some in the 
affluent community, when talking about unwarranted survivors, stressed their 
uniqueness would not be borne out in statistics, others were generally 
disparaging. They discussed such individuals in terms of ‘lucky fools’.  
11.3.4 Do lay explanations view cancer as a homogenous disease 
or multi-site and multi-causal? 
Much of the health beliefs literature reviewed in Chapter 2 found that cancer, in 
generic terms, was a feared disease. Rarely did this specify a cancer site. This 
study set out to explore whether cancer was typically thought of as one 
homogenous disease. Most participants talked about cancer as a generic disease, 
though admittedly it was first introduced into interviews as a homogenous 
disease. Early in narratives the catch-all label of cancer was offered and only on 
probing was the site, if it was known, disclosed. There were notable exceptions. 
One was breast cancer which was always given its full title, and it is likely that 
this reflects the media attention received by breast cancer (Gottlieb 2001). The 
other was non-smoking related lung cancer, which reflects the desire to distance 
the lung cancer sufferer from personal responsibility. The stigma attached to 
lung cancer has been previously observed (Chapple, Ziebland & McPherson 2004) 
and this too was found this study. Despite being the most common cancer, lung 
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cancer was rarely discussed. Biologically, cancer was seen as the one disease 
that affected different parts of the body, though a handful of participants made 
distinctions between leukaemia and other cancers. Cancer was seen as 
multicausal, even if these causes were poorly understood. Smoking was typically 
associated with all cancer sites. Often links between site and cause were made 
during the course of the interview and this was typically a commonsense view, 
for example, many assumed that diet and gastrointestinal cancers were linked. 
Proximity to cancer was influential here. Participants that had sought out 
information on specific cancer sites had an understanding of appropriate risk 
factors but this related directly to experience. This concurs with the idea of 
availability heuristics (Sanders et al 2007) because people draw on their direct 
experience to evidence their views.  
11.3.5 Are there differences between beliefs in deprived and 
affluent communities?  
Only subtle differences were found between those living in deprived and affluent 
communities. Views and experiences were similar across communities and often 
the key difference was the way in which thoughts were articulated. Proximity to 
cancer was the most important factor in levels of awareness, which were 
individually framed. Generally those in affluent communities had closer 
proximity to cancer and from that perspective appeared to have greater 
awareness. However, if a participant from a deprived community had close 
proximity, their level of awareness was similar to that of a participant with 
similar proximity in the affluent community and vice versa. It was the case 
though that those in the deprived communities were more likely to question the 
absolute risks associated with smoking, but more of them smoked or had 
smoked. Similarly those in deprived communities were more likely to suggest 
that cancer may have been caused by a faulty gene that required a trigger to 
activate it. However those in deprived communities were no more fatalistic as a 
consequence. In affluent communities the randomness associated with cancer 
was more likely to be introduced than the faulty gene theory. Arguably these 
concepts have a similar root. Both provide an explanation for the unexplainable 
but are expressed in different ways and far from being irrational, the trigger 
explanation is, in the context of cancer genes, a more rational response.  
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Given that risk behaviours are socially patterned (Wardle et al 2003), it may 
have been fair to suppose poorer overall awareness in the deprived 
communities. This was not the case. Awareness was highest among those 
participants that had experienced a close and anomalous cancer. None of the 
participants in the deprived community fitted this profile. Moreover, because 
the cancer disease experience is similarly socially patterned (Coleman et al 
2004; Faggiano et al 1997; Shack et al 2007) and lay epidemiology claimed that 
community events were important, more differences might have been expected. 
If epidemiological patterns are used as a guide then those in affluent 
communities should have fewer observable cancer events on which to draw, and 
those observable events should have better outcomes than those in deprived 
communities. This epidemiological reality was not reflected in the interview 
findings. 
11.4 Further reflections 
11.4.1 Explanatory models 
This study provides a clear insight into the way that people talk about disease. 
The idea that people seek explanatory models for illness (Kleinman 1980) and 
draw on a repertoire of beliefs to inform that model (Chrisman 1989) is not new. 
Yet, these studies focused on the reactions of patients and how they made sense 
of an illness. What this study adds is that ordinary, non-patient views of health 
are formulated in the same way and narratives of others – whether close or 
distant – are borrowed to fill that repertoire. Granted, Davison’s lay 
epidemiology described the process of information gathering from numerous 
sources which are then combined to form an explanatory model. The original 
description suggested a static model. It may be that our understandings of the 
risks connected with CHD do not change and so the explanatory model is fixed. 
More is demanded when arriving at an explanatory model of cancer. It is likely 
that explanatory models will hold only until the next case is observed. Each new 
case is fed into a dynamic explanatory framework. The findings of this study 
capture the elaborate and highly developed nature of explanatory models of 
cancer.   
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11.4.2 Prevention paradox & fatalism 
Lay epidemiology went beyond a description of the formulation of beliefs and 
the mechanism for risk estimation. Davison was clear that the concept could 
explain some of the shortcomings of health promotion. Davison demonstrated 
that the participants in the south Wales study had adopted many of the 
messages about CHD risk put forward by mainstream health promotion. Health 
promotion implements strategies at a population level. The population approach 
adopted by health promotion requires everyone to make behavioural changes in 
order to achieve even a slight benefit. However, in so doing, risk thresholds 
become lower and consequently many more people are now ‘high risk’. The 
distribution of CHD events will continue to fall out with the high risk group, so 
more among the high risk group will survive. Such observations lead, according 
to Davison, to rational questions about the extent to which behaviours are 
genuinely ‘risky’. Although candidates will succumb to CHD and non-candidates 
will not, the reverse is also true and it is this recognition that challenges health 
promotion. From the same data, Davison introduced the ideas of ‘fatalism’ and 
contended that fatalism, in all its forms, provides a reasonable explanation for 
an anomalous CHD event. Nowhere did Davison hint that fatalism challenged 
candidacy. Rather it appears that fatalism is as influential as candidacy in 
explaining CHD events: 
“Accounting for the randomness and scatter that exist around the 
epidemiological trends is not a central issue for public health 
professionals. Rather, they deal with the trends themselves and 
concern themselves with taking action directed at amending a 
probabilistic future. Popular health culture on the other hand, 
cannot turn its back on any illness or death. Those which violate 
general principles must also be explained. It is within this context 
that an ethnography of fatalism is important, as it seeks to throw 
light on the cultural structures within which common, but apparently 
anomalous, events can be accommodated.” (Davsion, Frankel & Davey 
Smith1992:101) 
It seems then that for Davison candidacy holds steady, even when challenged by 
anomalies. Hunt and Emslie (2001) countered that those anomalies, particularly 
within the family, ‘deconstruct’ candidacy. Family events will be most 
influential and have the power to transform, rather than confirm, candidacy. 
The findings of this study show that these positions are not mutually exclusive. 
Naturally, a family experience of cancer is, as Hunt and Emslie suggested, more 
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than just an event that is fed back into an overall explanatory model of cancer. 
However, the event need not necessarily challenge candidacy. For example, if a 
case was described as anomalous by virtue of an apparently ‘healthy’ lifestyle of 
the sufferer, a re-evaluation of what constituted ‘unhealthy’ does not 
necessarily follow. Rather, as Davison stated, this anomaly emphasised the hand 
of fate. Certainly, knowing smokers who did not have cancer and cancer 
sufferers that had never smoked did not lead participants in this study to 
deconstruct the candidacy of smokers. Hunt and Emslie also suggest that 
uniquely rich information, which cannot be gathered from distant or fictional 
sources, is only available in the family setting. This insight, they contended, 
provides family members with the ability to be lay anthropologists rather than 
epidemiologists: 
“The emphasis is not on isolating risk factors, but on contextualising, 
qualifying or even rejecting previously accepted risk factors or 
aetiological theories in the face of contrary personal experience. 
(Hunt & Emslie 2001:445) 
Yet Davison made provision for this in two key ways. First, by stressing that the 
lay public see the fallibility of candidacy and second, by stressing the 
importance of fate. Although candidacy is not as powerful for cancer as it is for 
CHD both the fallibility of mainstream explanations and fate were often 
introduced in relation to known cases in this study.  
Like Davison, Hunt and Emslie made a plea for health promotion to take 
cognisance of lay theories of health behaviour and consider motivations for 
behavioural change. The problems associated with the prevention paradox for 
health promotion were outlined by Davison many times and are echoed by Hunt 
and Emslie. Yet, Davison conceded when discussing fatalism that throughout the 
course of the ethnography in Wales he rarely found a participant that thought 
adopting healthy lifestyles were rendered hopeless because of fatalism. This is 
echoed in this study. Many of the participants, often as a result of anomalous 
family situations, had re-evaluated their beliefs and arrived at fatalistic 
explanations for cancer. There was widespread agreement that risk could not be 
eradicated but it could potentially be reduced by adopting healthier lifestyles.  
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11.4.3 Morality 
This study adds to the body of work that demonstrates health is a profoundly 
moral construct. The studies included in Chapter 2, primarily those of Blaxter 
(1982) and Cornwell (1984), showed that inherent in discussions about health 
and causality were moral judgements. Both found that their participants were 
loath to attach culpability to individuals but also found that it was important to 
remain strong in response to disease. These studies were carried out at a time 
before the move to the ‘prevention’ model and the subsequent concentration on 
personal disease avoidance took hold (Davison, Frankel & Davey Smith 1992). 
This present study was conducted in a climate where personal responsibility for 
disease avoidance is an accepted cultural norm. Was this ideological shift 
evident in the interviews? Undoubtedly many of those interviewed were keen to 
demonstrate not only that they were aware of what constituted healthy choice 
but also that they made the right choices. This echoes earlier findings by 
Crawford (1984). By outlining their good behaviour they were inhabiting what 
they see as an appropriate moral position.  
Many were reluctant to label ‘cancer candidates’ with the expectation of 
smokers, perhaps because they felt that it was morally unacceptable. Yet while 
explicit candidacy models were shied away from most participants had little 
difficulty separating good from bad behaviours, and sometimes implicit in these 
conversations was the moral status of those engaging in such behaviours. 
Sometimes the judgements were explicit. Often the idea of ‘deserving’ or more 
pertinently ‘not deserving’ cancer came up. This is recognisable as everyday  
cancer talk. In this study children were thought not to deserve cancer, and few 
could explain causality in children. The potential culpability of mothers was 
introduced, however. So although Clow (2001) rejected the strength of the 
stigma related to cancer some of the participants in this study made critical and 
quick judgements about culpability.  
11.4.4 Smoking 
Smoking had a special significance in this study. It was the most widely accepted 
cause of cancer, and smokers were clearly identified as candidates. However it 
was clear that the absolute risks of smoking depicted in health promotion 
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materials introduced questions in the minds of some participants. If some people 
can smoke and remain disease free, why not all? The difficulty of course is the 
certainty with which the message is portrayed, as Davison pointed out. Changing 
attitudes to smoking are evident throughout the interviews and, particularly in 
the affluent area, participants were eager to excuse the smoking of relatives or 
emphasise their ‘trade-off’ with good behaviours. Backett (1992a) similarly 
concluded that good and bad behaviours are balanced or off set to provide a 
holistic model of a healthy lifestyle. As well as smokers themselves, relatives of 
smokers were equally keen to make allowances for their loved ones and on a 
number of occasions deny the role of smoking in causality.   
 
11.4.5  Age 
Participants were asked to consider whether the cancer patients they knew had 
anything in common. Generally, they concluded that they did not but in reality 
what they often had in common was age. Many participants displayed an 
interesting attitude to cancer and age. Although many assumed that age was a 
risk factor for cancer, this was expressed as a commonsense view rather than 
knowledge gathered from ‘expert’ sources. Instead cancer was viewed almost as 
a by-product of ageing and it was not uncommon for participants to state that 
‘you have to die of something’. The typical narratives of tragedy and suffering 
did not apply to cancer in the elderly. Suffering was not thought to be as severe 
when the person is older and the disease is not likely to be as aggressive. 
Participants believed that this was because cells were thought to be ‘healthier’ 
in young people and therefore multiplied more quickly The ageing process, 
characterised by the body slowing down, is also applied to biology. Indeed 
cancer was not viewed as quite the killer in the elderly. Nevertheless, despite 
the relative indifference towards cancer in the elderly, it was often thought 
unwise to inform older people of cancer diagnoses. This may be a hangover from 
the stigma once attached to cancer.  
 
11.5 Chapter Summary  
This chapter reflected on the study’s original research questions and offered 
some additional reflections on other notable findings.  The next, and final, 
chapter will summarise the main findings from the study and reach some 
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conclusions before going on to suggest how these findings might usefully be 
developed in a future research agenda.
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12. Summary & Conclusions  
The aim of this study was to explore the utility of the lay epidemiology model 
when reflecting on ordinary beliefs about cancer. Originally the concept was 
developed by Davison and colleagues using data from an ethnographic study 
carried out in South Wales in the late 1980s. The communities involved in the 
study had recently been subject to a series of health educating activities that 
sought to highlight the risk factors associated with coronary heart disease (CHD). 
What emerged form the ethnography was a clear recognition of a ‘coronary 
candidate’ that was, according to Davison, a cultural mechanism that allowed an 
estimation of CHD risk. Candidacy however was fallible and this was illustrated 
by the identification of both anomalous deaths and unwarranted survivals.  In 
the face of uncertain aetiology participants in South Wales turned to fatalistic 
explanations like luck to account for irregular events. This rational and logical 
estimation of risk, it was suggested, might help explain the failure for the public 
to wholeheartedly embrace lifestyle change. Davison evoked Geoffrey Rose’s 
prevention paradox which questioned the wisdom of adopting a population 
strategy to health promotion. The approach, while yielding benefits at a 
population level, will mean little for the individual. Indeed, in changing the 
boundaries of risk the numbers thought to be high risk increased but CHD events 
continue to occur more frequently out with the high risk group. Consequently, 
the lay public observe increased numbers of both anomalous deaths and 
unwarranted survivals.  
At its most fundamental, lay epidemiology describes a method of information 
gathering that incorporates evidence from wide sources. The immediate family, 
wider family, social networks, the general public, and the media all contribute 
to the development of an explanatory model of CHD. The same is true of cancer. 
Participants in this study arrived at an explanatory model of cancer by drawing 
together a varied set of narratives that gave them an individually tailored 
evidence base. A model that is ever-changing to incorporate new evidence is 
described. 
Central to Davison’s notion of lay epidemiology was the ‘coronary candidate’ 
that allowed an estimation of risk. Candidacy could be applied prospectively, 
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but was more successful retrospectively. The examples Davison offers to 
illustrate coronary candidacy are powerful and are familiar evocations of 
everyday CHD talk. Cancer talk was equally familiar and discussed via a few 
typical narratives. These narratives are no less culturally embedded but the 
culture is dramatically different. The review of literature in this thesis has 
shown that CHD inhabits a unique cultural position. It is a disease that attracts 
little fear or dread in the public psyche and has been identified as representing 
a good, and crucially, quick death (Emslie, Hunt & Watt 2001a). Cancer is the 
antithesis of CHD. The findings from this study confirm the literature that has 
focused on the culture of cancer and shows that it is a disease commonly linked 
with uncertainty, tragedy and fear (Sontag 1978; Patterson 1987; Scanlon et al 
2006). These cultural differences have significant implications for the 
applicability of lay epidemiology to cancer.  
The dreaded nature of cancer meant that often participants in this study were 
reluctant to attach cancer candidacy labels. Smokers were the notable 
exceptions to this. Like physical stature in Davison’s study, smoking status was 
the first factor to be offered as explanation and the only risk factor that acted 
as a possible predictor of future candidacy. Other than smoking, risk factors for 
cancer were not universally recognised. Coronary candidacy is successful 
because the risk factors for CHD are well understood by the lay public. The same 
is not true for cancer and so candidacy is bound to be undermined. Without 
clarity around risk factors the scope for observing anomalous deaths is 
broadened, and ultimately this challenges candidacy. 
As well as being culturally different, cancer and CHD are very different diseases. 
The ease with which the lay public recognise the mechanistic biomedical origins 
of CHD was documented by Davison and others (Emslie, Hunt & Watt 2001a). 
Cancer is multisite and multi-causal. This study set out to establish whether the 
lay public thought of cancer as a homogenous disease. Cancer is talked about in 
generic terms, though site-specific details were provided in more in-depth 
narratives. Cancer though is looked upon as one disease that affects different 
parts of the body, rather than as an umbrella term for a group of diseases. 
Participants’ interpretation did not capture the complexity of cancer. The lack 
of simplicity contributes to the weakness of cancer candidacy 
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It might be argued that such stark biomedical differences between cancer and 
CHD indicate that any attempt to explore lay epidemiology in the context of 
cancer, and especially generic cancer,  was fruitless from the outset. While a 
study of lung cancer candidacy would undoubtedly have found clear links with 
smoking, any other cancer, taken in isolation might have had similar struggles. 
One of the few studies that took Davison’s original model as its starting point 
considered lay epidemiology in the context of breast cancer, and concluded that 
a firm concept of breast cancer candidacy was equally illusive (Salant & Gehler 
2008).  
Davison supposed that the lay epidemiological method of arriving at risk, by 
utilising observed population data, tested health promotion. Others however 
have emphasised the differences between lay and mainstream epidemiology 
Hunt & Emslie (2001) proposed that events in the family will have most 
resonance and make more of a contribution to explanatory framework. They 
likened the information gathering and processing procedure to that of a 
qualitative researcher, who gains in-depth and more meaningful data.  The 
findings from this study support both Davison and Hunt and Emslie’s positions. 
Cancer is marked by tragedy and uncertainty. If such an event was apparent in a 
family, this was indeed central to the explanatory model. If, however, the only 
available data related to the cancer of an elderly relative – neither unexpected 
nor tragic – explanatory models were supplemented with distant anomalous and 
tragic cases. Tragic and unusual cases of cancer were more likely to be recalled 
and retold. So while the lay view of cancer may be formed by drawing on 
elements of epidemiology and qualitative research, they also utilise methods 
employed in the mass media. They tell stories that are worth telling. It should 
be stressed that the lack of certainty around risk factors for cancer, leaves 
plenty of space for tragedy and anomaly to emerge.   
12.1 What does this study add? 
This study adds to the scarce body of literature that considers lay views of 
cancer amongst the ordinary public. Dein (2004) highlighted that there was a 
dearth of such material in the UK. A more recent example by Scanlon et al 
(2006) that considered the cancer beliefs among the Irish population and the 
indigenous white population in the UK reports similar findings. In addition this 
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study augments the health beliefs literature and is unique in considering the 
applicability of lay epidemiology to cancer. It shows that cancer means 
something quite different to CHD and this difference suggests that the concept 
of candidacy is of limited use. However in arriving at that conclusion the study 
confirmed findings from other studies that show that risk factors for cancer, 
with the exception of smoking, are not universally recognised. This too 
challenges any notion of candidacy. Although Davison proposed that coronary 
candidacy posed problems for health educators, this study shows that the failure 
of candidacy is equally problematic for health promotion.  
12.2 Future Research 
As well as drawing on observation of known cases, candidacy models, for both 
CHD and cancer do encompass known risk factors. Although coronary candidacy 
was originally presented with negative undertones, and used to explain the 
shortcomings of health promotion, it may be beneficial to consider the potential 
of candidacy. As Davison outlined, lay beliefs incorporate scientific explanations 
for CHD and this study found that participants make clear links between smoking 
and cancer and indeed smokers were marked as the only cancer candidates. 
Despite Davison’s criticism of the simplicity of health promotion, such 
straightforward messages therefore appear to be effective in establishing 
candidacy, though guaranteeing subsequent changes in behaviour is more 
challenging. It is possible that candidacy could be encouraged, particularly in 
areas where risk is poorly understood, for example in relation to the risks 
between alcohol and cancer. Arguably, introducing ideas of personal culpability 
and moral responsibility may prove problematic. It may be more helpful to focus 
on areas separate from behaviour or individual actions, and re-establishing age 
as a risk factor for cancer may be an area where candidacy could be positively 
utilised.  
Candidacy has more recently been used in the context of access to health care 
(Dixon-Woods et al 2006). In a review of available evidence, the authors 
concluded that vulnerable groups often fail to see themselves as warrantable 
candidates for health care. The uptake of preventative care could be improved 
if candidacy was better established. Though Dixon-Woods explicitly states that 
this candidacy model is distinct from Davison’s coronary candidate, there are 
Chapter 12  222 
similarities in the concepts. Taken together the models may prove a useful tool 
for health educators. Davison’s concept of coronary candidacy relied heavily on 
the cultural understanding of CHD and this study also showed the importance 
and strength of cancer’s cultural resonance. There is a need to better 
understand the socio-cultural position of illness to better understand the 
perception of risk. A discussion of candidacy within high risk groups that focus on 
specific risk behaviours could form the basis of future health promotion 
activities. Obesity, for instance, is an area that might benefit from a greater 
understanding of risk perceptions which may in turn illuminate the reasons for 
the success or failure of interventions to tackle obesity.    Arguably both models 
need further exploration, but there is scope to harness the notion of candidacy 
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Appendix 2 Community Organisations  
New Kilpatrick Parish Church, Manse Rd, 
Bearsden 
Milngavie & Bearsden Camera Club 
Bearsden North Church, Thorn Rd, Bearsden Antonine Probus Club 
All Saints Scottish Episcopal Church, Drymen 
Rd, Bearsden 
Probus Club of Allander 
St  Andrew’s RC Church, Roman Rd, 
Bearsden 
Bearsden Literary Society 
Bearsden Baptist Church, Roman Rd, 
Bearsden 
Milngavie Library Reading Group 
St Serf’s Scottish Episcopal Church, 
Shettleston Rd 
Rotary Club of Allander 
Sandyhills Parish Church, Ballieston Rd Bearsden and Milngavie Philatelic 
Society 
St Paul’s Church , Shettleston Rd Bearsden and Milngavie Ramblers 
St Joseph’s Church, Fullarton Ave Bearsden East Community Council 
Carmyle Church of Scotland, Carmyle Ave Bearsden North Community Council 
Bearsden Art Club Bearsden West Community Council 
Bearsden and Milngavie Bridge Club Milngavie Community Council  
Antonine Bridge Club Local Councillors, Glasgow City 
Council 
Allander Indoor Bowling Club Local Councillors, East 
Dunbartonashire Council 
Bearsden Bowling Club East End Community Health 
Partnership 
Milngavie Bowling Club Milngavie Family History Society 
Bearsden Chess Club Kelvin Choir 
Bearsden Choir Milngavie Flower Club 
Bearsden Flower Club Bearsden Horticultural Society 
Bearsden Golf Club  Milngavie Golf Club 











I am a postgraduate student and am asking for your help in a student project. 
Cancer is a common disease and many of us will know someone who has or who 
has had cancer. I am interested in hearing about the general public’s views and 
beliefs about the disease how their life experience shapes these views.  
Taking part will involve an interview with me at a time and place convenient to 
you. You do not have to answer any questions you are uncomfortable with and 
can ask to stop the interview at any time.  
I would be extremely grateful if you agree to take part. If you are interested 
please contact me and we can talk a little more about the study. 
Thank you for taking the time to read this 
 
Sara Macdonald, General Practice & Primary Care, University of Glasgow, 1 
Horselethill Rd, Glasgow G12 9LX 











I obtained your contact details from the East Dumbartonshire Council website/ 
East End Community Health Partnership and  I am emailing you in your capacity 
as  xxxx  of the xxxxx.  
  
I am undertaking my PhD at the University of Glasgow and want to talk to people 
about their views about cancer.  I am looking to speak to people who have not 
had cancer themselves.  I wonder if this is something your members may be 
interested in?  If it would be helpful for me to come to speak to your group, 
please let me know and I will arrange to do that. I have attached a little more 
information but if you need anything further I'd be happy to discuss the study.  
  






Research Fellow  
  




Appendix 5 Participant Information 
 Sheet 
 
An exploration of lay beliefs about cancer 
 
 
‘You are being invited to take part in a research study.  Before you decide it is 
important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it 
will involve.  Please take time to read the following information carefully and 
discuss it with others if you wish.  Ask us if there is anything that is not clear 
or if you would like more information.  Take time to decide whether or not you 
wish to take part. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The study is being carried out as a student project by the researcher Sara 
Macdonald. She is interested in what the general public think about cancer. In 
particular she would like to know what you believe causes cancer, who is at 
risk of getting cancer and if some people are more likely to get the disease 
than others. She is also interested in experiences that might have affected 
your views.  
 
Why have I been chosen? 
You have been chosen at random. The researcher visited a number of groups 
and clubs in your area.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part.  If you decide to take 
part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.  
The information from the interview will be used as part of a postgraduate 
student project. All the information is anonymous and no information will be 
identifiable to yourself.  
 
What do I have to do? 
We are asking you to take part in an interview with our researcher.  She will 
ask you some questions about what you think about cancer, what you believe 
causes the disease and who is at risk. The interview will be taped if you agree 
to it.  This is so we can remember what you have said.  
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
There are no disadvantages to taking part, other than the time it will 
take you to complete the interview.  We estimate this to be about an 
hour.  You will be able to stop the interview at any time, and ask us to 
destroy the tape.   
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
You will receive no direct benefit from taking part in this study. The 
information collected during this study will help us to understand more about 
people’s beliefs about cancer.  
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
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The information collected during this study will be written up as a student 
project.  We may also prepare it for publication in academic journals.   
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
The study is being organised by Sara Macdonald as part of her postgraduate 
study. Sara is based in the Section of General Practice at the University of 
Glasgow. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
The project has been reviewed by the University of Glasgow Faculty of 
Medicine Ethics Committee. 
 
Contact for Further Information 
Further information can be obtained from: 
 
Ms Sara Macdonald, Section of General Practice and Primary Care, Division of 
Community Based Sciences, University of Glasgow, 1 Horselethill Road 





















Study title: An exploration of lay beliefs about cancer  
 
Name of Researcher: Sara Macdonald 
                                              
Please initial box  
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the 
study. . 
 
2. I understand that this interview will be audio-taped. Information from the 
diary and interviews will be treated with confidentiality and none of the 
information in my interview will be traceable back to me. 
 
3. I understand that all personal identifying data will held securely for a 
period of up to ten years. 
 
4. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time without giving any reason, without my medical care 
or legal rights being affected.  
 
5. I understand that data collected during the study will be used by 
researchers involved in the study and anonymised data may be archived 
and used in future research. 
 








Researcher  Date  Signature 
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Have you known many people who have or have had cancer? 
 
Can you tell me a little about them? 
 
Could you tell me what sort of cancer that is/was? 
 
Were you surprised that they got cancer? 
 
Do the people you know with cancer have anything in common? 
 
What do you think are the main causes of cancer? 
 
Could you tell me how much of at risk the average person is of cancer? 
 
What about people who do all the right things and get cancer – can you 
explain that? 
 
What about people who adopt unhealthy behaviours, like smoking but don’t 
get cancer, can you explain that? 
 
What about childhood cancer – can you explain that? 
 
What about famous people? 
 




Appendix 8: Coding Frame 
Coding frame: version 1  
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Coding Frame _ Final Version 
Explanations  
 














































   - moral 
judgements  













Hierarchy of risk Prevalence 
 







 - Family of 
conditions 
  
Triggers   Metaphors   





     




Appendix 9  Nvivo Node Report 
NVivo revision 2.0.163 Licensee: Sara Macdonald 
 
Project: PhD User: Administrator Date: 26/11/2010 - 14:28:43  
NODE LISTING 
 
 Nodes in Set: All Tree Nodes 
 Created: 27/05/2008 - 13:31:03 
 Modified: 27/05/2008 - 13:31:03 
 Number of Nodes: 132 
 1 (1) /explanations 
 2 (1 1) /explanations/smoking 
 3 (1 1 1) /explanations/smoking/passive smoking 
 4 (1 2) /explanations/other behavioural 
 5 (1 2 1) /explanations/other behavioural/alcohol 
 6 (1 2 2) /explanations/other behavioural/sun 
 7 (1 2 3) /explanations/other behavioural/stress 
 8 (1 2 7) /explanations/other behavioural/obesity~diet 
 9 (1 2 9) /explanations/other behavioural/personality 
 10 (1 3) /explanations/environmental 
 11 (1 3 2) /explanations/environmental/work hazards 
 12 (1 3 4) /explanations/environmental/pollution 
 13 (1 3 8) /explanations/environmental/food additives 
 14 (1 3 16) /explanations/environmental/mobile phones 
 15 (1 3 18) /explanations/environmental/electricity pylons 
 16 (1 4) /explanations/biological 
 17 (1 4 3) /explanations/biological/genetics 
 18 (1 4 3 4) /explanations/biological/genetics/ticking time bomb 
 19 (1 4 6) /explanations/biological/hormones 
 20 (1 5) /explanations/familial 
 21 (1 6) /explanations/secondary event 
 22 (1 7) /explanations/moral position 
 23 (1 8) /explanations/psychology 
 24 (1 9) /explanations/need for explantion 
 25 (1 10) /explanations/lifestyle 
 26 (1 11) /explanations/link b~w cause & site 
 27 (1 12) /explanations/all cause 
 28 (1 13) /explanations/we all have it 
 29 (1 13 1) /explanations/we all have it/trigger 
 30 (1 13 16) /explanations/we all have it/triggered 
 31 (1 17) /explanations/luck~random 
 32 (1 19) /explanations/explanatory model 
 33 (1 30) /explanations/age 
 34 (2) /meaning & understanding 
 35 (2 1) /meaning & understanding/unpredictable 
 36 (2 1 2) /meaning & understanding/unpredictable/you never know ~ 
 37 (2 1 6) /meaning & understanding/unpredictable/asymptomatic 
 38 (2 2) /meaning & understanding/positive 
 39 (2 2 4) /meaning & understanding/positive/benefit of catching it early 
 40 (2 2 5) /meaning & understanding/positive/curable 
 41 (2 2 15) /meaning & understanding/positive/survival 
 42 (2 3) /meaning & understanding/comparison with TB 
 43 (2 4) /meaning & understanding/screening 
 44 (2 6) /meaning & understanding/tragedy 
 45 (2 13) /meaning & understanding/its common 
 46 (2 14) /meaning & understanding/relative danger of site 
 47 (2 16) /meaning & understanding/The Big C 
 48 (2 16 1) /meaning & understanding/The Big C/spread 
 49 (2 16 2) /meaning & understanding/The Big C/aggressive 
 50 (2 16 3) /meaning & understanding/The Big C/its too late 
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 51 (2 16 6) /meaning & understanding/The Big C/cancer = death 
 52 (2 16 7) /meaning & understanding/The Big C/fear 
 53 (2 16 8) /meaning & understanding/The Big C/pain 
 54 (2 16 9) /meaning & understanding/The Big C/horrible death 
 55 (2 16 10) /meaning & understanding/The Big C/wasting away 
 56 (2 17) /meaning & understanding/what is cancer like~ 
 57 (2 17 1) /meaning & understanding/what is cancer like~/images 
 58 (2 17 20) /meaning & understanding/what is cancer like~/analogies 
 59 (2 17 20 1) /meaning & understanding/what is cancer like~/analogies/combative 
language 
 60 (2 34) /meaning & understanding/clusters 
 61 (2 35) /meaning & understanding/childhood cancer 
 62 (2 36) /meaning & understanding/comparison with CHD 
 63 (5) /attitude to NHS 
 64 (7) /knowledge 
 65 (7 1) /knowledge/weaving lay~expert descriptions 
 66 (7 2) /knowledge/sources of information 
 67 (7 13) /knowledge/not expert 
 68 (7 37) /knowledge/media 
 69 (9) /Risk 
 70 (9 1) /Risk/personal risk 
 71 (9 2) /Risk/experienced already 
 72 (9 3) /Risk/can't eliminate risk 
 73 (9 4) /Risk/candidacy 
 74 (9 5) /Risk/annomolous case 
 75 (9 6) /Risk/unwarranted survivor 
 76 (9 7) /Risk/population view 
 77 (9 23) /Risk/it won't happen to me 
 78 (10) /behaviours 
 79 (10 1) /behaviours/'bad' 
 80 (10 1 6) /behaviours/'bad'/ignores advice 
 81 (10 2) /behaviours/'good behaviours' 
 82 (10 3) /behaviours/personal accounts 
 83 (10 4) /behaviours/others 
 84 (10 5) /behaviours/moderation 
 85 (10 6) /behaviours/hypochondriacs 
 86 (10 27) /behaviours/upbringing 
 87 (11) /experience of cancer 
 88 (11 1) /experience of cancer/delay 
 89 (11 2) /experience of cancer/impact of cancer 
 90 (11 3) /experience of cancer/individual cases 
 91 (11 3 1) /experience of cancer/individual cases/siblings 
 92 (11 3 2) /experience of cancer/individual cases/extended family 
 93 (11 3 3) /experience of cancer/individual cases/spouse~partner 
 94 (11 3 4) /experience of cancer/individual cases/friends 
 95 (11 3 5) /experience of cancer/individual cases/acquaintances 
 96 (11 3 6) /experience of cancer/individual cases/parents~in-laws 
 97 (11 3 7) /experience of cancer/individual cases/proximity 
 98 (11 3 8) /experience of cancer/individual cases/narrative 
 99 (11 3 9) /experience of cancer/individual cases/age of sufferer 
 100 (11 3 28) /experience of cancer/individual cases/celebrity 2 
 101 (11 4) /experience of cancer/recurrence 
 102 (11 5) /experience of cancer/dealing with disease 
 103 (11 6) /experience of cancer/perception shift 
 104 (11 6 1) /experience of cancer/perception shift/time 
 105 (11 6 2) /experience of cancer/perception shift/experience 
 106 (11 8) /experience of cancer/professionals 
 107 (11 9) /experience of cancer/symptoms 
 108 (11 9 4) /experience of cancer/symptoms/fear the worst 
 109 (11 10) /experience of cancer/speed 
 110 (11 28) /experience of cancer/cancer sites 
 111 (11 31) /experience of cancer/shock 
 112 (11 38) /experience of cancer/was it cancer~ 
 113 (12) /aesthetics of 'health' 
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 114 (14) /positive stories 
 115 (15) /science 
 116 (15 1) /science/research 
 117 (15 2) /science/does science know~ 
 118 (15 17) /science/contradictory evidence 
 119 (15 20) /science/medical advances 
 120 (16) /health education 
 121 (18) /affects everyone 
 122 (25) /deprivation~affluence 
 123 (25 1) /deprivation~affluence/bearsden 
 124 (25 26) /deprivation~affluence/poor get everything 
 125 (26) /healthy living 
 126 (26 1) /healthy living/happiness~contentment 
 127 (26 22) /healthy living/positive attitude 
 128 (26 24) /healthy living/do the right things 
 129 (26 33) /healthy living/attitude to life 
 130 (29) /parent's health 
 131 (32) /fatalism 
 132 (39) /community 
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Appendix 10 Proximity Vignettes 
Affluent Participants 
The first interviewee was Lisa, (45) year old professional. Lisa’s husband had 
been diagnosed with colorectal cancer two years previously. He had recovered 
well despite a long diagnostic delay. He had experienced a recurrence but that 
too was successfully managed. Just months before her husband’s illness, her 
mother-in-law had been diagnosed with and, died very quickly of lung cancer. 
She was a non-smoker. It was this event that prompted her rethink of what she 
thought she knew about cancer, and this need was only emphasised following 
her husband’s diagnosis. Her only previous experience of cancer had been 
amongst elderly relatives or her wider social network, and neither her mother-
in-law nor husband fitted her preconceived cancer profile. Lisa was extremely 
thoughtful during the interview but she remained angry at the lengthy diagnostic 
delay. This was the first time she had discussed her story outside of her family 
and friends and admitted that she enjoyed the process.  
Engaging with Murray (83) was quite different. He began by stating that he had 
no close experience of cancer. He was adamant that tobacco was the main and 
possibly only carcinogen worth discussing. He was wedded to scientific 
explanations and was reluctant to engage in speculation on any level. If he 
didn’t know the ‘facts’ he was not prepared to comment. Later he went on to 
admit that both his parents had smoked and that upon his mother’s post-mortem 
at the age of 92, a lung cancer “that would never of killed her” was discovered.  
Kathleen (68) decided to take part in the study because she had an interest in 
health things. She had experience of a number of family members, mostly aunts 
and uncles who had died of cancer when she was in her 20s and 30s. Her father, 
she believed had died of ‘some form of cancer’ but that, she admitted, had 
never been confirmed. Her closest friend was, on the day of the interview, 
receiving surgery for colorectal cancer. Kathleen was extremely calm and 
described how she had sought out information, primarily from the internet, on 
her friend’s behalf. She was very well-informed, though she was not pessimistic.  
Andrew (57) knew little about cancer. He had no ‘close’ experience of cancer, 
though he was aware that his sister-in-law had cancer. The site had to be 
confirmed from a discussion with his wife, who he looked to often for 
information. His wife did not participate in the interview. He had no awareness 
of risk factors beyond smoking and he admitted that only recently had he 
become aware of the many different cancer sites. This was precipitated by the 
diagnosis of oral cancer in a close friend and he had previously not known it 
possible to get oral cancer.  
Jessie’s (63) motivation for participating in the interview was, like Murray’s, a 
sense of duty. She is interested in cancer and as a retired nurse who volunteers 
in a hospice had much to say about cancer generally. Her mother had died of 
gastric cancer in her 80s and she had been her main carer. The fear and stigma 
surrounding cancer was evident throughout Jessie’s interview. She had never 
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disclosed her mother’s diagnosis to her and had removed mirrors from her house 
in order that her mother did not witness her demise.  
Both Elsie’s (62) mother and husband had cancer, and though her mother died, 
her husband had recently received the ‘all-clear’. She attributed his head and 
neck cancer to his work as an illustrator and had arrived at this conclusion 
because she had seen a documentary about the carcinogenic properties of paint. 
She was hesitant about the role of her husband’s smoking in his cancer. Often 
she said that she didn’t like to think about cancer and that she had simply 
decided ‘that’s not for me’. On hearing of her husband’s diagnosis she said she 
decided that they would ‘act like he had flu’ but simultaneously she began 
observing his everyday household chores in order that she could undertake such 
tasks ‘if  need’s be’. 
Jim (64) and Phyllis (58), a married couple, were interviewed together. Jim had 
little experience of cancer but Phyllis’ mother had survived cancer three twice. 
A close friend had recently died of colorectal cancer and this was regarded as an 
anomalous death. She was asymptomatic and had died very quickly They had 
settled on passive smoking as the root of her cancer because of her work in a 
bar. They also attributed Phyllis’s mother’s cancer to smoking but knew of many 
people who had smoked and remained healthy into older age. Jim in particular 
was moralistic about disease. His sister, who was 18, had died when he was a 
teenager and he questioned why drug addicts manage to remain disease free.  
Colin (61) had a limited experience of cancer. His first experience was that of 
his grandfather, who died when he was 14 and this had remained with him. His 
brother recently died suddenly of pancreatic cancer. The cancer was diagnosed 
following an emergency admission to hospital As they were not in touch he found 
out afterwards and had no knowledge of his brother’s illness experience. He was 
sure that his brother would have ignored symptoms and wondered what would 
have happened had he gone to his GP early. Colin had a close friend who had 
been diagnosed with leukaemia more than 20 years before and had defied the 
odds.  
Janet (46) was a nurse and had previously worked in neurology. She had 
experience of nursing patients with primary brain tumours and attributed these 
to smoking. Her grandmother had died of breast cancer, as had a close school 
friend. She didn’t question why either of these events had happened, she simply 
assumed that breast cancer was common. The cancer event that had most 
impact on her was that of her aunt, who had died of oral cancer. Her aunt was 
healthy; the diagnosis ‘came out of the blue’ and she died very quickly. Janet 
described this as especially tragic because her uncle committed suicide soon 
after her aunt’s death.  
Grace’s (62) husband had died of colorectal cancer seven years before the 
interview. He was first diagnosed 10 years before that, though Grace was clear 
that he had ignored his symptoms for many months. She had been his main carer 
and because he died many years post-diagnosis, she described the illness as long 
and drawn out. She assumed that her husband’s cancer was caused by smoking. 
Her brother died of asbestosis.  
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Angus (56) was the only participant to use the word candidate in relation to 
cancer. He described his older brother, who had died of pancreatic, cancer as an 
‘ideal candidate’ because of his unhealthy lifestyle. His brother had died very 
quickly – three days after first presenting to his GP. Angus was one of four 
brothers and weeks before the interview another brother had been diagnosed 
with mantle-cell carcinoma. Despite a poor prognosis, Angus was sure that they 
would be able to ‘beat’ his brother’s disease. Angus interpreted risk statistics 
quite literally and so believed that from his family group of four brothers, two 
had cancer, so he was likely to avoid it.  
Emily (37) was an allied health professional. Both her parents-in-law had cancer. 
Her mother-in-law died in her early 50’s, but her father-in-law was now cancer 
free in spite of an initially poor prognosis. Both had smoked so ‘they knew the 
risks’. Although she was keen to down-play the genetic links in cancer, it was 
clear that she was concerned for her husband and children. Her husband had 
originally agreed to take part but eventually declined. He found it a difficult 
area to talk about. Emily had changed her view of cancer because her uncle (her 
maternal aunt’s husband) had died of throat cancer and met none of the risk 
criteria.  
Clare (42), in the four years before the interview had lost her mother, father 
and best friend to cancer. Her grandmother had also died of uterine cancer. 
With the exception of her father, who had worked with chemicals, she could not 
explain any of these events. She was extremely candid about her mother’s 
psychological health which she had settled on as the only possible risk factor. 
Her experience had led her to conclude that cancer was simply random and little 
could be done to avoid it.  
Jenny (38) was also an allied health professional. She chose to meet in her place 
of work and refused permission to record the interview. Although she said she 
had known people with cancer, she would not disclose the level of relationship. 
Any insight she offered was from a purely professional perspective.  
Both Barbara’s (64) parents had died of cancer but because they were elderly 
she had somehow discounted it as cancer. It was not her parent’s cancers that 
she offered most narrative about. Rather she fixed on the case of a work 
colleague who had died of breast cancer in her 30s. It was this experience that 
had formed Barbara’s view of cancer and had been completely unexpected and 
very much an anomalous case. Barbra’s main reason for judging this as 
anomalous was that her colleague was ‘meticulous’, ‘precise’ and she didn’t 
think such people got cancer.  
Eileen and Barry, also a married couple opted to be interviewed separately. 
Eileen had a number of cases to draw on – her brother, her sister-in-law, others 
in her social network. All of these people, as far as she was aware had led 
‘healthy, good lives’, with the exception of her brother. He had, what she 
described as, a chequered past, which could explain his cancer. She was not 
uncomfortable talking about this and ended the interview fairly quickly. Barry 
(74) confirmed the cases that Eileen had introduced but was less clear that his 
brother-in-law was responsible for his cancer because of his behaviour. Barry 
also knew of a number of men within his social circle that had prostate cancer. 
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He was sure that age was a risk factor and thought that everyone old ‘had some 
kind of cancer’. His knowledge of other risk factors was reasonably poor though 
he supposed that diet and exercise were important.  
Deprived participants 
Both Betty’s (61) mother and mother-in-law had cancer and she had been their 
main carer. Her mother had gastric cancer and had experienced a long pre-
diagnostic delay and then a fairly quick death. It was a difficult time and very 
painful for Betty. She blamed her mother’s smoking for her cancer, and she 
smoked up until she died aged 70. Her mother-in-law was 83 when she died and 
she had also died very quickly following her diagnosis. Betty said that her 
mother-in-law was terrified of cancer and felt it better not to disclose her 
diagnosis. This experience had not been as traumatic as her mother’s. Betty was 
also aware of many other cancer stories from her family – including her brother 
who had been diagnosed with throat cancer but was a non-smoker – and her 
wider social network.  
Charles’ wife (74) was undergoing treatment for endometrial cancer at the time 
of the interview. Her prognosis was good and was at the mid-point of her 
chemotherapy treatment. He also had many friends who had had cancer and 
could not arrive at an explanation, apart from smoking. His wife’s diagnosis was 
so recent that he hadn’t considered why she might have had cancer. She was a 
non-smoker.  
Gary (37) and Caroline (37), a married couple chose to be interviewed together. 
Caroline then offered little. Initially they thought they knew few people with 
cancer though Gary’s father had survived prostate cancer 12 years before. Gary 
talked about his father as an unwarranted survivor. As the interview progressed 
they remembered many more neighbours, friends, and school friends who had all 
died of cancer. Gary talked about his cousin who had died of breast cancer. She 
had had a difficult home life and had ‘given up’ following the diagnosis. He 
believed that if she hadn’t had such an attitude she may have survived.  
Karen (25) was the youngest participant and had very little experience of 
cancer. Her uncle had died of gastric cancer when she was a child but knew few 
of the details because of her age. He was in his 30s. She also had a school-friend 
who had died of cancer – though she was not clear of the site and said that she 
had been attending the doctor because she had a sore leg. Her friend died aged 
19.  
Patricia (62) had many examples of cancer from family and fiends on which to 
draw. Both her parents had died of cancer and both were in their 70s. Although 
both her parents smoked and had lung cancer she had searched for other 
explanations. Her father was violent and her mother the victim of domestic 
abuse, and she thought this had contributed to her mother’s cancer. She 
believed that ultimately her mother’s cancer had been triggered by a mugging, 
which had shaken her and a few weeks later she received a diagnosis of cancer. 
Patricia was privy to information from an elaborate social circle and despite the 
presence of risk factors in sufferers’ behaviour Patricia saw all these cancer 
deaths as anomalous.  
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Pauline’s (57) mother was present during the interview but remained silent 
almost throughout. Near the end of the interview she simply said ’my granny 
Jessie said, if you fear it you’ll get it’. Pauline began the interview by saying 
that she felt lucky that cancer was not in her family but then went on to offer 
narratives of a paternal aunt and then uncle who had both died of cancer. 
Pauline’s close friend was from a cancer family, where parents and many siblings 
had cancer. Her friend was fearful that she would be unable to escape cancer, 
and she had recently been diagnosed with melanoma, thus confirming Pauline’s 
belief that cancer is apparent in families.  
Rose’s (61) first experience of cancer was that of a maternal aunt that had died 
of breast cancer, leaving a young family. Her memory was of her mother caring 
for her aunt and nursing her at home. Beyond her aunt, she could remember a 
neighbour of her mother’s who also had breast cancer and also left a young 
family. Rose also believed that illnesses ‘ran’ in families and in her family they 
had problems with cholesterol.  
Josephine (61) had a number of close experiences of cancer. Both her parents-
in-law had died of colorectal cancer and she was surprised that her husband had 
not because of the familial link. Her friend’s husband had recently died ‘quickly’ 
of oesophageal cancer and another friend who they assumed had come through 
colorectal cancer had just discovered that she had a recurrence. Josephine was 
continually struck by the unpredictable nature of cancer and was aware of many 
narratives that provided evidence of this.  
Lorna (57) had many cases of cancer ‘in her family’ and was one of the few 
participants who knew a child that had died of leukaemia. All these different 
cancers, among these different people had led Lorna to conclude that cancer is 
in all of us and requires a trigger.  
Rona (31), Peter (67) and Julia (65) were all members of one family and chose to 
be interviewed individually. It was interesting hearing about the same cancer 
stories but from three different perspectives. Julia’s sister had died recently of 
oesophageal cancer and this had been traumatic for the family but Julia, in 
particular. At the time of diagnosis, alcohol was identified as a risk factor but 
Julia was adamant that her sister was a moderate drinker. Julia’s father had also 
died of a brain tumour that had gone undiagnosed for some time. Julia had 
clearly been searching for causal explanations and had eventually arrived at the 
idea of dormant genes. Both Julia and Peter used the same gardening metaphor 
to describe cancer. Peter’s mother was thought to have died of cancer but that 
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